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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis investigates language development and social 
functioning. It concentrates on the development of one aspect of 
language, namely conversational competence in children between the ages 
of three and half and seven. A main assumption is that language is an 
aspect of social life and must be understood accordingly. In the 
empirical research, nineteen children were observed interacting with -
their mothers. The study had two aims. The first was to find out the 
extent to which children at different developmental ages were able to 
successfully communicate with their mothers. Here, two aspects of 
language use were investigated: the relevance of the child's comments to 
ongoing conversation and the orientation of the child's speech to the 
listener's perspective. The results indicate that children's language 
use is not as egocentric as the Piagetian perspective indicates. The 
second aim was to link the children's use of language with their social 
functioning. For that purpose, the same children were tested on several 
socio-cognitive tasks. The analysis showed that children's scores on the 
socio-cognitive tasks were related to several parameters of their 
language functioning. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the present thesis is to investigate language development 
and social functioning. The study adopts a pragmatic approach to the 
study of language. It is assumed that to give a full account of 
language, it is necessary to consider how language is used. Thus, the 
focus is on how language functions as part of a system of symbols which 
can be used in a variety of ways to make assertions about the world, to 
plot strategies for social exchange and to achieve particular purposes. 
Although much research has been done on the way children acquire 
grammar and syntax, little is known about the development of the child's 
ability to use language in an everyday context. The use of language 
requires more than an adequate knowledge of grammatical and semantic 
rules. The child must also acquire knowledge of how the adult community 
uses language and how language structures their social lives. He must be 
able to discern the relevant context of discourse, what is assumed and 
what must be made clear. Similarly, he must know how to initiate and 
terminate a conversational exchange and know how and when to say what he 
wants so that his intentions will be understood. Furthermore, successful 
linguistic communication requires that the child be sensitive to the 
rules of conversation (e.g. turn-taking rules) and shape his speech 
accordingly. 
Some of the complexities of language use are illustrated by the 
production and understanding of such speech as sarcasm, hints or 
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metaphors. If one observes adults in their everyday environment, one 
will note how adults often conceal their original intentions and 
communicate in indirect and non-literal ways. Consider the indirection 
often dictated by the rules of politeness. When you stop someone on the 
road, you usually say "Do you have the time?" as you are looking at his 
watch, since you know that to just ask for the time is considered 
impolite. Assuming that the other person obeys the same rule of 
politeness you are fairly sure that he will tell you the time, rather 
than just replying that he has the time and walking away. Similarly, "Oh 
great!" uttered upon dropping one's china on the floor, does not 
necessarily signify actual happiness, but rather may convey annoyance. 
Indeed, one supposes that a listener will interpret the utterance as 
being sarcastic. In this thesis, an attempt will be made to explore how 
and when children are able to go beyond the information given by language 
in order to make sense of its indirect and non-literal uses. 
A central orienting assumption of the present thesis is that language 
is an aspect of social life and must be understood accordingly. Language 
is embedded in dialogue, group interaction and a larger social context. 
To effectively use language, these social factors must be understood. 
Given this assumption, we view language acquisition and language 
development as one aspect of the growth of effective social functioning. 
The child's understanding of language develops gradually. To begin, the 
child is tied up in the "here and now" of his personal environment. The 
sentences he uses involve simple objects and events of his everyday 
environment. Eventually, the child must enter into a more public world. 
He must possess the concepts that the adult community shares and 
recognize other people's points of view. Communication through language 
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helps the child to see others as people who have their own wants and 
intentions yet share a common form of life and mode of linguistic 
expression. With time, the understanding of personal intentions, 
conversational conventions and social knowledge expands and new 
linguistic and social concepts are formed to orient communication in 
various contexts and social situations. 
In this first chapter, a theoretical discussion of pragmatics is 
presented. The aim of this discussion is to justify the present 
concentration on the development of the child's linguistic behaviour 
rather than on the child's grammatical or semantic development. First, 
the various theories put forward to account for the place of language in 
our lives will be presented. Included are Lockian, behaviourist and 
Wittgensteinian accounts of language. Second, the argument will be made 
that language is best seen as a rule governed system embedded in social 
interactions. Given the social basis of language, the child's learning 
of the meaning of words depends on his learning how words are used by the 
adult community as part of purposive social activity. Third, two main 
types of pragmatics, empirical and universal, will be examined. Here, 
the claim is made that it is justifiable to adopt a framework which 
assumes universal principles of linguistic communication. To understand 
the process whereby children acquire language, we need to examine those 
universal principles and see how these can be translated in terms of the 
child's developing abilities. 
(ii) Theorizing about language  
How does language Function? What is its place in the child's 
thinking and development? To answer these questions, two further 
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questions must be addressed: What is the nature of the "mind" and for 
what is language needed? Since the function of language and its 
development will depend on one's view of mental happenings in general, 
both questions are interrelated. To address them, we will discuss two 
popular theories of language. In so doing, we hope to illustrate the 
advantages of a pragmatic theory of language as the only theory which 
does justice to the complexity of linguistic communication and its 
development. 
According to the Lockian tradition, mental happenings occur in 
isolated fields known as "minds". Given that there is no direct 
knowledge of other minds, the function of language is to communicate 
these invisible ideas and to make them known to others. This tradition 
has given rise to several mentalistic approaches to account for meaning. 
All such attempts have been characterized by a radical separation between 
the words in which thoughts are expressed and the thoughts themselves. 
There is said to be a world of mental experience to which thought belongs 
which is personal and individual. It is not shared. In the private 
world of mind, thinking is said to consist of a number of mental acts or 
processes which underlie intelligent use of speech. In simple terms, 
words stand for or refer to the inner processes of thought. The medium 
in which thought occurs is defined here in terms of images and ideas, 
both simple and complex. Meaning is thus "mental". What are the 
implications of the Lockian tradition for language acquisition and 
development? The child, it may be argued, learns the meaning and usage 
of each word through experience. By working on what it is given, the 
human mind is therefore capable of producing new ideas by comparison, 
composition and abstraction. 
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In the second popular tradition, the Chomskian tradition, meaning is 
again mental. However, mental ideas are innate. There are innate 
syntactic abilities that determine the conceptual categorization of 
reality for the child. Although meaning is mental, the human mind is not 
capable of picking up the whole range of language. For Chomsky (1965), 
the child is genetically predisposed to acquire the syntactic rules that 
underlie our sentences. Chomsky's theory of language is therefore a 
competence theory and his aim is to account for one of the most complex 
aspects of language, namely the acquisition of its syntactic aspects. 
Several important criticisms of the two traditions are worth 
mentioning. The first concerns the concept of "meaning" that they 
propose. For both traditions, meaning is a mental phenomenon. What the 
present thesis wishes to argue, however, is that meaning is not mental. 
Meanings do not exist independently of language use. They have no 
separate existence either mental or physical. Given that language is 
needed to translate into words our inner and private "ideas", we can, in 
the true Lockian tradition, postulate that "meaning" stands for "ideas". 
However, one cannot easily explain meaning in terms of the concept of 
"ideas", for the term "idea" is derivative or resultant from an activity. 
Thus, to say "I get the idea" simply means "I understand the meaning of 
that statement" (be it verbal or nonverbal). Such a statement, however, 
does not explain or point to a particular mental process. The same may 
be applied to "thought" or "conception" as used in an explanatory 
fashion. For example, S. Langer (1965) writes that in talking about 
things, we have conceptions of them, not the things themselves, and it is 
the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly mean. 
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While it would be difficult to deny that we have some kind of private 
mental experiences, there are several unacceptable claims made in 
mentalistic accounts of language. Firstly, as we have noted, in so far 
as a medium of thought can be identified, it can be said to occur largely 
in words or symbols of some kind. Yet the leap from this point to the 
claim that we think in some alternative medium to language before we make 
utterances is unwarranted. Indeed, it seems more reasonable to argue 
that when we do think before we speak, we do so in words. That is to 
say, that to have a specific thought is synonymous with having a set of 
symbols which possess a specific meaning. Thus, when we look for words 
in which to express what we want to say, it is not necessarily the case 
that we have the precise thought in ideas which we cannot adequately 
code. Rather, it is that we have not yet got the appropriate thought 
because we have not yet formulated it into words. We can only have a 
particular thought if it is formulated in relevant terms, for to have a 
specific thought is to entertain a set of symbols that have that specific 
meaning (Hirst, 1975). What every symbol does for us is to serve as the 
focus for a whole mass of understanding which does not have to be made 
explicit. Without this symbolic language, that understanding would have 
to be made explicit if it were to be used at all. In effect, this would 
make any abstract thinking impossible (Hamlyn, 1978). That is to say any 
thinking that presupposed a body of knowledge or understanding which is 
divorced from the circumstances in which it ordinarily gets application 
would be impossible. 
Secondly, the nature of mental processes can only be known or 
described in relation to their achievements as symbolically expressed; we 
can know nothing directly about the nature of the mind itself, as if this 
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was the label of a directly inspected object. As Hirst (1975) rightly 
writes, "...we cannot specify any medium in which the process of thought 
occurs 	 All intelligible thought involves the use of symbols, and most 
frequently the use of words." (p.71) Implicit in any mentalistic theory 
of meaning is a negative account of meaning. If, contrary to the 
assumption that words represent or stand for thought, one assumes that 
thoughts occur in words, then the answer to the question as to the 
meaning of words cannot be the thought for which they stand. 
A further question to be raised concerning a mentalistic theory is, 
"how would one account for the possibility of shared meaning through 
language?". If the meaning of a word is said to exist in private 
thought, and the word is merely its overt statement, how can one account 
for the existence of a common language which could at specific instances 
be guaranteed to produce the same thoughts in all listeners and speakers? 
Worse problems are encountered when we attempt to understand the 
process of language acquisition . Any account which shares the Lockian 
tradition and involves a supposition that concepts are acquired by 
abstraction presents problems. How, for example, would it be possible to 
form a concept by reflection on common features of experience, when the 
recognition of these common features is only possible after one has 
already established the criteria for recognition of a relevant instance 
of a given concept? If a child sees a tree and, on reflecting upon its 
common features, comments "this is a tree", then the child must have 
already established the concept of tree-ness in order to recognize the 
tree as such. That is to say, such an account cannot offer an adequate 
solution to the problem of how concepts arise in the first place. 
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At this point one can draw on the Chomskian tradition. Given that 
Chomsky (1965) assumes the existence of innate ideas, we can say that the 
child is genetically predisposed to acquire our language. Addressing the 
question of the acquisition of linguistic competence, Chomsky sometimes 
refers to a "language acquisition device". It is a device, no doubt part 
of our physiology, which is capable of utilizing the information received 
by a process of structuring, perhaps in the way that a programmed 
computer can utilize information fed into it. It is best understood as a 
device which describes the syntactic structure of language and the rules 
that underlie sentences. Thus, the child is conceived as testing 
particular grammars against the linguistic inputs and selecting the 
appropriate grammar which is the most compatible with the language 
heard. Influenced by this theoretical framework, studies by Braine 
(1963) and Brown and Fraser (1964) attempted to investigate language 
development by concentrating on two central problems: (1) describing the 
child's acquisition of grammatical structures and, (2) discovering the 
rules used by the child to generate utterances. A specific 
characteristic of the child's language - the one word period - was 
treated as representing "holophrases", which had the underlying 
representation of a full sentence (McNeill, 1970). 
However, Chomsky's assumptions of language were soon called into 
question. Specifically, the main assumption, that transformational 
grammar functions as a model of speech production, has proved to be 
fruitless Eor studying early language. Bloom (1970) attacked the 
accounts of early speech development in terms of pivot grammars as 
failing to acknowledge meaningful distinctions which the child can 
appreciate cognitively but cannot differentiate linguistically. 
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Moreover. Schlesinger (1971) argued that the underlying structure in 
children's speech is mainly semantic rather than syntactic in nature and 
reflects the child's ability at each developmental point to perceive the 
world. Thus according to this view, grammar is a learned and 
semantically based system of general conceptual categories of the world 
(agents, objects, actions, and so on). 
Performance Theories of Language  
The above criticisms lead one to consider performance theories of 
language acquisition and development. Underlying such theories is the 
assertion that "meaning" is not a kind of "thing" nor does it (in either 
mental or physical form) exist per se. The concept of meaning can be 
understood only by concentrating on the social context, that is, only by 
an examination of the way the particular word is used by people. 
Differences in the meaning of words can therefore make sense only in 
terms of differences in their uses. Likewise, similarities of meanings 
can make sense only in terms of their uses. 
Before embarking on a brief analysis of the philosophical position 
behind the slogan "meaning is use", an alternative theory of language, 
"performance theory", will be discussed briefly. Although its Focus on 
behavior makes a discussion of performance theory an appropriate point of 
departure, it is important to remember that it does not share the 
philosophical tradition of the "use theory". Basically, a behaviourist 
theory of language holds that for an expression to have meaning, its 
utterance must elicit certain behavioural responses in the listener 
and/or be produced in relation to certain stimuli. Therefore, for two 
expressions to be synonymous, they must produce the same responses and/or 
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be produced in response to the same stimuli. The question of meaning, 
then, is a matter of examining the behaviour connected with the utterance 
of expressions. Thus, the meaning of an expression is the situation in 
which the speaker utters it and the responses which it calls forth in the 
observer. From this perspective, language acquisition is explained in 
terms of the conditioning of the response which an expression calls forth. 
The objections to the crude version of such a theory are somewhat 
obvious: Does the meaning of the word change each time we respond 
differently to it? How it is possible to find any justification for a 
theory which claims that a word minus its response is meaningless? 
However, there are some very sophisticated versions of the behavioural 
tradition which avoid ridiculous suppositions. For example, C. Morris 
(1946) postulates a theory according to which all meaningful symbols or 
signs (sentences may be included) serve the function of preparatory 
stimuli, that is to say, they set up a disposition in somebody to respond 
to future stimuli. The meaning of a sign is said to have two components: 
the denotatum  defined as "that which would complete the response 
sequences to which the interpreter is disposed", and the siqnificatum, or 
essential properties which are significant of the sign. A sign is 
synonymous with another if the two signs have the same significatum. 
"Thus for something to be food and serve as the goal we are disposed to 
achieve by the buzzer or by the word 'food' it must be edible. So 
edibility is part of the significatum of the buzzer or the word 'food'." 
(Morris, 1946). 
Although, this version of the theory avoids the obvious criticisms it 
is nevertheless equally problematic. The assumption, that each word 
which has a distinct and clear-cut meaning has also a distinctive 
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clear-cut goal directed response sequence towards which it disposes the 
listener, may be plausible in the case of words which stand for concrete 
objects (i.e. for names of objects). However, abstract nouns present 
problems - let alone words such as "if" and "only". Nonetheless, 
children at about the fifth year of age are in a position to fully 
understand hypothetical statements. Furthermore, there is no logical 
connection between the meaning of a sentence and the disposition which it 
is supposed to set up. Consider, for example, a case of a sentence 
uttered with the intention of frightening somebody who has an obscure 
phobia of X. By indicating the presence of X one may induce fear. Yet 
the utterance "Oh, look there is an X" itself does not carry such a 
function in its commonly accepted meaning. A behaviourist account would 
surely need to distinguish meaning as connotation and meaning in terms of 
personal uses (e.g. "He means a lot to me"). 
A further problem arises from the failure to distinguish between 
preparatory stimuli which are signs, and those which are not. To be able 
to do so, one must establish a non-behaviourist criterion to identify the 
distinctive Features of the two. An account which describes meaning in 
terms of behaviour is problematic in so Ear as one cannot avoid raising 
the question as to whether it is possible to identify behaviour 
independently of one's prior knowledge of the meaning of words 
descriptively associated with it. If the term behaviour denotes 
movements and gestures involving intentionality and effect in a social 
context, then the crucial point would seem to be that it is the 
linguistic interpretation of a particular action, or the categorization 
of labelling it, which gives it a particular meaning. One may, for 
example, perform a bodily gesture which carries with it a variety of 
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interpretations of intention which are culturally or historically 
relative. In this case, it is the implicit message accompanying a 
particular gesture which renders the actual movement meaningful. Thus, 
it would seem that to determine what behaviour is, one would have to 
understand the given language of a given culture wherein a description of 
a particular action within such a culture will be attributed its 
meaning. As Cooper (1978) writes in concluding his example of the 
anthropologist studying a strange tribe, "No doubt studying their 
behaviour can be used to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses about how they 
mean their words; but it is difficult to see that we can explain the 
meaning of their words in terms of their behaviour." (p.61) 
Such criticisms as are made here apply equally when one considers 
synonymy. How, for example, could one explain the synonymy of words 
lacking associated distinctive types of goal directed behaviour, such as 
"black" and "noir"? Nor can one deem two pieces of behaviour to be the 
same unless one knows that their respective descriptions mean the same. 
Unless one has some criteria Eor synonymy it is impossible to say which 
differences in behaviour are necessary to meaning. Because one knows 
that two words are synonymous on some independent ground (i.e. they are 
used to denote the same object), some difference in responses to the two 
expressions in question may be counted as irrelevant. One is presented 
with a circular argument: "If this is so, it follows once more that any 
appeal to responses in explication of synonymy will be circular since we 
do not know which responses to look for unless we already know something 
about what words mean" (Cooper, p.33). 
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The pragmatic approach to language  
Having acknowledged that both mentalistic and behaviourist accounts 
do not offer adequate explanations of "meaning" and its development, we 
turn to the perspective adopted in the present thesis. Two points have 
become central in our discussion so far. First, meaning is not an 
entity, but can only be understood in terms of the social context and the 
use to which people put their words. Second, in accounting for meaning 
one has to take into consideration the subjective elements of the user. 
There must exist essential connections between meaning and the use of 
language . As has been pointed out before, if these connections do not 
exist, it is a curious contingent fact that the rules of language are 
"public rules" accessible to all speakers. To make these connections 
explicit one has ultimately to move towards the view that meaning can be 
understood only in terms of the speaker's beliefs and intentions as these 
direct acts of communication in specific contexts of social interaction 
involving discourse. 
As an ordinary language philosopher, Wittgenstein (1958) began to 
chart the features of everyday discourse in terms of patterns known as 
"language games". He showed how slight and subtle differences in the use 
of language would alter its meaning; hence the plea "Don't ask for the 
meaning, ask for the use". He maintained that words enter the very 
structure of our experience and what is known of reality is a function of 
the system of representation which humans bring to bear on it. In other 
words, the categories we impose on the world are linguistic. Learning 
the names of objects is preliminary to the use of language and not an 
example of it. In Philosophical Investigations (1958), he claims: 
"Naming is not so far a move in the language game any more than putting a 
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piece in its place on the board is a move in chess."(p.6). Wittgenstein 
maintained that learning to attach labels to certain objects cannot be 
called "understanding" a language but, on the contrary, is simply a 
process of copying and repetition. One could argue that learning to 
attach labels to certain objects cannot be seen as understanding, 
particularly in the case of coming to know or understand abstract 
conceptions. Even for observable concepts, the idea that we learn the 
objects by learning to attach labels to them, is not satisfactory. In 
many cases, correct identification of an object by the appropriate name 
relies on further understanding the conceptual assumptions over and above 
perceptual evidence. Mercury, for example, looks like a liquid. One can 
attach the label "metal" to it only having understood the attribute such 
a label gives to it. 
So, as Hamlyn (1978) has argued, such a theory becomes the denial of 
various forms of mentalistic and referential accounts. Indeed, it is 
this very denial that lends it much of its initial appeal. Distinctive 
in its rejection of the conception of meaning as an abstract entity and 
in its assertion that life situations or human interactional contexts are 
fundamental to the notion of meaning, it also offers a solution to the 
problematic task of explaining the meaning of words such as "if" (Cooper, 
1973). The pedagogical implications of such a view of meaning would also 
seem to contribute to its feasibility. We teach children new words, by 
encouraging them to learn their applications in appropriate situations 
rather than by encouraging them to conjure up mental images or be taught 
through observing the responses of others. 
A useful distinction to be made at this point would perhaps be that 
between language and speech. For example, if one takes a simple phrase, 
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like "Good morning", as seen in the context of the written word, its 
meaning has limited possibilities. It may tell us something about the 
time of day and it functions as a greeting or acknowledgment. If one 
considers Wittgenstein's example of the thief saying "Good morning", then 
one is likely to assume that in such a situation the effect which the 
"good morning" has upon the hearer is different. It may induce fear or 
surprise because it is the context in which it occurs which contributes 
to its meaning. It can be argued, therefore, that if one wishes to avoid 
any implicit behaviourist claims, one is wise to make a distinction 
between the effect of an utterance and its meaning. An account of 
meaning in terms of its use needs further elaboration if it is to be 
accepted. As exemplified above, there are types of contexts in which 
meaning cannot be extrapolated in terms of use alone. Some social 
outcomes are relevant to meaning as is also the intentionality of the 
user in certain contexts. Hence, if one considers meaning in terms of 
use, it is speech rather than simply language with which one will be 
concerned. 
The study of language and the study of speech acts are not two 
independent studies. In principle, they are one and the same since every 
meaningful sentence in virtue of its meaning can be used to perform a 
particular speech act and since every possible speech act can in 
principle be given an exact formulation in a sentence or sentences 
(assuming an appropriate context of utterance). (Searle, 1975). 
Speech-Acts are thus characterized by the speaker's specific intention 
(illocutionary act) to produce a desired effect on the audience 
(perlocutionary act). At the same time, they are characterized by an 
intention to produce that response by means of the audience's recognition 
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of the intention to produce that response. Using language properly, a 
speaker assumes that this recognition will be achieved because of the 
association between the rules of using the expression he utters and the 
production of that effect. A clear relationship, therefore, exists 
between the intentionality and the conventionality element in using and 
comprehending language. In learning to use language, the child must not 
only have a clear intention to produce a desired effect on the hearer but 
must understand that a certain word stands for a concept. In other 
words, he must acquire that conventional form of behaviour which is 
involved in giving a concept a name and thereafter treating it as the• 
concept's name. 
In sum, the key assumption adopted here is that to understand 
language, one has Eirst to understand what people do with the use of 
language and how this system functions in social interactions. Our 
utterances have a form, but they also perform several functions (i.e. the 
function of requesting, or informing, etc.). More importantly, a 
particular form can perform several functions. The questions we are 
concerned with are: What sort of behaviour is linguistic behaviour? 
What are the rules or principles that underlie successful linguistic 
communication? A number of different answers have been put forward. 
Some theorists have concentrated on analyzing the kind of speech acts we 
perform with language (see Searle, 1976; Dore, 1971, etc.). Others have 
directly examined the context of linguistic behaviour - namely by 
examining conversational behaviour (Grice, 1975; Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson, 1974). However, before embarking on a discussion of these we 
shall first address a more general issue. 
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Universal vs Empirical Pragmatics  
The attempt to understand linguistic communication and the rules 
behind it poses the main dilemma of whether there are general universal 
rules or principles underlying linguistic communication. This dilemma is 
closely linked with a more specific and practical question of the sort of 
correspondence between the form of an utterance and its context. Is this 
a one-to-one correspondence, or does the actual context affect the 
form-function relationship in a radical way so that the possibility of 
discovering universal principles of language usage is severely minimized? 
The question is worth pursuing, raising as it does important 
methodological considerations. If we argue that universal principles 
governing linguistic communication do exist, then we have (a) to analyze 
structured contexts and develop a theory of contexts and their relation 
to the forms of communicative exchange and (b) to develop a theory to 
account for those contexts which are themselves inherently meaningful or 
structured and thereby allow the individual to make certain types of 
rational inferences and to choose the means that most satisfy their 
desired goals. On the other hand, if we argue that social variability is 
socially conditioned, then (a) the speech community must form the 
starting point for linguistic competence of individuals, (b) we need to 
concentrate on the forms and types of verbal interaction in connection 
with the concrete situations of particular speech performances as 
elements of a closely linked interaction. 
The two alternative answers represent different kinds of 
philosophical views of the nature of knowledge and of man. The first is 
linked with the work of British analytical philosophers (e.g., Brown & 
Levinson, 1978; Shotter, 1980). These take the speech acts phenomenon as 
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a unit of human action and they attempt to arrive at a model where human 
linguistic reasoning can be described in terms of universal logical 
processes which are independent of the way in which propositions are 
expressed in particular languages and cultures. The second approach, on 
the other hand, is associated with the work of sociologists who 
concentrate directly on verbal strategies of speaker-listener 
coordination as revealed in the practices of conversational management. 
The latter approach will be examined first since some of its 
criticisms will help us explain the first one. Ethnomethodological work 
argues against the tendency to take for granted the claim that the 
ability to converse and use language successfully exists at all times, 
that interlocutors are cooperating and that interpretative language 
conventions are always shared by the members of the community. As 
Gumperz (1982) argues, "the experience of modern industrial society with 
its history of communication break-downs, of increasingly intricate 
constitutional and legal disputes and its record of educational failure, 
suggests that such assumptions may not fit the facts of modern urban 
life."(p.4). Instead, in order to communicate, conversationalists rely 
on indirect inferences which build on background assumptions about 
context, interactive goals and interpersonal relations. From these, they 
derive frames in terms of which they can interpret what is going on. A 
general theory of discourse strategies must, therefore, begin by 
specifying the linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge that needs to be 
shared if conversational involvement is to be maintained and then go on 
to deal with what it is about the nature of conversational inference that 
makes for cultural, subcultural and situational specificity of 
interpretation. In other words, the grammatical and lexical knowledge 
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are only two of several factors in the interpretation process. In 
addition to the physical setting, the participants' personal background 
knowledge and their attitudes towards each other, socio-cultural 
assumptions governing role and status relationships as well as social 
values associated with various message components play crucial roles. 
Adopting this perspective, most of the ethnomethodological work 
concentrates on the participants' ongoing process of interpretation in 
conversation and on what enables them to perceive and interpret 
particular constellations of cues in reacting to others and pursuing 
their communicative ends. Speakers with differing backgrounds are the 
rule rather than the exception and signalling language conventions vary 
from situation to situation. Hence, the approach makes no assumption 
about sharedness of rules or evaluative norms. Consequently, language 
acquisition and development is seen as a matter of the child's 
acquisition of particular social and conventional rules which enable him 
to use language and to converse in different social situations. The 
emphasis lies on discovering the importance of different social roles in 
acquiring language (e.g. mother-child and teacher-child conversations) 
and in analyzing changes that take place in language functioning across 
differing social contexts (e.g. home vs school context). The task of 
socio-linguistic analysis, then, is that of specifying the interrelations 
of social variables in events characteristic of particular social groups; 
the principle role is to show how social norms affect the use and 
distribution of communicative resources. The researcher records the 
everyday speech of speakers selected according to criteria of 
sociological sampling as representative of a particular group or 
community. He, then, attempts to describe the various values, beliefs 
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and attitudes present at that particular moment and then examines how 
everyday situations define the underlying assumptions with respect to 
which participants infer what is intended. 
Basically, the ethnomethodological account focuses on the impact of 
particular contexts on the actual form of language. We wish to argue 
that this direction is somehow sterile. It limits one to making claims 
about the rules governing a particular situation at a given moment. The 
child is faced with the almost impossible task of having to acquire the 
language usage of every individual situation in every particular moment 
in time. The logic of this position allows for no general claims of . 
understanding. As Brown and Levinson (1978) rightly argue, norms, being 
specific to particular social populations, have a severely limited 
explanatory role in comparative research. 
A far more important point, however, stems from the realization that 
conventions and norms have a rational origin. This rational origin sets 
the boundaries of the potentially infinite development of language 
conventions and its norms and social values. For example, Brown and 
Levinson (1978) have analyzed in great detail the phenomenon of 
"politeness". As they have argued, the phenomenon can be seen as falling 
under several universal principles which are used by participants to 
produce verbal interaction. In particular, the strategy of the speaker's 
willingness to cooperate and the strategy of "keeping on good terms" with 
the hearer in interpreting politeness phenomena derive Erom the universal 
mutual knowledge assumptions of interacting individuals: that they are 
rational and that they have a "face" (wants, desires, means). 
Discovering the principles of language usage may, therefore, be largely 
coincidental with discovering the principles out of which social 
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relationships, in their interactional aspects, are constructed: both are 
dimensions by which individuals manage to relate to others in particular 
ways. 
The doctrine of absolute cultural relativity in the field of human 
interaction and linguistic reasoning presents problems. Human linguistic 
reasoning can be described in terms of universal logical processes. What 
in fact Searle (1969, 197 , 1976), Grice (1935, 1978) 	 and Bach and 
Harnish (1979) have tried to delineate are the conversational principles 
and the various speech acts that exist and are necessary for the 
application of the concept of language in the first place. Their 
argument is essentially an epistemological one dealing with the nature of 
knowledge which is unchangeable for all times and cultures. In other 
words, it assumes a kind of knowledge that participants require in order 
to use linguistic means to converse. 
It is true that there are important differences in the way different 
cultures and epochs come to conceptualize and justify their experiences. 
One can say that these ways are connected with many other factors, such 
as needs, interests, and social conditions. However, can one infer that 
all knowledge is social and thus no universal claims can be made? There 
is in fact a very trivial sense in which one can claim that all concepts 
are social given that they embody rules for classifying experience and 
are publicly accessible. In that case, then, one can argue that there 
are no a priori limits to the number of ways in which we might organize 
our experience. Any conceptualization of experience, however, would need 
to respect fairly basic rules of intelligibility and these should be made 
rather explicit. We may give a sociological account of the reasons we 
make such discriminations as we do, but we cannot end the matter here. 
- 22 - 
There must be something about the world itself that makes possible 
certain discriminations rather than others. In other words, certain 
features of the world and of what human beings are, put certain 
constraints on our conceptualization. 
The search for universal rules is well exemplified in the work of 
Grice (1975). He attempted to analyse certain general features of 
linguistic communication necessary for identifying the existence of 
conversations. He claimed that for a "conversation" to take place, both 
participants must behave according to some maxims. Both must observe the 
"co-operative" maxim, must "make contributions which are relevant", and 
must have "an intention to communicate". These features must be seen as 
being closely related to the very nature of conversations. Thus, Grice 
is directing our attention back to these general patterns of human 
activity with which our collective intellectual conceptions come to be 
given their standard significance. 
There is another important sense in which ethnomethodological 
explanations of language functioning are unwarranted. It concerns the 
ethnomethodological emphasis on the social as opposed to the individual 
parameters of language. Meaningful language creativity on the speaker's 
part is simply out of the question. However, linguistic communication 
involves human agency. As Shotter (1980) points out, social 
psychological enquiries must be grounded in a full understanding of human 
agency in action processes: "Human action would seem to be unique not 
because, from an external observer's point of view, no other behaviour is 
quite like it, but it is only about human behaviour that we are able to 
make and sustain certain assumptions ....in observing people's motions we 
still ascribe their trajectories to them, we still think of them as 
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controlling their own movements in relation to their own thoughts and 
feelings. "(p.49). In other words, an adequate understanding of 
linguistic communication must take into account the "actor as operator", 
as the constructor of his line of action. Thus, an adequate description 
of face-to-face communication must take into account both the structure, 
that is, the social forms for that communication, and the individual 
operating within that structure. 
As soon as we introduce the concept of human agency into our model of 
linguistic communication, we need to raise specific questions related to 
the structure of human action. A fundamental issue concerns the way 'in 
which people come to construct their paths of action. Shotter (19 
p.56) regards the concept of "intentionality" as the key generative 
mechanism here - "intentionality is a fundamental and irreducible 
feature, a presupposition of all thought, all conceptual activity, and 
all action." Although a person's action can be just situationally 
reactive, nevertheless it is intentional all the time. This means that 
intentionality is both a person's characteristic and it is socially 
constructed. Human beings have the ability to adapt to specific social 
situations and to influence the outcomes of such situations. They are 
both controlled by and in control of their social milieu. Theorists 
adopting this orientation address questions such as: What are the 
universal principles that lie behind the construction of social 
behaviour? What are its functions as action and interpretation? How can 
we propose a general schema for deriving actions from goals? In relation 
to language acquisition and development, our aim should be to identify 
the universal parameters of language use and then to study the means 
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whereby the child picks these up and becomes able competently to deal 
with conversations. 
To summarize the discussion so far, we have argued that language is 
best understood as a system embedded in social implications where 
dialogue, group interaction and social context are significant for 
learning. Words acquire their meaning by the way people use them. We 
have to come to think of language as a publicly available social reality 
and not a kind of essence whose nature we can work out in our heads. 
Speaking a language is part of an activity, a rule-governed activity 
embedded in social interaction. Having made the claim about the 
importance of viewing meaning as use, Wittgenstein was not prepared to 
commit himself to the production of positive general theories of 
language, maintaining that generalizations would give rise to 
distortion. However, his tradition gave rise to two main paths of 
reasoning. The first, a relativistic one, proposed that we can only 
argue in favor of language specificity. Thus, the study of language 
becomes the investigation of its use in particular historical and 
cultural settings and particular situations. We have argued, however, 
that this reasoning does not take into account the "user" of language. 
Superficial diversities in language use can emerge Erom underlying 
universal principles of linguistic communication and are satisfactorily 
accounted for only in relation to them. There are underlying principles 
of linguistic communication which, despite their being socially bounded 
in their specific application, are universal in the extent to which they 
are related to what humans do in communications. Pragmatic elements in 
communication are equally important. We propose that language theory 
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will benefit from a coherent account of pragmatics and semantics embedded 
in a more inclusive theory of purposive behaviour. The interest, 
therefore, lies in analyzing the content of communication (linguistic 
utterances), its contextual domain and finally the speaker's intentions 
and the hearer's recognition of them. 
There are several models put forward to account for parts of 
linguistic communication (i.e. Bach and Harnish's model, the model of 
speech-acts proposed by Searle, and Grice's model of conversational 
participation). An analysis of these models and their relationship to 
our study of language acquisition and development is the focus of the 
next chapter. What is immediately important is to emphasize once again 
the advantages of viewing language functioning in terms of a universal 
pragmatic tradition. These advantages can be summarized by stating that: 
1) In any language, we find words whose meaning-specifications can 
only be given by reference to context or usage. For example, the meaning 
of words like "well", "oh" and "anyway" cannot be explicated simply by 
context-independent statements. One has to refer to pragmatic concepts 
like relevance, or "shared assumption" of communication to understand 
them. 
2) Such an approach provides us with models of linguistic 
communication directed to explain language "uses", language "users", and 
"social contexts". With such models, we can adequately account Eor 
certain speech characteristics (e.g., for "metaphors", "hints", "irony") 
which can not be accounted for by linguistic theories alone. 
3) Children have greater facility with language than has been 
suggested by researchers who have concentrated on traditional linguistic 
theories. During the early stages of language acquisition children 
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establish an interactional matrix for language learning and then slowly 
utilize linguistic means for promoting interaction (Bruner, 1975, 1978; 
Bates, 1976). By employing a pragmatic approach to the study of child 
language, we are able to distinguish more easily the interactional 
structure of the child's language from the language itself. Thus, we can 
understand the linguistic competence together with the communicative 
competence that children possess at different developmental periods. 
4) Such an approach to linguistic functioning broadens the scope of 
our investigation. Our interest is directed towards understanding the 
functions that language performs in social contexts and how these are 
performed along with understanding the most powerful social context of 
language, namely the context of conversations. 
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Chapter 2  
SPEECH ACTS AND CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS  
As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, the practical meaning 
of the slogan "language in use" is that the only way to explicate the 
meaning of a term is to give an account of what can be done with it. The 
meaning of the term depends on how it functions as part of a symbol 
system which we can use in a large variety of ways to make assertions 
about the world and achieve our purposes in it. This shifts the emphasis 
from questions relating to the linguistic structure of speech to the • 
pragmatic functions of our utterances which convey particular intentions 
in given social contexts. 
There are two important implications of the pragmatic approach to the 
study of language. First, the study of language must concentrate on 
discovering the functions (speech acts) performed in social contexts. 
Second, the study of language must have as its focus the various 
strategies employed by people in their interactions. Conversational 
analysis becomes an important way to investigate the kinds of 
interactions that go on between participants and the background knowledge 
which is necessary for understanding each other. In terms of language 
development, our aims then should be the understanding of 1) how children 
become competent conversational partners and 2) how they learn to carry 
out certain linguistic acts and 3) what kind of speech acts are 
characteristic of children at different developmental points? 
(i) Speech-Acts Analysis  
The question addressed here is: "What sort of behaviour is linguistic 
behaviour?". In adopting such a framework, one must engage in a 
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speech-acts analysis of what "speakers do with words" and how people 
relate words to the world (Austin,1962; Searle,1971). 
Of all the issues in the general theory of language usage, the 
speech-acts theory has aroused the widest interest. Psychologists have 
suggested that the acquisition of the concepts underlying speech-acts may 
be a prerequisite for the acquisition of language in general (e.g, see 
Bruner, 1975; Bates,1976). Literary critics have looked to speech-act 
theory for an illumination of textual subtleties or for an understanding 
of the nature of literary genres (e.g., Levin, 1976), and philosophers 
have seen potential application to, among other things, the status of . 
ethical statements (e.g., Searle, 1969). This interest has partly been 
aroused because the speech-acts theory is the only one so far to attempt 
to formulate models of "how" to deal with subjective phenomena, speaker's 
intentions and the hearer's shareable assumptions about the world. The 
force of the theory of speech-acts lies in its suggestion that language 
use is governed by a system of public rules and criteria capable of being 
stated. Aided by conceptual classifications, these rules may be 
investigated empirically by observing language in action in identifiable 
socio-linguistic contexts. For the purposes of language acquisition and 
development, the speech-act theory forces us to take into account two 
main parameters of children's language: (a) the child's intentions in 
communicating with others, (b) the context of inter-subjectivity or 
shared understandings within which speech-acts occur. 
Before embarking on the discussion of speech-acts theory and its 
relation to children's language, some explication of the theory itself is 
in order. In this chapter, we can not review all the voluminous 
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literature on the subject. Instead, we offer a brief sketch of the 
philosophical origins, a lay-out of the different positions that have 
been taken on the crucial issues, and a short discussion of the 
implications of these positions for a study of language acquisition and 
language development. 
Austin (1962) was the first to note that some sentences like "I 
object" or "I apologize" are not used merely to say things (i.e. describe 
states of affairs), but also to do things. Isolating such utterances, he 
termed them "performatives" and contrasted them to statements, assertions 
and utterances which he called "constatives". Whereas constatives are 
truth-conditionally assessed utterances, performatives were utterances 
assessed in terms of felicity conditions. A major shift in Austin's work 
was his realization that from the original distinction between 
constantives and performatives one can in fact consider a whole family of 
speech acts of which constatives and the various performatives (e.g. 
explicit or implicit performatives) are particular members. As Levinson 
(1983) writes, Austin began by expanding the class of performatives to 
include implicit performatives. The utterance "Go", for example, may 
perform an advice, or an order, doing, entreating or daring according to 
context. However, simple statements or constatives were omitted. The 
question then arose whether such statements are really different. Could 
they too have a performative aspect? Once the doubt was raised a few 
observations could confirm the insubstantial nature of the performative/ 
constative dichotomy. For example, there is clearly no real 
incompatibility between utterances being truth-bearers, and performing 
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actions at one and the same time. Thus, "I warn you the gun may fire" 
seems both to perform the action of warning and to issue a prediction 
which can be assessed as true or false. Austin consequently came to 
reject the dichotomy between performatives and constatives in favor of a 
full-blown general theory of speech acts. 
If the notion that in uttering sentences one is also doing things is 
to be clear, the ways in which one might be said to be performing actions 
in uttering a sentence must be specified. Austin isolated three kinds of 
acts that are performed simultaneously: 
(i) Locutionary act  : the utterance of a sentence with determinate • 
sense and reference. 
(ii) Illocutionary act: the making of statement, offer, promise, 
etc. by virtue of the conventional force associated with the 
the sentence. 
(iii) Perlocutionary act: the bringing about of effects on the 
audience by means of uttering the sentence, such effects 
being special to the circumstances of utterance. 
It is the second kind, the illocutionary act, that became the focus. 
Indeed, the term "Speech-act" came to refer exclusively to that kind of 
act. 
The above seem to be Austin's main contributions to the subject. In 
his attempt to systematize Austin's work, Searle (1976) proposed that 
there are just five basic kinds of action-carrying utterances: 
(i) 	 Representatives: utterances which commit the speaker to the 
truth of the expressed proposition (paradigm cases: asserting, 
concluding). 
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(ii) Directives: utterances which are attempts by the speaker to 
get the addressee to do something (paradigm cases: requesting, 
questioning). 
(iii) Commissives: utterances which commit the speaker to some 
future action (paradigm cases: promising, threatening, 
offering). 
(iv) Expressives: utterances which express a psychological state 
(paradigm cases: thanking, apologizing, welcoming, 
congratulating). 
(v) Declarations: utterances which affect immediate changes in the 
institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on 
elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (paradigm cases: 
declaring war, christening, firing from employment). 
Several criticisms have been raised in relation to this typology. By 
elaborating on these, we aim to justify the particular model of 
linguistic communication adopted in the present study and our belief that 
speech-acts analysis must always go hand in hand with conversational 
analysis. The criticisms may be summarized as follows: 
(1) As Levinson (1985) argues, the above typology lacks a principled 
basis. Contrary to Searle's claims, it is not even built in any 
systematic way on felicity conditions (which speech acts must meet if 
they are to succeed). Consequently, there is no reason to believe it to 
be definitive or exhaustive. Applying the typology to the study of the 
child's development, we can never be sure whether the lack of certain 
speech acts can be attributed to the child's immaturity or to the 
typology's indefinite and inexhaustive nature. 
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(2) Curiously enough, Searle failed to define illocutionary acts. 
Moreover, he never explained what an illocutionary act is relative to his 
analysis of the felicity conditions of speech-acts. As Levinson rightly 
wonders, will every illocutionary act have an essential condition? 
Furthermore, will this condition be essential for the acquisition of the 
illocutionary act in the first place? 
(3) Like Austin, Searle distinguished between perlocutionary and 
illocutionary acts in terms, of what is done IN saying something and what 
is done BY saying something. This, however, does not help us understand 
the differences between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, since it 
does not explain the distinction it marks. Strawson (19c d) suggested 
that effective illocutionary acts require the hearer's recognition of the 
speaker's intention. The speaker intends the hearer to identify the very 
act he intends to perform and successful communication requires 
fulfilment of that intention. But if this is the case, then, generally 
speaking, we can not rely on our vocabulary of verbs of action to mark 
off illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. For acts like ordering, 
warning, informing and assuring we must distinguish the ultimate 
illocutionary effect the speaker is trying to achieve from the 
illocutionary effect of the hearer uptake. The present criticism is 
fundamental and one can argue that it underlies the basic Searlean 
thesis. Illocutionary acts are a matter of conventional behaviour. More 
importantly "meaning" is conventional. But, as we have argued so far, 
language is far more complex and creative. Meaning is as much a matter 
of conventions as it is a matter of people's communicative intentions. 
As Grice (1957) put it, meaning presupposes the idea of people meaning 
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things in a social context. Furthermore, Eor X to have meant anything, 
not merely must it have been uttered with the intention of inducing a 
certain belief, but also the speaker must have intended an audience to 
recognize the intention behind the utterance. Thus, to summarize Grice's 
point of view, "A meant something by X" is roughly equivalent to A 
uttered X with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the 
recognition of this intention. As soon as we introduce the concept of 
intentions as being of vital importance for linguistic communication, 
then we need a model which directly addresses the inferential process 
that the hearer undertakes in discovering his partner's communicative• 
intentions at each point of their linguistic communication. It is the 
intentional element in communicative exchanges that makes one understand 
not only synonymous or ambiguous utterances but also non-literal and 
indirect performances of illocutionary acts. 
Bach and Harnish (1979) have offered a similar taxonomy of 
speech-acts. They have argued that our utterances can be seen as falling 
under the five main categories oE: constatives, directives, commissives,  
expressives, and acknowledgements. This is very similar to Searle's 
taxonomy. 
Having a model of language which concentrates on isolating different 
speech-acts and offering detailed descriptions for each language function 
has clear advantages. Guided by such a model, we can detect the 
different functions that the child at different developmental periods 
performs with language. We can isolate the "form" from the "function" of 
an utterance and see how the child gradually learns to use the same form 
to perform various functions. It has been suggested (Dore, 1979; 
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McShane, 1980) that some speech-acts are far more complicated than others 
and require semantic and syntactic complexity to be carried out and 
realized as such. In particular, commissives are sophisticated language 
uses. They require fairly specific conversational uses of words to 
realize their intentions. If this is so, such a model enables us to see 
what acts develop at what age and what they require. In so doing, it 
expands our knowledge of the conditions required for speech-acts to be 
realized and successfully carried out. 
However, as soon as we concentrate on speech-acts, it would take us 
just one minute to understand that language is "rich" in meanings and 
communication (or rather the study of it) is a complex affair. Both 
adults and children can use utterances to perform various functions. The 
power language has in a social context is far more complicated. Whatever 
functions it can be said to serve are not fixed, but are flexible in 
order to fulfil the real purpose. Thus, language can operate on several 
levels at the same time. For example, the child's classic utterance, 
"mummy sock" (BlooM, 1970), can be seen both as a statement of a 
proposition conveying the speaker's attitudes to both propositions to the 
listener and, at the same time, as a device used to control the discourse 
and constrain the listener's behaviour. Interpretation will depend to a 
great degree on the assumptions the listener will share with the child, 
his interpretation of the child's intention, and the context of the 
child's utterance. In short, one needs a model of linguistic 
communication which attempts to account for the context of our utterances 
together with our interpretative processes whereby we understand the 
intentions behind each other's utterances. 
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Bach and Harnish (1979) have offered an extremely important 
contribution to the study of language usage. Firmly believing that 
meaning must be seen in terms of conventional as well as intentional 
behaviour, they devised a model for speech-act communication which takes 
into account contextual information. Given that the realization of the 
utterance's meaning depends, at least partially, on the realization of 
the speaker's intentions, one obvious problem is how to arrive at a model 
of linguistic communication which attempts to decode the speaker's 
communicative intentions. They proposed a speech-act schema which offers 
a schematic account of the way the hearer identifies the expression 
uttered, the meaning it has in the language, what the speaker meant by 
it, and to what things he is referring. Once the hearer identifies these 
various items, he has identified what is said. This, together with 
certain mutual contextual beliefs, allows the hearer to proceed to the 
identification of the speaker's illocutionary act. Bach and Harnish's 
schematization of this inference is called a speech-act schema. Their 
intention and inference approach contrasts sharply with Austin's view of 
illocutionary acts as conventional and with Searle's notion of 
constitutional rules (i.e. the rules that create or constitute the 
activity itself, like for example, the rules that create the activity of 
warning someone). 
Following Bach and Harnish (1979) the different aspects of a 
speech-act are: 
Utterance act: S utters E. 
Locutionary act: S says to Hearer that so-and-so. 
Illocutionary act: S does such-and-such in communicating E. 
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Perlocutionary effect: S affects the hearer in a certain way. 
These acts are intimately related. The success of the perlocutionary act 
depends on the hearer identifying one of the other acts. 
The speech-act schema proposed by Bach and Harnish is an inferential 
one. In other words, they were interested in elaborating the inferential 
process whereby adults understand direct, indirect, literal and 
non-literal expressions. The inference the hearer makes is based not 
just on what the speaker says. It is also based on certain "mutual 
contextual beliefs" and on three presumptions which are shared not just 
between the speaker and hearer, but by the members of the linguistic. 
community at large. These three presumptions are: 
(i) The linguistic presumption: members of the linguistic community 
share a common language (L) and that whenever any member S utters E 
in L to any other member H, H can identify what S is saying , given 
that H knows the meaning(s) of E in L and is aware of the appropriate 
background information. 
(ii) The communicative presumption: whenever a member S says 
something E to another member H, he is doing so with some 
recognizable illocutionary intent. 
(iii) The presumption of literalness: the belief in the linguistic 
community that whenever any member S utters any E in L to any other 
member H, if S could (under the circumstances) be speaking literally, 
then S is speaking literally. If it is evident to H that S could not 
be speaking literally, H supposes S to be speaking non-literally and 
seeks to identify what that non-literal illocutionary act is. 
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Some elaboration of the schema is in order. The locutionary act, the 
act of saying something provides the hearer with the core of information 
from which to infer the speaker's illocutionary (communicative) intent. 
Even when the speaker (S) speaks literally, such that his illocutionary 
intent is made more or less explicit by what he says, his intent has to 
be inferred by the hearer. As Bach and Harnish assert, this inference 
works as follows. Speaker (S) utters expression (E). 
1(a) E means 	 in Language 	 Basis: Hearer (H) hears S 
(L) 	 uttering E. 
(H) Has knowledge of L 
(Linguistic presumption) . 
2(b) S means 	 by E 	 Assuming the existence of 
the linguistic presumption (H) 
understands expression E. 
Hearer H at 1(a) of the SAS(speech act schema) realizes that S has 
uttered E. Assuming S meant anything at all by E, to reach 2(b) H must 
determine what S meant by E, that is, the operative meaning of E. 
However, in as much as ambiguity is rampant in natural languages, H is 
likely to need more than the linguistic presumption and the identity of E 
to determine what S meant by E. It would seem that he must reject all 
but one of the meanings of E as contextually inappropriate and rely on 
certain mutual contextual beliefs to do this. Accordingly, his inference 
would take the following form: 
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1(a) S is uttering E:"Let's go" 
(a) E means"let's go" in L 
(b) S means "let's go" by E 
(c) The literal meaning of E is 
contextually appropriate. 
hearing S utter E, 
knowledge of L. 
Communicative presumption 
Mutual contextual 
belief: the speaker and 
hearer are just about to 
start a basketball game. 
2(b) S means "Let's go" (let's start) 
by expression E. 
Bach and Harnish do not claim that contextual selection always 
represents a psychologically real process nor do they argue that 
selection necessarily proceeds in the precise sequence specified. In 
fact, we usually seem just to hear and understand the expression in the 
contextually most appropriate way. 
The above example emphasizes certain important issues of linguistic 
communication. First, it stresses the fact that any communicative 
exchange involves an interpretative process. Second, utterances occur in 
a special social context - the conversational context - which is 
crucially important for the interpretative process. In turn, the 
analysis emphasizes two important outcomes: (1) that conversations and 
conversational behaviour should be the ultimate focus of our analysis of 
speech-acts, (2) that in our study of language development, we need to 
concentrate not only on the literal meanings of an utterance, but also on 
the meaning this utterance may acquire by virtue of its position in the 
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specific conversational context it was uttered (i.e. its conversational 
meaning). 
(ii) Conversational Analysis  
"Conversations" are considered to be the most important dynamic 
contexts of language. There are important elements in the communication 
situation that are relevant considerations in understanding what message 
is being sent and what intentions the speaker had in sending it. 
Utterances must be organized so that they are consistent with various 
social conventions. They must be relevant to the general topic and 
account for the fact that a listener might need extra information for• 
sufficient comprehension of the speaker's intention. In ordinary 
conversation, people must follow certain specific rules (e.g., the rule 
of "one party at a time"). This suggests that, at least, conversational 
behaviour might be seen as a rule-governed behaviour. By "rules", we 
refer to structures for generating or interpreting speech, reports of 
beliefs about practices and standards of correctness. The researcher's 
aim is therefore to discover how the rules of conversation and address 
can be discovered and adequately stated. His object is then to explain 
how the child acquires and develops these rules. 
The Gricean (19r ;) analysis is an attempt to understand and codify 
the pragmatic rules for the conversational use of language. It is an 
attempt to find sets of principles or strategies for arriving at 
inferences about the intentions an interlocutor has in saying what he 
says. Grice 	 offered three characteristics which apply to all 
conversations: (1) Conversations occur against a background of shared 
knowledge and assumptions (e.g., a shared assumption that the hearer 
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shares a common language). (2) The utterances exchanged in a 
conversation and their meanings have conversational goals. There is an 
important distinction between the "literal" meaning and the 
"conversational" meaning (conversational implicature) of an utterance. 
The realization of this difference is perhaps the most important idea in 
pragmatics. The notion of conversational implicature provides an 
explicit account of how it is possible to mean more than what is actually 
"said" (i.e., more than what is literally expressed by the conversational 
sense of the linguistic expression uttered). For example, consider the 
following: 
A: Can you tell me the time? 
B: Well, I just saw the postman. 
All that we can reasonably expect a semantic theory to tell us about this 
minimal exchange is that there is at least one reading that we might 
paraphrase as follows: 
A: Do you have the ability to tell me the time? 
B: The postman has come. (An irrelevant response) 
Yet it is clear to native speakers that what would ordinarily be 
communicated by such an exchange involves considerably more: 
A: Do you have the ability to tell me the time? 
B: No, I don't know the exact time at the present moment, but I can 
provide some information from which you may be able to deduce the 
approximate time, namely the postman who usually comes at 1:00 has 
come. 
An important issue that emerges as soon as one concentrates on 
conversational meaning in the study of child language is how children 
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acquire and develop not only the "literal" meaning of X but also the 
conversationally implied or conveyed meaning of X. To answer this 
question, one has to introduce Grice's third characteristic of 
conversations: (3) A conversational contribution is a message having a  
cooperative function (i.e., it is an integral part of a jointly entered 
activity intending to make sense). The introduction of the idea of 
cooperation with a partner is of crucial importance for understanding 
conversations. Grice (1967) spelled out certain principles of 
cooperation ("Be relevant", "Be clear", "Contribute only the information 
needed") and argued that participants in a conversation actively assume 
each other's cooperation. They assume that contributions are relevant 
and are intended to follow from verbal and/or from the situational 
context. It is this notion that allows speakers and hearers to go beyond 
the literal meanings of utterances to an understanding of the meanings 
intended. For example, the utterance "I'll close the window" in response 
to a statement "It's cold in here" can be understood as a true response 
to the speaker's statement only when the hearer assumes the maxim of 
relevancy. 
Similarly, Bach and Harnish's model allows one to understand the 
process whereby people come to terms with and comprehend many complex 
instances of speech such as indirect or non-literal utterances. Consider 
the following exchange: 
A: I am willing to be patient 
B: The door is over there! 
In this example, speaker A makes a declaration of his willingness to go 
on cooperating with his partner. However, hearer B responds with an 
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utterance that one might classify in the beginning as irrelevant. The 
utterance B produces is a statement which in terms of semantic or 
grammatical analysis of the exchange can not be considered as a follow-up 
of AS utterance. But when we analyze the above exchange with a 
pragmatic approach in mind, we understand that both A and B are involved 
in an argument. A is willing to be more patient and somehow to start the 
interaction from the beginning. B, however, is unwilling to do so. He 
chooses a statement to perform an indirect speech act and inform his 
partner that it is time for him to go. In relation to complicated 
speech-acts, Bach and Harnish's model works as follows: 
Ll S is uttering E 
(a) E means "The door is over 
there" by E in L 
(b) S means The door is over 
there" 
(c) The supposition that S 
means "The door is over there" 
by E is inappropriate given 
the context. 
L2 S means " The door is over 
there and you should 
leave the room", by E 
hearing S uttering E. 
Ll, knowledge of L 
Linguistic presumption 
Contextual information: A 
statement concerning the 
whereabouts of a door is not 
the issue of the present context 
of discourse. 
Communicative presumption: 
Speaker A can not MERELY mean E. 
Mutual Contextual Beliefs:(i) 
Both participants have a 
fight. (ii) Doors are used 
for the purpose of 
entering or leaving 
This interpretation is 
contextually relevant. 
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(iii) Applications to the study of child language: 
a) Speech-Acts: 
As we have already pointed out, a speech-act theory provides us with 
a specific taxonomy of speech-acts. Applied to the study of the child's 
language, the aim becomes one of finding out the kind of knowledge (both 
social and linguistic) which allows the child at each developmental point 
to engage in purposive socio-linguistic acts. These speech-acts are 
embedded in complex interactional settings. In fact, the production of 
speech-acts may be instrumental in shaping the nature of the social 
interaction. This suggests a second aim for the study of the child's-
language, the exploration of the ways in which speech-acts are embedded 
in the context of the mother-child interaction. By examining the 
different kinds of speech-acts used by both the mother and the child, we 
may better understand how interaction is shaped at each developmental 
point. This will require examining how specific speech-acts are used by 
both mother and child to control, direct and maintain conversation. 
b) Conversational Analysis: 
One of the main purposes of applying a conversational model to the 
study of children's language is to examine in detail what children have 
to acquire in order to become mature conversationalists. The work that 
follows views conversation as being essentially social and interpersonal. 
Thus, the first question we shall address is the question of 
communicative competence. We will examine the development of 
conversational ability in young children by asking what is involved in 
learning to participate in conversation. No less important for the study 
of child language is the issue of how children acquire and develop not 
only the literal meaning of an utterance, but also its conversationally 
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implied or conveyed meaning. According to Grice's (1975) and Bach's JHarnisW5 
(1979) accounts, the various meanings which are implicated by the speaker 
and inferred by the hearer in conversational discourse follow from 
general principles which govern all aspects of human interaction. In 
other words, one can trace the chain of inferences from the literal 
meaning to the meaning in context on the basis of reasonable assumptions 
about the world and people's interactions in it. At each developmental 
point, the child's capacity to obey these general principles in his 
conversation will reflect his intellectual grasp of various assumptions 
about the world. In this context, the aim of research becomes that of 
discovering the child's use of language and that of investigating how he 
uses conversational rules to process the correct meaning of the 
linguistic utterance in question, at each developmental stage. 
As regards the cooperative activity, it is true to say that the child 
acquires a whole mass of behaviours of this kind in a gradually 
developing way. It has often been assumed that newborns lack any basic 
social skills and that their requirements are purely physiological. A 
number of recent studies on the neonate's behaviour tend to refute this 
view. In fact, it is now claimed that infants are biologically 
predisposed for communication from the moment of birth. As Fantz (1965) 
pointed out, moments after birth, infants display an interest in the 
human face which is prior to any interest in objects. The ability to cry 
is another element which carries clear social connotations. Gaze 
behaviour taking place between infant and adult is identical to that 
found in adult-verbal conversations (Jaffe, et al, 1970) and, as Fogel 
(1977) found, mutual gaze is present from three months onwards. However, 
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it is important to distinguish such early behaviours from later ones 
which are used with a clear intention to communicate. As Sugarman (1984) 
points out, communication involves more than the emitting of a behaviour 
with a high social potency. Communication involves the intention to 
convey an idea to someone else. This distinguishes communication from the 
production of mere expressive or other interpretable behaviours. Hence 
the main question becomes "How do babies develop the ability to use these 
behaviours intentionally?" Most researchers (Keenan, 1974; Snow, 1977; 
McTear, 1984; Sugarman, 1984) have pointed out that communicative 
behaviour develops as a result of the child's social experiences, in • 
particular his interactions with his caretaker. Perhaps the most obvious 
point is that adults treat and behave towards their children as if they 
have clear intentions and as if they are full participants in a 
conversation, while in fact the children are only gradually becoming so. 
As indicated by Clark (1978), caretakers will respond selectively to 
their infant's gestures and vocalizations, focusing on those which are 
meaningful in adult communication. Later on, caretakers will create and 
maintain the discourse structure for their children, teaching them in a 
sense how to participate in that structure and eventually appropriate 
it. But, most importantly, the caretaker responds to some of the child's 
actions as if they were communicative (Clark, 1978). Thus, as Clark 
(1978) points out, human babies become human beings because they are 
treated as if they are already human beings. An interpretation of the 
possible importance of mother-child interaction for language development 
is given by Bruner (1975). As Bruner claims, one of the earliest 
principles of communication to be acquired is that particular behaviours 
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receive predictable responses. Examining games like "give and take" and 
"peekaboo" Bruner shows how such games help the child learn to make 
correct responses to the caretaker's elicitations, or take turns, 
anticipate actions and eventually initiate episodes. 
Around the ninth or tenth month we can begin to attribute to the 
infant's behaviours the intention to communicate meanings. Bates (Bates, 
et al., 1979) suggested that around the tenth month we can see the first 
clearly intentional acts - the acts of requesting and of stating. The 
child begins to understand the role of adults as agents and the role of 
his own signals in affecting that agency. Thus, the child can use an 
object to attract his mother's attention (proto-declaratives) or the 
gesture of "pointing" to make a proto-imperative. The following is an 
example of an imperative sequence from a child aged 12 months: 
C. is seated in a corridor in front of the kitchen door. She 
looks towards her mother and calls with an acute sound "ha." 
M. comes over to her, and C. looks towards the kitchen twisting 
her body and upper shoulders to do so. M. carries her into the 
kitchen and C. points towards the sink. M. gives her a glass of 
water, and C. drinks it eagerly." (Bates, 1979, p.121) 
Bruner (1981) has found that by the 15th month the act of requesting 
becomes more sophisticated. The child has specific vocalizations which 
accompany different nonverbal behaviours. At that age Snow (1977) found 
the mother's expectations towards their children increase. Mothers 
expect their children not only to take a turn but also to provide 
appropriate responses. By the age of two, the child can use language and 
some elements of conversational ability are evident. The child is able 
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to maintain continuity (Keenan, 1974) and to respond to most questions 
addressed to him appropriately (de Villiers, 1979). However, there are 
still severe limitations in the child's ability to converse. The child 
is egocentric in his use of language and has major problems in placing 
speech in the right context and comprehending speech which is not 
relevant to the topic at hand. After the fourth year of life, knowledge 
about the social environment, the particular language communities and the 
context in which concepts are understood expands and imposes specific 
socio-linguistic constraints on how reality can be interpreted. 




LANGUAGE USAGE AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONING 
This chapter will focus on the analysis of language performance and 
production and will examine what the development of language entails. 
Two main parameters of language are of interest: (a) the development of 
speech-acts, and (b) the development of conversational competence and the 
understanding of "conversational meaning". An underlying consideration 
throughout will be the end of language development. The adult model of 
linguistic communication suggests the following points: 
(a) Speech-Acts: 	 (i) Speech-Acts are well differentiated and serve 
many purposes. 
(ii) A highly developed ability to maintain and 
control interaction and conversation with the use of 
specific speech-acts (e.g. with the use of 
requestives ). 
(b)Conversational 	 (i) An understanding of intentional communication. 
Competence and 	 (ii) An understanding of the social context of an 
Conversational utterance. 
Meaning (iii) An understanding that for the successful 
comprehension of some utterances, the hearer needs 
to make certain inferences. 
(iv) An understanding that speech contributions 
must be relevant to the discourse at hand and 
must be coordinated with the listener's perspective. 
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AIMS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study attempts to find out what children can or cannot do 
at different developmental periods. This entails the following: 
(a) Investigating both the kinds of social functions language 
performs in a social context at different developmental periods and the 
ways in which speech acts expand to serve a more complex and more 
sophisticated interaction. Furthermore, given that speech acts are 
embedded in social situations, we are also interested in investigating 
the nature of the interaction that children are able to engage in at . 
different developmental periods. 
(b) Examining the interpretative process that occurs in 
conversational exchanges. Here, we are interested in a developmental 
analysis of linguistic communication and the inferential abilities which 
help young children to see conversational acts as accomplishments of 
social episodes. We will examine the degree to which the child is able 
to cooperate with his conversational partner and infer communicative 
intentions. The main belief of the present study is that because this 
understanding depends on the child's developing ability to take the 
perspective of the others and of the social situation, it is more social 
than linguistic. To understand how such an ability develops, both 
language and social functioning in general will be examined. At this 
level of analysis, the focus will be on one particular speech-act - the 
act of asserting. How assertions are performed and to what extent the 
child's responses are relevant to ongoing conversation will be examined. 
At the same time, the analysis will concentrate on examining what kind of 
assertions are performed and how successful they are. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON CHILDREN'S LANGUAGE 
(i) Speech-Acts  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, we can attribute the 
intention to communicate meanings to the child's behaviour around the 
ninth or tenth month. Around that period, we have the first isolated 
words (Dale, 1972). In most cases, these are two syllable approximations 
of adult words. At the same time, we have comprehension of highly 
specified speech discriminations of word pairs (e.g. "bet", "pet") 
(Nelson, 1973). It is at the eighteenth month that one-word utterances 
appear in the child's behaviour. Usually these are meaningful 
expressions of person and object names and some relational words (e.g. 
"up", "no", "more"). We also see the beginning of the comprehension of 
simple instructions and questions and the participation in simple 
conversations and naming games. Around the eighteenth month, Snow (1977) 
found that mothers start correcting their children's speech both in terms 
of content and pronunciation. Furthermore, Rodgon (1979) found in her 
study of children's comprehension of questions that most questions 
addressed to eighteen month old children require yes-no answers. She 
also found that all children at this age were able to discriminate such 
questions from wh-questions and respond appropriately. By the age of 
two, the child is able to combine words to express semantic relations 
(e.g. agent, action). 
At the beginning of the emergence of language, the child is very tied 
up with the "here and now environment. The sentences he uses are very 
simple and involve objects and events that take place within his 
immediate personal experience. Most of his assertions are labellings of 
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events or objects. At that age, the child's speech seems to be mainly of 
a responsive type. This is not surprising given that the literature 
suggests that adult's speech to young children has been consistently 
found to contain a high proportion of questions (Snow, 1977; McShane, 
1980). This prevalence of questions can be viewed as part of the 
caretaker's attempt to construct a conversational interaction with the 
child (Snow, 1977). Questions are a powerful means of turn allocation 
(Sacks, 1974). By the age of two and a half, children's language 
contains fewer instances of labelling. With an increase of vocabulary, 
the child's assertions become far more complex than simply labels of 
objects. As McShane (1980) has Eound, at the end of the second year, a 
"doggie" becomes "doggie on table" or "I like doggie". By the age of 
three, the child begins to further exploit the semantic potential of 
language to refer beyond the "here and now". By that age Ervin-Tripp 
(1977), found instances in children's language of recall of events, 
whether prompted or not, which made reference to potential events. 
Another main category of speech acts Eound in child language at that 
early age is that of requests. In particular, the development of 
requests for action can be traced back to the early prelinguistic stage. 
From about the age of nine months, children's gestures and vocalizations 
can be interpreted with some reliability as intentional requesting 
schemas. Based on a detailed and careful observation of one child 
between twelve and sixteen months, Carter (1978) describes a range of 
different communicative schemata, including requests. One of the most 
common was the request for action. This was realized by an open-handed 
gesture towards an object along with a vocalization of an (m) initial 
monosyllable. Similarly, Halliday (1975) reports the use of 
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vocalizations such as (na) at 0;9-0;10 and (mnn) at 1:1-1:3 months, which 
he interpreted respectively as "I want this" and "Give me that". 
Ervin-Tripp (1977) reviews a number of accounts of the early use and 
development of verbal requests. Early in the second year, the first 
requests are realized by combinations of gestures with names of desired 
objects and words such as "more", "want" and "gimme". 
By their third year, children's language ability expands enormously 
and both their assertions and requestives become more differentiated and 
complex. Ervin-Tripp and Miller (1977) found at this age many instances 
of pretend play which were verbally defined and conversational episodes 
which were longer. Similar developments occur in the child's 
responsives. As language matures, replies are minimized in length, being 
focused on the crucial element in question (Ervin-Tripp and Miller, 
1977). At this age, children could usually give categorically 
appropriate replies to what questions and could answer with animate 
objects to who questions (Ervin-Tripp and Miller, 1977). However, all 
children had diffiCulty with how, when, where from and why questions. 
Indeed, most children require a full year to comprehend the above forms 
of wh-questions. Children's requestives are also developing. The 
children progress from the primitive "gimme" of the previous stage to 
more subtle and diverse requesting which is more characteristic of adult 
speech. As Ervin-Tripp (1978) reports, it is after the third year that 
one can see socially biased requests, embedded imperatives (e.g."would 
you") and polite markers (e.g. "please", "could you") accompanying direct 
requests. 
So far, no study concentrates on any other speech act category as it 
might be used in the child's repertoire. Regulatives and performatives 
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are relatively sophisticated language uses which, following the 
speech-act model, require fairly specific conventional uses of words to 
realize their intentions. For example, the criteria for performing a 
performative include: stating a claim, issuing a warning, or making a 
joke. The ability to perform these seems to develop only during the 
school years. 
Parallel to the acquisition of speech-acts, the child becomes capable 
of using language for other diversified purposes. By his third year, the 
child is able to use language to initiate conversation (Ervin-Tripp, 
1977; Keenan, 1978;) and maintain its flow by producing adequate and 
appropriate responses (Dore, 1977; Ervin-Tripp, 1979; McTear, 19 ). The 
child also becomes increasingly able to control the information received 
by querying or by using tag constructions (Garvey, 1977; Ber-Anger and 
Garvey, 1981). 
CONVERSATIONAL COMPETENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONVERSATIONAL MEANING 
Apart from the need to learn more differentiated and complex speech 
acts, the child must learn to become a better conversationalist. In 
other words, he must learn to produce relevant discourse, to construct 
coherent sequences of dialogue and to adapt his speech to the listener's 
needs. Moreover, the child must be able to discern when the standing 
questions have been answered or the topic has been resolved and learn how 
to get attention and initiate a conversation. As Ervin-Tripp (1979) 
points out, a two year old cannot do the above, so that "jumping" 
properly into adult conversation, for example, is for him a very 
difficult task. Ervin-Tripp and Gordon's (1980) work on naturalistic 
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videotapes taken in four families, found that when other people were 
talking, 89% of the time the two year-olds just blurted out requests. 
But only 31% of the school age youngsters did that. The older children 
interrupted conversations by using polite markers or excuses. Moreover, 
they not only tried to get attention more often, but used more effective 
attention getters (e.g., calling out "Hey Joe", instead of just "Hey", 
etc.) 
As already mentioned, another important ability that the child has to 
develop is the construction of coherent discourse. Participants in 
conversation rely on certain cohesive devices such as anaphoric reference 
(e.g. he, she, etc.) or discourse connectors (e.g. as a matter of Eact, 
actually, etc.) to illustrate the relevance of one sentence to another. 
However, as McTear (1980) rightly points out, participants rely on more 
than surface markers of cohesion in their construction of relevant 
discourse. Utterances are related to another. Usually the first 
utterance sets up certain expectations as to what utterance will follow. 
Thus, a request for action predicts a response related to the request 
which can be either compliant or non-compliant. Responses are therefore 
inspected for their relevance in the light of the discourse expectations 
set by preceding initiations. 
How then does the child develop the ability to understand one 
utterance as being related to another and to produce coherent discourse? 
At the beginning of language development, the child is too immature to 
keep track of coherence. His language is tied up to the immediate 
environment and it is usually the adult who provides the links from one 
utterance to another. By age three, we see one of the first instances of 
the child's attempt to set up expectations concerning the type of 
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utterance which follows a question. As Ervin-Tripp (1979) and McShane 
(1980) have found, the child replies to questions even when he does not 
understand what precisely is being asked. Thus, the expectation that a 
request must be followed by a response is present. As McTear (1985) 
points out in his review of the literature on the development of cohesion 
in conversation, one of the earliest cohesive devices used by young 
children involves repetition of all or part of the preceding utterance. 
Development from such immature to more adult-like conversational 
strategies has been investigated by Keenan (1974) and Keenan and Klein, 
(1975). As they report, the strategy of repetition was used at age two 
years and nine months as a means of responding to adult's questions. By 
age three, however, strategies such as substitution were used. McTear 
(1985) quotes the following example: 
A: flower broken, flower 
B: many flowers broken 
At the same time, by age three, the children investigated by Keenan 
started using anaphoric pronouns instead of repeating preceding 
utterances. Ervin-Tripp (1978) reports the following developments in 
children between the age of two years and nine months and three years and 
six months: 
(1) The appearance of auxiliary ellipses in responses. For example: 
"Mary was", "I did it". 
(2) The use of pronouns in replies to refer back to previously 
mentioned nouns. 
(3) The use of conjunctions to connect sentences across turns. 
Here, development reflects the cognitive difficulty of the relationships 
indicated. In particular, addition is the first to be expressed (e.g., 
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and, also). This is followed by connectives denoting temporal change 
(e.g., then), adversative contrast (e.g., but, though) and finally 
condition. Furthermore, McTear (1985) found the use of because present 
in his daughter's speech at around age three. Between the ages of three 
and a half and four, both the children McTear investigated started using 
well, sure, anyway and otherwise as cohesive devices. However, the 
children did not use any discourse connectors judged to be more mature 
ones, like mind you, frankly, actually or as a matter of fact. McTear's 
belief is that these devices develop later on and are representative of 
children's language at school age. 
The child's ability to link utterances and produce relevant discourse 
marks another major development in his language, the development of a 
more open conversational structure. McTear looked at the structure of 
the children's dialogue and found a development from the tendency to use 
more closed exchanges consisting of initiation and response sequences to 
the tendency to use more open exchange structures (where exchanges are 
linked by utterances with a dual function of responding to a preceding 
utterance and initiating a further response). 
So far we have pointed to evidence that at age three, children are 
quite competent in their language usage. By that age, the child already 
has a good vocabulary and can communicate successfully with people in his 
immediate environment. As a conversational partner, however, he is still 
severely limited. The conversational exchanges he is engaging in are 
necessarily short and the cohesive devices he is using are not 
elaborated. Furthermore, the child often fails to take the perspective 
of another person adequately and to adapt his language accordingly 
(deVilliers & deVilliers, 1979). It is after the third year that we can 
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observe the beginnings of such developments. 
The child's egocentrism has been investigated by studies on 
referential communication. Most of these have been influenced by 
Piaget's (1959) theory of egocentrism. Piaget (1959) himself has 
concluded that the pre-school child is egocentric. Because he cannot 
take into account the listener's perspective when structuring the content 
of his messages, his early communication is necessarily deficient. 
However, recent studies conflict with this position. Most studied 
children's conversations in naturalistic settings and found that children 
are able to take the perspective of another person much earlier than 
believed by Piagetians. For example, Shatz and Gelman (1973) tested 
children aged four and a half and found an ability to adjust their speech 
to the listener's demands. The four and a half year-olds treated two 
year-olds quite differently from adults. Speech directed to the two 
year-olds was devoid of any statements about mental states and any 
requests about complex information. The children's main goal was to get 
the two year-olds' -attention to which end they employed speech which was 
of a repetitive kind, containing many attention getters and 
what-questions. 
However, a point worth remembering is that the foregoing are not all 
or nothing abilities. Development of successful communication is a 
gradual process. As we saw, at Eour and a half years, we have the first 
conscious attempts to adjust the speech to the social context. Yet, 
children at this age still have problems. Spilton and Lee (1977) studied 
the speech adaptations of Eive year-olds to a peer listener's adaptations 
during free play. The authors Eound that the language used seemed very 
adaptive, but also that most questions occurring during the peer 
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interaction were of a highly general nature. As Spilton and Lee argued, 
the high frequency of general questions (which are not very predictive of 
an adaptive response) suggests that five year-olds might not be very 
competent as listeners and adopt that strategy in order to minimize the 
chances of unsuccessful communication. Of course, it may equally be the 
case that this strategy is the only strategy available in the five year 
old's language repertoire. 	 Peterson et al (1972) studied the 
developmental changes in children's responses to three indications of 
communicative failure. Both four and seven year old children readily 
reformulated their initial messages when explicitly requested to do so by 
the listener and both failed to do so when confronted only with 
nonverbal, facial expressions of listener's non-comprehension. In 
contrast, only the seven year-olds tended to reformulate their messages 
in response to an implicit rather than an explicit verbal request for 
additional help (such as " I don't understand"). There was evidence that 
the four year-olds did interpret the latter type of feedback as a request 
for help, but did not understand what kind of help was needed. 
CONVERSATIONAL MEANING: THE CASE OF INDIRECT AND NON-LITERAL UTTERANCES 
As we have already pointed out, children must eventually develop the 
ability to go beyond the form of an utterance and to understand that a 
particular utterance can perform many different functions. Depending on 
the circumstances, children have to develop the ability to interpret an 
utterance in constative form, not only as a constative but also as a 
complaint, a question, an accusation, an attribution of negative 
qualities or possibly an invitation to contradiction. As we have argued, 
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in order to understand the communicative intent of an utterance, the 
hearer must be able to perform certain kinds of inferences concerning the 
other person's intentions and the appropriateness of the present context 
of discourse. Although much research has been done on children's 
language abilities, little is known of the ways in which children develop 
a concept of communicative intent and understand not only what is said 
but also what is implied. To be able to interpret the speaker's 
communicative intentions the hearer must have: (1) An understanding of 
the direction of discourse and of the mutual knowledge which underlies 
the context of discourse. (2) An understanding of the fact that the • 
speaker performs a particular utterance with a given intention in mind. 
(3) An understanding that some situations are in need of an inference if 
communication is to be successful. 
Let's examine in detail what the child must know in order to perform 
and understand the act of asserting successfully. The first condition is 
the "preparatory" condition (Searle, 1969). This condition states that: 
The device X is to be used only if the hearer is or might be in a 
position to understand the desired effect and the speaker believes that 
the hearer is in such a position. Translating the above condition in 
terms of the performance of assertions, the child needs: (1) A specific 
linguistic knowledge. This consists of understanding the conventional 
Eorm of behaviour which is involved in giving something a name and 
treating that word thereafter as the thing's name (the linguistic 
assumption). (2) An understanding that asserting is a cooperative 
activity which is based on certain pragmatic presuppositions. In 
particular, if the speaker is using the sentence appropriately in that 
context, he must pragmatically presuppose that (a) the hearer is able to 
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perceive X or the state of affairs, (b) the hearer must know that X is 
the name of something, (c) the hearer must currently either attend to X 
or can arrive at X via the common ground of the discourse. 
For producing and understanding literal-direct assertions, the above 
conditions are not problematic for young children. As we have already 
argued, two and a half to three year olds operate with those conditions 
and are able to both direct attention and refer to something in the 
external world. The capacity to acquire and direct adult attention 
develops during the nonverbal period (Atkinson and Griffith, 1977). 
Examples of children's assertions are also given by Ervin-Tripp (1978a). 
She analyzed the conversational exchanges of two and a half year-olds. 
In asserting " A battery, this is a battery. Look battery. Battery is 
Jiji's" (example given by Ervin-Tripp, 1978a), the child aims at making a 
reference about something in the external world and claiming that 
particular object belongs to someone else. By uttering "look", the child 
verbally attempts both to make sure that the hearer attends to the 
referred object and to establish that the object referred to can form 
part of their common ground. In that particular example, the 
conversation continues with the hearer who states: "get one, I'll play 
with that one." Here, the hearer continues the conversation and uses the 
word "one" to signal to the speaker that he attends to the same object 
referred to previously. From now on, this has become a part of their 
common ground. 
In the case of indirect or non-literal assertions, however, the 
situation becomes far more complex. To recognize the presence of 
indirect or non-literal expressions, the child must not only make 
inferences concerning the other person's state, but also inferences about 
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what the present discourse context involves and what is appropriate or 
inappropriate. Moreover, he needs to infer that, under the particular 
circumstances, the speaker could either not merely be implying X (and 
thus the speaker is producing an indirect act) or that there is a certain 
recognizable relation in saying P and implying R (e.g. in metaphorical 
language). The child faced with such utterances has first to infer the 
literal or direct meaning of the utterance and then conclude that this 
reading is inappropriate in the present context. To understand the 
intended meaning, the child must search via the Maxim of Relevance for an 
interpretation which makes the utterance relevant to the particular topic 
or issue at hand. 
Virtually all the developmental research on conversational analysis 
deals only with one limited aspect of pragmatics, namely forms of 
requests and their responses. Ervin-Tripp (1977) hypothesized that 
children's use of forms of requests progresses from direct imperatives 
(e.g. "Gimme cookies") to indirect requests based on conversational 
postulates (e.g. "Those look nice"). Although children seem to be better 
at comprehending than at producing indirect requests, recent empirical 
studies on the use of request forms have generally confirmed this 
prediction. Shatz (1975) examined two year-old's responses to direct and 
indirect requests from their mothers. She found no difference in the 
likelihood of compliance to direct versus indirect requests. It may be 
that the young children in this study did interpret indirect requests 
correctly on the basis of the context in which they were uttered. But it 
is equally possible that they were relying on nonverbal cues from the 
mother or only on parts of the request (e.g. interpreting an utterance 
like "Can you shut the door" as "Shut the door"). Bates (1976) also 
- 62 - 
examined the production of request forms by two to four year-olds 
interacting with their mothers. She found that virtually all such 
requests by children were either conventional commands, "Can I have" 
requests, or statements of desire (e.g. "I want that"). In a long 
titudinal study of two Italian children, Bates found that indirect 
requests based on conversational postulates do not appear until ages 
three and a half to four at least. As deVilliers and deVilliers (1975), 
Ervin-Tripp (1978) and Shatz (1978) conclude, two and three year-old 
children respond often to indirect commands or assertions as if they were 
direct ones. They also have great difficulty in understanding and 
producing metaphorical or sarcastic language. However, there are many 
requests which are labelled indirect requests which in fact are not 
difficult for the young children. For example, embedded directives 
(which fall usually under the category of indirect speech) are extremely 
explicit and thus are acquired early in life. Moreover, children as 
young as two years can respond appropriately to requests in the form Can 
you ..." and even to requests in which the desired act is not stated as 
in "Are there any more cookies?" (Shatz, 1975). However, they also 
respond with actions to utterances which do not necessarily require an 
action. Thus, Shatz has argued that children operate with an 
action-based rule of the form "mother says-child does". In Shatz's 
(1975) discrimination experiment, children were presented with utterances 
containing: "can you+feasible act" in two discourse contexts: one 
following a series of directives and one Following an information 
exchange. It was found that even in the information exchange context, 
children showed a bias towards action-based responses. It is, therefore, 
argued that older children develop away Erom this action-based strategy 
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by learning the appropriate linguistic and contextual markers for various 
illocutionary acts. 
Question directives and hints are less explicit than embedded 
directives and in most cases they do not mention the desired goal, state 
or object at all. Consequently, their comprehension has to rest either 
on repeated conjunction with more explicit forms or on active inference 
by the hearer. As Ervin-Tripp (1979) argues, from age four on, the 
comprehension of complex indirect speech acts enlarges. However, 
McTear's (1985) study on two four year-old children did not find a 
developmental trend away from direct imperatives to more indirect forms. 
As he himself points out, this can be explained in terms of the 
particular context of the requests. Given that most of the requests were 
directed to a peer in play, one can expect direct imperatives to 
predominate. McTear found that both his children used some hints in 
requesting and that some of these hints displayed evidence of strategic 
ploys on the part of the speaker. At the same time, McTear was able to 
analyze the request strategy used by the children at different 
developmental periods. As he argues, complex conditions such as 
reference to the possible consequences of a request act develop late 
(around age five), whereas querying the need for the request or the 
action using a simple why question occurs earlier. Moreover, denial of 
obligation occurred early, whereas denial of willingness occurs late. 
All these developments are of crucial importance for successful and 
cooperative communication. The changes that occur as the child matures 
are due merely to his enlarged understanding of the implications or 
requests regarding the needs of others and a willingness to gratify those 
needs. The key assumption underlying the present study is that because 
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this change depends on the child's ability to take the perspective of 
others, it must be considered to be more social than linguistic. This 
change, of course, may require considerable knowledge of the practical, 
social and technical facts needed to make a successful inference. Thus, 
as Ervin-Tripp (1979) rightly points out, we can expect variations in the 
rate of development because of these social factors. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that although by the fourth or fifth year 
children are able to use diverse syntactic forms, they still refer 
explicitly to their desires and goals when these are not obvious from the 
context. So the major difference between adults and children, as 
Ervin-Tripp concludes, "...is not diversity of structure nor diversity of 
social features - though the rules may increase in number of variables 
and in complexity with age - but systematic, regular unmarked utterances 
.." (Ervin-Tripp, 1979, p.188) which either do not refer to what the 
speaker wants or which do not show an ability to use the intentions of 
speakers in developing elaborated strategies as a means to a 
communicative goal. Ervin-Tripp (1979) concludes that by the age of 
four, children appear able to understand simple indirect forms and to use 
verbal strategies to achieve a goal. By the ages of five and six, they 
do not require reference to the desired goal in order to understand a 
complex indirect act and, by seven, they become able to operate above and 
beyond the level of words and to use language to anticipate social 
events. 
To understand direct or indirect non-literal expressions, the hearer 
has to be aware of specific conventional agreements (rules) which are 
culturally used to refer to things (e.g. metaphors) and facilitate action 
interpretation in social exchanges. To understand non-literal 
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expressions, the child must be able to take the perspective of others and 
to view speech-acts addressed to him as intentional. He must also have a 
considerable knowledge of the social facts needed to arrive at the 
intentional goal. We hope to show that children are able to cope with 
non-literality after their sixth year, and that this ability continues to 
develop until adolescence when the function of social rules is fully 
recognized. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD'S CONVERSATIONAL ABILITY 
IN THE LIGHT OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING 
So far we have discussed one aspect of the development of the ability 
to become good conversational partners. The emphasis has been on 
examining how the child understands not only what is grammatically said, 
but also what is conversationally meant (i.e., whether a particular act 
is an act of referring, predicating, promising etc.). Once we adopt the 
above framework for studying the interpretative process which occurs in 
conversational exchanges, we move towards studying social knowledge and 
social interaction. Interaction, in the abstract sense intended here, 
can be understood as a sustained production of chains of mutually 
dependent acts constructed by two or more agents, each monitoring and 
building on the action- of the other. In such an approach, we ask what 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must be met in order for that 
highly coordinated kind of interdependent behaviour to take place. In 
spelling out the conditions (e.g. mutual orientation, awareness of the 
interactional domain, means-ends reasoning, inferences of the probable 
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goal that the other's behaviour was intended to achieve etc.), we move 
towards studying language use which has the development of social 
understanding as its core. 
Most pragmatists working in the area of child language assume an 
interdependence of language and social functioning. In particular, 
Ervin-Tripp (1981) writes: "...interpersonal control acts always involve 
both information about social assumptions and relationships, and 
information about desired acts or goals" (Ervin-Tripp, 1981, p. 208). 
Moreover, as McTear (1985) points out, "..one only has to consider the 
inability of children to unravel the temporal and logical sequence of 
events in a film intended for adult viewers or to understand the humor in 
an adult comedy show, to recognize the extent to which competent 
participation in adult interaction depends on a degree of knowledge of 
the world which is beyond the experience of the young child." (McTear, 
1985, pp. 202). 
However, there are very few studies which attempt to examine in 
detail the interdependence of language and social functioning. Flavell 
et al (1968) give an account of their experimental work which links 
referential communication and role-taking ability in children. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1979) investigated the use of the definite and 
indefinite article and linked the appropriate usage of such articles to 
the overall cognitive ability of the child to assess the extent of the 
listener's knowledge. Both sets of works concluded that children's use 
of language becomes socially more appropriate with age owing to an 
increasing sensitivity to the listener's perspective and an increasing 
cognitive ability to assess the other's state of knowledge. However, 
there is no study in the literature which attempts to examine the 
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development of conversational behaviour together with the development of 
social functioning. The present study sets out to do exactly this. It 
aims to spell out the main parameters of social functioning which are 
related to competent language usage and to examine how this relation 
works in everyday conversations. 
When studying language in the context of social cognition, there are 
several important aspects of the child's socio-cognitive development 
which appear to be of importance. These include: 
(1) the development of inferences about others and the ability to  
role-take. Here, we include: (a) the ability to attribute to other 
people inner states (e.g. intentions, beliefs), (b) the understanding 
that other people's inner states may be different from yours, (c) the 
understanding of "agency" and human action (i.e. means-ends 
relationships, consequent and antecedent acts and goal directed 
behaviour). 
(2) the ability to engage in inferential reasoning: Here, we 
include: (a) the ability to understand that a particular situation 
is IN NEED of an inference, (b) the ability to successfully perform 
an inferential act and arrive at the implicit information or the 
implicit intentions of the speaker. 
(3) the understanding of social rules and social contexts: Here, we 
include: (a) children's reasoning about social rules and social 
contexts, (b) children's knowledge of usual sequences of events and 
roles. 
(4) knowledge of certain social conventions: that is knowledge of 
certain conventional uses of words (e.g. metaphors). 
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Although not much research has been done on the development of these 
abilities in relation to language understanding, children's social 
development has been the subject of many studies. 
Following the Piagetian position, it was assumed that children had to 
be capable of concrete operational thinking, before making any kind of 
inferences about another person's inner state. The classical example of 
that position is the belief that children below the age of seven or eight 
typically make the egocentric error of attributing their own point of 
view to a doll. This position, however, has been challenged by 
researchers who worked from within the Piagetian framework. Bryant • 
(197;1 has found that if you change the classical Piagetian designs and 
make sure that memory controls are made, children as young as four can 
make certain kinds of inferences. Shatz (197 ) has argued that children 
do understand the perspective of the other person if the situation is 
more familiar and relevant to them than the classical "mountain" 
experiment. 
The criticisms of the Piagetian designs generated new research 
designs which aimed at investigating the social abilities of children as 
young as three years old. These new designs have marked a shift in the 
ideology of studying social interaction. As Shatz (1975) argues, the 
experimental paradigms used so far for assessing children's abilities in 
interactional contexts (i.e. the sociological and the Piagetian paradigm) 
have failed to capture the dialectics of subject to subject interaction. 
However, children's social knowledge is not acquired independently of 
their social actions. We, therefore, do not need to study only the 
development of social knowledge, but also the social development of 
knowledge. We need to concentrate on the interactional context which 
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presents to the child occasional discrepancies from the behaviour he 
expects from others. These discrepancies provide the child with 
continuous corrective feedback about the interpretations he makes of the 
other's behaviour and his inner states and they motivate him to attempt a 
reassessment. 
REVIEW OF THE SOCIAL COGNITION LITERATURE IN RELATION TO THE SOCIAL 
PARAMETERS OF LANGUAGE USAGE 
(1) The development of inferences about others: There is now 
evidence to support the belief that the ability to attribute inner states 
to other people develops quite early in life. As Keasy (1979) has shown, 
three and four year-old children ask why questions which emphasizes the 
fact that they start concentrating on the psychological motives of 
others. Lambers and Loss (1980) found that in a familiar and highly 
motivated natural setting, three year-old children make few errors 
regarding the other people's feelings. In her study of the 
representation of emotion, Shields (1985) demonstrated that three 
year-old children operate with an implicit two phase model (steady versus 
upset emotional states) which begins to be more differentiated at age 
five. This claim is in agreement with Flavell (197) who argues that a 
four year-old child shows some limited knowledge of some sort of 
inferences about other's emotional states, especially if these are simple 
(i.e., sadness vs happiness, or goodness vs badness). 
Flavell (1968), however, asserts that a distinction should be made 
between the child's ability to understand intentions and his ability to 
understand motives. In fact, as Keasy (1979) argues, the concept of 
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intentionality and the concept of motive seem to follow different 
developmental sequences. The concept of motive emerges earlier. Whereas 
the concept of "motive" deals with what a particular motive behind an act 
is (e.g. bad or good), the concept of "intentionality" deals with whether 
the action was accidental or motivated. As Keasy argues, children at the 
age of three already seem able to differentiate between good and bad 
motives, and the concept of bad is learned before the concept of good. 
In contrast, it is not much before their sixth birthday that children 
seem able to differentiate clearly between accidental and intentional 
events and attribute to people subjective responsibility for their 
actions. This claim is consistent with Fein's (1972) findings which 
showed that although four year olds were able to perceive the causality 
of social pictures, this ability increased with age and accurate 
statements were achieved only after the age of six. 
It is reasonable to assume, then, that before the age of five 
children have a notion of a psychological force, but that this notion is 
global and undifferentiated. At the age of five, children begin to make 
accurate distinctions between the possible causes of the social phenomena 
and to understand the concept of "intentionality". They consequently 
become increasingly able to differentiate between inner-subjective states 
and concrete behaviours and to understand the correct motives, thoughts 
and intentions which underlie overt behaviour. 
The empirical work on the study of role-taking abilities can be 
divided into two main paradigms. The first is Piaget and Inhelder's 
(1956) paradigm of visual-perspective taking. The second is set by 
Flavell (1968), who investigated situations which depend upon the 
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child recognizing and accommodating to the thoughts, feelings and 
intentions (as well as the percepts) of another person. 
Piaget and Inhelder (1956) report a number of studies of the 
coordination of visual perspectives. One of them, the "Doll and 
Mountain" experiment, has since been regarded almost as an operational 
definition of spatial egocentrism. In this experiment, the child is 
presented with a three dimensional model of three mountains. He is then 
asked to identify the visual perspective of a doll which was placed in 
several different positions from those of the child. Piaget and Inhelder 
(1956) distinguish three stages of the children's performance in the 
experiment. In the first (between approximately four and seven years), 
the children responded egocentrically. They tend to attribute their own 
perspective to the doll. Seven and eight year-old children are in a 
transitional stage where errors are made, but are not predominantly 
egocentric. However, it is not until nine or ten years of age that 
children perform without errors. In the first stage, it seems that 
children lack the knowledge that the appearance of objects is a function 
of the spatial position from which they are viewed. In the second, they 
have this knowledge, but only in the third stage do they acquire the 
ability to determine what that appearance would be for any specific 
viewing position. 
We have already mentioned that the classical Piagetian framework for 
studying role-taking abilities has been criticized as being inappropriate 
for young children. Recent literature suggests that the ability to 
coordinate visual perspectives is a function of the particular task 
presented and that, in some circumstances, non-egocentric responses may 
already be elicited in three or four year-olds. Shatz and Watson (1971) 
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used a task similar to that of the "Doll and Mountain", along with 
another in which the child himself moved and had to predict the view from 
his new position, the object being covered during the move. With three 
and a half and six and a half year-old children, the former task proved 
very difficult, yet the latter unexpectedly easy. Shatz and Watson 
(1971) suggest that in the former task the visible presence of the object 
seen by the child may make it harder for him to detach himself from it in 
order to appreciate the other's point of view. They found that if the 
easier task was done first, it facilitated performance on the "Doll and 
Mountain" type of task. Huttenlocher and Presson (1973) obtained similar 
results on a task in which the child himself moved and had to predict his 
new view. Fishbein and Nigel (1974) have raised an interesting point in 
relation to the Piagetian tasks. They argued that one should distinguish 
between social and and conceptual aspects of perspective taking tasks. 
Whereas conceptual aspects concern the inferences involved in the 
construction of the other's view, social aspects concern the child's 
tendency to select his own point of view, acting as though the 
instruction made reference to himself rather than to another person or 
the listener. Given such a distinction, it becomes clear that our main 
concern is primarily with the social aspects of these tasks rather than 
with the conceptual one. 
Moving even further down the age scale, a group of studies by 
Masangkay, McCluskey, McIntyre, Simms-Knight and Flavell (1974) 
demonstrated the capacity for some basic inferences about visual 
perspective in children as young as two and a half years old. For 
example, the child at this age can understand that when a card with a 
different picture on each side is interposed between himself and another 
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person, that person can see the picture which he himself cannot. Thus, 
it is safe to argue that from early infancy, the child appears to show 
some sensitivity to alternative visual perspectives, but as Light (1979) 
points out, such sensitivity will probably only be manifest in very 
simple situations where the instructions are explicit. 
Flavell (1968) conducted a wide-ranging study of role-taking in 
middle childhood and adolescence, providing valuable descriptions of the 
nature and pattern of acquisition of various abilities subsumed under the 
heading of role-taking. He divided the tasks used into two types: those 
involving a straightforward inference which might be correct or 
incorrect, and those in which there is no "right answer", but where the 
interest is in the degree of subtlety of the child's role-taking in the 
situation. The latter category involved all social guessing games which 
contained the potential infinite chain of inference, "I think that he is 
thinking that I am thinking ...". Most of the tasks Flavell used fell 
into the category in which there was not a "right" answer. For example, 
he used a picture story composed of seven pictures. When the child had 
"told" the story depicted, three of the pictures were removed. The 
sequence was so constructed that the remaining four pictures still made a 
meaningful story, but one which was significantly different from the 
original. The youngest children (seven year-olds) grasped the original 
7-picture story and could express it easily. But, for the 4-picture 
story, the seven year old's stories included various degrees of 
contamination from the original story. Flavell (1968) also investigated 
communication aspects of role-taking. He argued that effective 
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communication depends upon the child taking an accurate measure of the 
listener's role attributes and then actively using this knowledge to 
shape and adapt his messages accordingly. In one task, the child was 
asked to give instructions to another who was blindfolded in order to see 
whether he adapted the content of his messages accordingly. In another 
task, the child had to tell a story to a pictured four-year old child and 
then to a pictured adult. Flavell remarks that the seven year-old 
children showed remarkable competence. 
The main problem faced by any researcher when a child fails on a task 
is to decide why the child fails. It is often difficult to decide 
whether the child does not know that others have different viewpoints 
(what Flavell has called the "existence" element), whether he is unaware 
that this is a task which requires this particular kind of knowledge (the 
"need" element), or whether he is simply having difficulty in working out 
the other's perspective (the "application"element). As Flavell (1968) 
has pointed out, it might even be wrong to conclude that the child 
considers his message to be adequate to a listener who cannot see. It is 
possible that the child fails to pay attention to this listener and thus 
fails to see the need to adapt his messages to his needs. An apparent 
disparity between underlying abilities and actual performance has been 
noted in other studies. Levine and Hoffman (1975), in their study of 
empathy in four year-olds, point to a marked gap between the availability 
of inferential skills and the use made of them. Acredolo (1977) suggests 
that the period around four years of age may be one in which the gap 
between the ability to coordinate perspectives and the spontaneous use of 
such ability is particularly wide. She makes this suggestion on the 
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basis of a study in which prompts and reminders were found to be uniquely 
effective in improving performance at this age. 
The general picture which emerges from the studies is that some basic 
forms of role-taking emerge very early in childhood. But these are 
initially fragile, situation specific and heavily dependent upon 
contextual and instructional cues. Thus, preschool children are capable 
Ikos 
of cooperative behaviours (Garvey, 1973) and speech adaptability to 
listener's needs (Shatz and Gelman, 1973), but as Light (1979) points 
out, : "... such children undoubtedly do behave egocentrically in a host 
of ways, but their egocentrism is far from complete and does not 
constitute nearly as tight a strait-jacket as has often been supposed." 
(p.25). 
THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOCIAL CONTEXT AND ITS CONVENTIONS 
From an early age, the developing child participates in social 
systems - be it the family, the school, or the peer-group. Nevertheless, 
little research has been done on the development of the individual's 
concepts of social groups and systems of social interaction. One reason 
is the emphasis placed by students of social cognition on the moral 
v. 
domain of social interactions. Shatz (1975), Damon (1977), and Turiel 
(1971, however, emphasized the need to distinguish clearly the 
development of moral vs the development of social issues. They have thus 
concentrated on examining the development of social issues and their 
experimental paradigm emphasizes the need to assess the child's abilities 
in interactional contexts. Their view assumes that the child's social 
development is influenced not only by specific others (as the learning 
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tradition will postulate) but also by interactions with patterns of 
social behaviour and social organizations. At each developmental point, 
the developing child must be viewed as constructing a workable social 
theory ( a belief system) that is consistently modified in content and 
structure by the social environment. By observing social action, by 
communicating and being communicated with, the child gathers and creates 
social experience and social information. While he constructs and 
reconstructs social beliefs, the social environment acts and reacts in 
ways that provide essential social information and structure. 
Work on the understanding of social rules and social structure has 
identified four main stages of children's reasoning about the social 
context and its rules. Shatz (1975) and Damon (1977) found that three 
and four year-olds reason in ways specific to the act and situation. 
Damon's interviews with children probed their views about violations of 
sex roles, table manners and stealing. The interviews suggest that 
rule-following at early ages is based on personal desires which justify 
compliance or noncompliance. After the Fourth year, children acquire a 
global rationale of rules and social uniformity. However, this rationale 
consists of understanding what is good and bad without supplying any 
causal justification. In their sixth year, children become aware of 
social conventions as arbitrary uniformities that function to coordinate 
the actions of individuals within a social system. Thus, a clear 
distinction between conventions and principles is recognized and 
conventional violations are judged as being less serious than principle 
violations. However, it is not until the seventh year, that the 
organizational function of social rules is recognized. Violations of 
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conventions are seen as clearly less serious than principle violations, 
but the social impact of conventional violations is fully understood. 
As we pointed out in the beginning of the present chapter, besides 
the understanding of social rules and social conventions the child must 
acquire general social knowledge. In particular, he must acquire event 
knowledge and knowledge about certain social categories (e.g. status, sex 
roles, etc.). How does the recognition of children's event knowledge 
enhance our understanding of children's communicative competence? 
Several different points come to mind. First, the notion of a 
sequentially based representation is an appropriate way to characterize 
the conceptual underpinnings of some of the linguistic phenomena of 
interest. Some of the child's communicative knowledge is inherently 
sequential in nature. For example, the rules for maintaining a 
conversation are based on the ability to deal with temporally contiguous 
speech events. Indeed, conversational settings, such as the telephone 
setting, consist of well-defined familiar sequences, such as starting a 
conversation with "Hello", then determining the identity of the caller 
and the nature of the call, followed by a variable length of discourse in 
which turn-taking is closely maintained, and concluding by saying 
"Good-bye". Other linguistic phenomena are linked with event knowledge 
indirectly. For example, Ervin-Tripp (1978) reported that children drew 
heavily upon their practical reasoning, their understanding of common 
event sequences, to infer the appropriate action response to an indirect 
request. If the mother says: "Is the door open?" when she has her arms 
full of grocery bags, a child would open the door regardless of whether 
or not he understood the indirectness of the question. In other words, 
the child will open the door just because the context dictates for him to 
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do so regardless of the language used. Ervin-Tripp suggested that such 
redundancies in natural context contribute to a child's mastery of 
indirect requests. 
Most researchers agree that young children have acquired some sort of 
general understanding of familiar sequences of events by the age of three 
and a half or four years. Nelson (1981) concluded that script knowledge 
in young children is general in form, temporally organized, consistent 
over time and socially accurate. Her conclusions are based on a number 
of studies with children ranging in age from three to eight years. The 
children were asked to tell "What happens if..." they engaged in familiar 
activities such as eating dinner or going grocery shopping. Even three 
year-old children were able to relate reasonably accurate sequences of 
events. According to Nelson, a child moves from a direct representation 
of social relationships to an increasingly more general, abstract and 
static representation. Similarly, Goldman (1982) interviewed six, nine 
and twelve year-old children about their views on being friendly, getting 
a dog and doing chores. All the children had mastered the relevant 
information and the sequence of events leading to concrete situations 
(e.g. getting a dog). However, on more abstract situations (such as 
friendship), the younger children did not respond accurately. But, as 
Goldman pointed out, what most older children knew about friendship was 
found to be additions to what most younger children knew. "Thus 
developmental differences in the content of the knowledge .... appear to 
reflect an increase in the amount and variety of information expected by 
the majority of children within each age group." (Goldman, 1982, p. 301). 
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FORMULATING SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT SOCIAL LINGUISTIC UNDERSTANDING 
(1)  A developmental descriptive model. The primary research 
objective is to arrive at a "developmental descriptive analysis". The 
intended output would be a fairly detailed picture of what develops when 
in the domain of social knowledge and communicative competence. The 
present study does not address any causal-analytic questions. Nor does 
it intend to make statements regarding the order of such developments. 
In other words, we do not wish to imply that social cognition is the 
prerequisite of language understanding or vice versa. To suggest that 
would simply be to misunderstand the complex interrelation between social 
cognition and language understanding. Moreover, we need to avoid the 
circularity decried by Campbell (1979), that is the use of facts about 
the nature of children's language to infer facts about social development 
that are in turn used to explain language development. 
Our main beliefs are that social knowledge and communicative 
competence are related, and that developments in one area facilitate 
developments in the other. At the same time, the distinction between 
linguistic and social knowledge is not clear cut. As Gumperz (1972) 
argued, social concepts such as status and role are manifest only in the 
linguistic system. Following this, Ervin-Tripp (1977) observed that 
language may introduce social distinctions to a child. It may serve as 
an "instructional milieu for learners regarding the major social 
dimensions and categories of groups they join." (Ervin-Tripp, 197 , p. 
152). Bowerman (1981) concluded : "To the extent that socially 
important concepts can be inferred only through communicative 
interactions, and have no direct non-linguistic correlates, acquisition 
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of them could not take place independently of language." (Bowerman, 1981, 
p. 153). To conclude, we can say that as children acquire the system of 
language based knowledge represented in the notion of communicative 
competence, they draw upon the totality of their social experiences. 
(2)  A developmental analysis of linguistic interaction The review of 
the social cognitive research and the research on children's language 
leads us to a developmental analysis of linguistic interaction. It also 
helps us to formulate specific expectations regarding social linguistic 
understanding. 
The ability to engage a peer in a coherent conversation is documented . 
in two year-old children (Garvey and Hogan, 1973; Keenan,1974). However, 
it is limited and depends on the communicator's skills in placing his 
language in the child's world. The child lacks the appropriate skills 
for regulating interaction with others and has problems taking another's 
perspective. By age three, children's conversational acts become 
enormously sophisticated in several ways. Grammatically, their 
structures are no longer telegraphic; their speech contains most of the 
function words (articles, conjunctions, prepositions, etc.) and 
grammatical morphemes ( for inflecting verbs for tense, etc.) in the 
language. Functionally, the variety expands considerably beyond the 
assertions, questions and commands of approximately a year before. 
However, the most significant development in terms of language 
acquisition is the emergence of the control of form and function (Dore, 
1977). At about that age, children start to realize that form and 
function are not isomorphic; that is they understand that the same form 
can be used to convey several different functions and that the same 
function can be conveyed by different forms. To learn that different 
- 81 - 
grammatical forms can be used to communicate a single intent, the child 
must first understand that participants have different intentions to 
communicate. The child must also somehow acquire rules or conventions 
for deploying grammatical knowledge in actual conversations. This 
pragmatic (as opposed to grammatical ) knowledge involves beliefs about 
how to accomplish various goals and other aspects of social episodes 
through the use of language. It also involves an active interpretation 
or inference concerning the action goals or the conveyed intent of the 
messages. 
This "inferential" perspective which helps the child see 
conversational acts as accomplishments of social episodes is present at 
about the age three. At that age, the child starts attributing inner 
states to other people. However, he lacks the social cognitive 
perspective required to view conversational acts as steps in a plan for 
the accomplishment of specific goals. Although he has a notion of 
psychological states, the psychological and physical aspects of behaviour 
are frequently undifferentiated and the ability to form causal schemata 
has not fully developed. Indirect speech-acts are thus understood only 
if these can be directly inferred from the present context of discourse. 
At the same time, it is believed that there is a considerable difference 
in the "uses" of language by adults and children when they communicate. 
Given that the child at this age is an immature conversationalist, the 
adult who interacts with him has to employ those speech-acts categories 
which facilitate conversational participation and maintain conversational 
flow. Thus, with the youngest children (three and four year-olds), 
mothers are expected to direct action and ask questions which help to 
control and direct conversation. However, the Functions that language 
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performs change for older children. Six and seven year-olds are active 
and equal conversational partners who are able to select, control 
information received and direct discourse. 
We expect young children to have similar problems when we examine 
their communicative effectiveness. As we have pointed out, young 
children's role taking abilities are poor. Consequently, the main 
limitation children will have in sustaining everyday communication will 
be to clarify their intentions and to realize that their perspective is 
not always clear to others. Young children will frequently include in 
their talk speech which is incomprehensible to a listener or which does 
not account for his perspective. Five year-old children, however, will 
not. 
By age four, children understand simple indirect speech-acts. 
However, it is not until the end of the fourth year that they can 
understand complicated indirect speech-acts (e.g., hints) and not until 
age five do they understand the conversational meaning of utterances 
which do not make explicit reference to the desired goal. This is not 
surprising if we consider the evidence from the social-cognitive research 
which supports the belief that children at that age begin to make 
accurate distinctions between the possible causes for the social 
phenomena and understand the implications of human agency. 
To understand direct or indirect non-literal expressions, however, 
the hearer needs to be aware of specific conventional agreements (rules) 
which are culturally used to refer to things (e.g. metaphors) and 
facilitate action interpretation in social exchanges. The ability to 
understand non-literal expressions requires the ability to take the 
perspective of others as well as the ability to view speech-acts 
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addressed to you as intentional acts. Moreover, it requires a 
considerable knowledge of the social and practical facts needed to arrive 
at the intentional goal. To understand complex forms of conversational 
implicatures, the child must operate with specific conversational 
principles (e.g., the principle of relevancy or cooperation). However, 
he must also assume that although at specific points in discourse, talk 
does not appear to proceed according to these specifications, the 
principles of conversation are nonetheless followed. It is only by 
making the above assumption, that the child will make inferences about 
what is meant rather than what is said. Children become aware of social 
conventions and understand their significance in regulating social 
interaction only after age six. Thus, it is believed that children will 
be able to cope with non-literality after their sixth year and that this 
ability will continue to develop until adolescence, when the function of 
social rules is fully recognized. However, it is important to note that 
it is reasonable to expect variation in the rate of development in coping 
with complex forms of language because of the social and technical 
factors involved. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS  
(i) Aims of the present study  
As we have already pointed out, the primary aim of the present study 
is to investigate conversational competence. The approach adopted is 
pragmatic. It emphasizes (i) the importance of taking into account the 
social context in which language occurs, and (ii) the use of language - 
the communicative functions it performs. The acquisition of language is 
viewed as one aspect of the growth of effective communication and social 
functioning. When acquiring language, children do not merely acquire its 
grammar, but also knowledge of how the adult community uses language and 
how language structures its social life. 
This study aims: (1) To investigate the kind of social functions 
language performs at different points in the child's development. Here, 
we are interested in exploring the young child's ability to use language 
to make reference to objects, to make requests, to assert and to initiate 
conversations. Furthermore, we are interested in examining the degree to 
which children at different developmental points are competent in 
producing successful speech-acts and coherent discourse. For example, we 
are interested in how successfully children at different ages understand 
the listener's perspective and in how ably they direct their speech 
according to his needs. (2) To analyze the kind of interaction children 
at different developmental periods are able to engage in. This gains 
special importance in light of (1). (3) To examine when and how children 
begin to understand the "conversational meaning" of an utterance. The 
aim here is to understand the interpretative process which occurs in 
conversational exchanges. The interest lies in analyzing the development 
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of linguistic communication with a focus on those inferential abilities 
which help young children to see conversational acts as accomplishments 
of social episodes. (4) Given the belief of the present study that 
conversational competence is closely related to social functioning, we 
also aim to investigate children's performance on certain socio-cognitive 
tasks. We will attempt to relate the children's socio-cognitive 
abilities to their abilities as competent conversational partners. 
EXPECTATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study's underlying assumption is that the development of 
communicative competence goes hand in hand with the growth of social 
awareness and social sensitivity. However, as we have already argued, we 
do not wish to account for language development solely in terms of a 
socio-cognitive theory. What the argument of the present paper boils 
down to is that there are interesting correspondences between 
socio-cognitive acts and the linguistic acts that a child acquires. We 
are therefore interested in showing that language functioning is only one 
aspect of social functioning and that language development is best seen 
as being one aspect of the growth of general social understanding. 
Given that the study is observational, specific hypotheses are not 
made. The object is first of all to look and see what is there in 
children's language use. By analyzing their problems and development, 
we intend to offer 	 a developmental analysis of linguistic competence. 
We view these problems within the general context area of the child's 
emerging social understanding. Using independent socio-cognitive 
measures, we then attempt to explore whether the child faces similar 
problems in his social functioning. 
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METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS OF THE STUDY 
In order to investigate conversational behaviour and social 
functioning, the design of the present study should be one which has 
several important aspects. Firstly, we need a design which permits the 
investigator to arrive at a detailed analysis of what children do with 
language and how they do it in a social context. The design most 
appropriate for the present purposes is an observational one aiming at 
exploring language development and use in a natural everyday 
environment. However, understanding conversational interaction 
necessitates a clear picture of both verbal and nonverbal behaviour. 
Nonverbal cues (e.g. eye-to-eye contact) signal important messages in 
adult conversational interaction. With young children, moreover, the 
recording of nonverbal behaviour is very critical. Nonverbal behaviours 
are not just an accompaniment of talk but often, and particularly at an 
early age, an alternative to talk (Bates et al, 1979; Ochs, 1979; McTear, 
1985). As McTear (1985) has pointed out, many of the children's 
attention-getting and attention-drawing devices are nonverbal. It is 
often the case that the child points or touches the mother to direct her 
attention and uses gaze to establish eye-contact with her. These devices 
are sometimes used together with verbal ones, but are often used as 
substitutes. Consequently, to omit them would be to overlook important 
aspects of the children's conversational abilities. Furthermore, to pick 
up and understand the presence of indirect and non-literal speech, we 
often have to take into account both the context of the speech and 
certain nonverbal devices used to explicate the nature of the utterance. 
Thus, we need a videotaped documentation which helps us to assess the 
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significance of the discourse context. This is vital for assigning 
functional meaning to our conversational data. 
Secondly, given that the purpose of the present study is to take into 
account developments in social understanding, as well as developments in 
language understanding, the situation for analysis must be one which 
allows the investigation of both these understandings. In other words, 
the methodology which must be employed should take into account the 
social setting where both language and social functioning take place. To 
get a lifelike, but still structured, situation, the selected task is a 
game task. We thus videotaped conversations that occur when children-
play with an adult. The game requires that the two players create the 
rules whereby they shall play. To succeed they must cooperate by using 
language. By analyzing the beginning and the end of the game 
interaction, we can study both the ways in which participants establish 
and structure their discourse and the ways in which they arrive at 
agreements about social rules and social interactional patterns. 
Two related problems are relevant here. The first concerns the 
extent to which the present design provides a representative picture of 
children's general conversational abilities. The second, is concerned 
with the ways in which the data are collected and the extent to which 
these might affect the naturalness and spontaneity of the observed 
behaviour. The first concern raises sampling problems. On the one hand, 
there is the issue of the degree to which participation in a game will 
ellicit representative conversational behavior. Clearly, any situation 
chosen will have its intrinsic biases. The game situation was chosen 
both because children are familiar with such a situation and because it 
necessitates a considerable amount and variety of conversational 
- 88 - 
behavior. On the other hand, there is the question as to how 
representative the performance of such a small group of subjects can be. 
This may be a problem, but at this early stage in research, a detailed 
analysis of a relatively small sample of the children's language use is 
preferable to a more superficial analysis of a larger sample where many 
aspects of conversational behaviour will necessarily be overlooked. The 
second question concerns the extent to which the data can be considered 
as natural or spontaneous. To overcome such problems, all children who 
took part in the present study were recorded in their nursery. The 
camera was placed in one corner of a room and most children were unaware 
of its presence. To create an even more natural situation, the mother 
who was chosen to play the game with the child. It is believed that 
children feel more relaxed when playing with their mother. At the same 
time, her involvement should increase their chance both to draw on their 
ordinary repertoire of behaviours and also become meaningfully involved 
in the situation so that their behaviour would be representative. 
Thirdly, it was felt that the game situation was not sufficient for 
the investigator to infer the children's social awareness and social 
sensitivity. In order to arrive at a representative picture of the 
children's social development which is independent of performance in the 
game task, all children were assessed on three role-taking problems. 
Performance on these problems helps the investigator to examine the 
children's development of social understanding independently and then to 
explore its relationship to a naturally occurring interaction. At the 
same time, such tests help us to examine individual differences in social 
functioning within the same age group. This is especially important 
given the evidence that age has been suggested to be helpful but yet not 
a predictive variable for social development. 
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GENERAL PROCEDURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
(1) Subjects  
The children were selected from four age groups. There were (a) five 
children aged 3.6-4.0, (b) five children aged 4.6-5.0, (c) five children 
aged 5.6-6.0, and (d) four children aged 6.6-7.0. The mean age of the 
first group was 3.7, of the second group 4.8, of the third 5.7 and of the 
fourth 6.9. 
In the first two groups there were 3 boys and 2 girls. In the third 
group there were 3 girls and 2 boys and in the fourth 4 boys. 
Originally, the fourth age group had five children. However, the scores 
of the child in the last age group were not included in the final 
results. For most of the recording sessions, the mother was the one to 
talk and this child, aware of the camera, became camera shy. It was thus 
felt that his performance could not be representative of his true 
abilities and it was therefore not included in the present analysis. 
All other children had no problems with the game situation or the social 
tasks. 
Three children were videotaped in their own houses rather than in the 
nursery. Since the observer came to their house and set up the camera in 
front of them, they were fully aware of being videotaped. However, they 
did not appear to be unduly affected by the presence of the camera. From 
time to time they looked in the direction of it, but otherwise they 
ignored it and got on with their play. According to the mothers their 
play did not differ substantially from other occasions when they played 
together without the presence of the camera. 
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All the children but one were selected from a particular nursery 
located in the middle class community of Laguna Beach, Southern 
California. One child was selected from a nursery in a community near 
Laguna Beach. The nursery is situated in the Irvine university campus 
and serves mainly university students. The child's parents were Japanese 
students at Irvine. However, the three years and six months old child 
was born in United States and had a good grasp of the English language. 
All the subjects were volunteers. The observer composed several 
leaflets which were distributed to all the mothers at the nurseries. The 
leaflets explained the purpose and the methodology of the present study. 
The mothers interested in becoming part of the study were asked to make 
an appointment with the nursery coordinator. 
(ii) The recording sessions  
The recording sessions took place, in all but three cases, in an 
isolated room in the nursery. The observer had set up the camera before 
the child and the mother came in. As soon as the mother and child had 
entered the room the observer explained the purpose of the interaction 
and left the room. The length of the recording sessions varied with each 
individual mother-child pair. The average length of the sessions for the 
first two age groups was 20 minutes and for the last two age groups 35 
minutes. 
After each pair had finished the game the mother was asked to come to 
an adjacent room to inform the observer. Immediately after, the observer 
met the child and played with each child for about an hour. After this 
first contact, the child was asked to participate in the three 
socio-cognitive tasks. The mother was encouraged to be present, and most 
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mothers were in fact present. However, four of the mothers had to go and 
the socio-cognitive tasks were played without their presence. 
The children's performance in the socio-cognitive tasks was recorded. 
the recording sessions for the socio-cognitive tasks lasted for 
approximately 30 to 40 minutes. 
(iii) The Game Situation 
The game was a board game with unknown rules. As we have already 
pointed out, the aim of the mother-child interaction was to succeed in 
cooperating by using language in order to arrive at an agreement about 
the rules of the game and play it. The board game was designed by the 
observer. It was, however, very similar to a popular game played in the 
United States which is called "Candyland". It was believed that using a 
design for a game which was somehow familiar to most children will make 
the situation less stressful especially for the younger age group. All 
children were familiar with "Candyland" and had played it at least once. 
Each mother-child pair was presented with a 14"x 23" game board which 
represented a road composed of a series of coloured squares. The 
children had to snake their way from the beginning to arrive at a goal (a 
box of candies). There were several forks in the road (one was leading 
towards the goal and the others leading off the board). In the course of 
the journey the children encountered several potential threats (e.g. wild 
animals and witches). The complexity of the game varied according to the 
child's interpretation of these threatening objects (See Fig. 1). 
Along with the board the children were handed: a square cube with 
different colours in each side (could be used as a dice), a cutout figure 
of a key (could be used to open the door for the candies), a cutout 
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figure of a sword (could be used for protection from the dnimdls), and a 
toy pig and cow. The:.e objects were not necessary for the yams. Their 
employment as parts of the game was up to the individual child. 
FIG.1 THE BOARD GAME 
THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN 
REDACTED DUE TO THIRD 
PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER 
LEGAL ISSUES
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Two adult pairs were also asked to perform the same task. Their 
interactions were recorded and transcribed in the same manner as the 
children's. This was done to provide a standard for evaluating the 
children's performance on this new task. 
(iv) Transcription Rules  
All the videotapes of each mother-child pair were transcribed by the 
observer. The basic transcript included information about both the 
verbal and the nonverbal behaviour of the participants. The behaviour of 
the child and the mother was presented side by side in parallel columns. 
Turns were thus separated in individual participants columns. Fig. 2 
represents a portion of the actual transcript and its format. 
FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE OF THE TRANSCRIPT 
CHILD 
Non-Verbal 	 Verbal  
1.Looks at 	 1. We are to 





4. points at 4. (U) 
board  
MOTHER 	 CONTEXT 
Verbal 	 Non-Verbal  
1.Looks at C. 	 M=Mother 
C=Child 
2. Um 	 2.Looks at 	 Mother 
board comes 	 and 




3. Looks at 	 table in the 
board then at 	 nursery and 
4. Leans, looks 	 the game 
closely at 	 interaction 
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FIGURE 2 (continued) 
CHILD 
	
MOTHER 	 CONTEXT 
Non-Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Non-Verbal  
5.Watches M. 	 5. We can go 	 5. Points at 	 has just 
here. 	 route on board begun. 
6.Smiles, 	 6.Brown (WH) 	 6. Looks where 
points at 	 C. Points 
at board 
7.Watches M. 	 7.Brown!YES 	 7. points at 
brown square 
8.Looks close 	 8.And this? 	 8.points at 
at board 	 red square. 
9.Looks at M. 	 9.Red 	 9.//Red 	 9. Looks at C. 
smiles. 
10.Looks M. 	 10. Gre::en 	 10. Looks at board 
ll.then at 	 11 	 11. looks at C., nods 
The advantages of using such a format for children's transcripts are 
twofold (Ochs, 1979). First, the reader can see more easily the prior 
verbal behaviour of the child. In interpreting the child's utterance the 
reader of a transcript can assess its place with respect to what the 
child has been saying or doing as well as with respect to the talk or 
behaviour of the other speaker. That is, the present format provides 
greater access to the stream of behaviours that the talk of another may 
have interrupted. In this way, the researcher may assess whether the 
child's behaviour is contingent on the talk of another's or whether it is 
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contingent on both or neither. Second, several studies (Keenan,1975; 
Keenan and Klein, 1975) which documented the development of discourse 
coherence of twins (aged 2;9) over a period of one year, showed that 
young children link their utterances to their prior talk before linking 
them with the speech of others. So, verticality within each speaker 
column encourages such kinds of discourse links. 	 Further studies of 
children at the one-word stage (Bloom, 1973; Keenan and Schieffelin, 
1976; Atkinson, 1979) indicate that the expressions of a single 
proposition frequently cover the space of several utterances. This 
process may be thus masked in a classic vertical script format. 
A third column, near the participants' columns, provided the reader 
with specific information about the general context of the discourse. It 
it believed that this column is particularly important in understanding 
the presence of indirect or non-literal expressions. 
The mother's column was added on the right hand side of the child's 
column on purpose. In this way, transcription biases do not coincide 
with a priori cultural biases (i.e. the mother as the competent language 
user who controls and dominates discourse). 
As the above example indicates, behaviours are numbered sequentially 
as they occur. Behaviours are numbered Eor each page of transcription. 
Furthermore, as Fig.2 shows, behaviours that occur at the same time by 
two different participants are numbered by the same number. This system 
is useful in classifying different behaviours and in showing clearly to 
the reader the exact overlap of nonverbal with verbal behaviours (For 
example, the child's nonverbal behaviours 10,11 which occur with a single 
utterance). 
Certain symbols were used to describe nonverbal actions and frames, 
as well as matters of timing. These symbols are explained in Appendix 1. 
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Specific procedure of data analysis  
The transcripts were analyzed in two ways. First, a language 
analysis was carried out. However, in order to examine how language is 
placed in the general interactional pattern of the participants, a 
socio-interactional analysis was performed. 
LANGUAGE ANALYSIS  
The utterances of both the child and mother were coded in relation to 
their function as speech-acts. A special note was made as to whether the 
utterances performed a direct, indirect or non-literal function. In 
order to investigate how good communicators young children are, the 
childr-n's assertions were isolated and their degree of relevancy and 
cooperation was examined. 
(i) Speech-acts analysis: The utterances of both participants were coded 
according to Bach and Harnish's classification system. Their system 
includes six major classes of functions : ASSERTIVES, REQUESTIVES, 
RESPONSIVES, COMMISSIVES, EXPRESSIVES, and ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. However, 
given that the particular study is dealing with children's language, 
whereas Bach and Harnish's system is derived from adult's language, the 
classes were subdivided into a total of 20 highly differentiated 
subclasses of conversational acts. Part of Dore's (1977) system was used 
to arrive at the 20 subcategories. The actual system used in the present 
study is quite different from Dore's due to the poor inter-observer 
agreement that was obtained with Dore's original system. 
Table 1 below, shows the major classes with their subdivisions together 
with the definition of each class. 
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TABLE 1 SPEECH ACTS CLASSIFICATION 
(i)Assertions about objects 
(ii)Assertions about Events 
(iii)Assertions about internal 
phenomena 
ASSERTIVES: reports facts, 
states rules, convey 	  
attitudes,etc. 
RESPONSIVES: utterances 
which supply solicited 	  
information to prior 
requestive act. 
REQUESTIVES: utterances 
which solicit information 	  
from the hearer 
COMMISSIVES: utterances 
that look forward and 
promise or offer a claim 
to the partner. 
EXPRESSIVES:non- 
propositional 	  
utterances which 
convey attitudes 










act or simply helps 
the maintenance of 









(iv)Requests for clarification. 
(v)Requests for Action 
(vi)Suggestions 










To the above list two more categories were added . The category of 
Personal speech, and the category of Uninterpretables. Given that Bach 
and Harnish's system is for adult conversations it is perhaps not 
surprising that it does not include personal or private speech. However, 
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in the present study it was judged that such a category was needed since 
young children often talk to themselves and do not use language which is 
directed to others. 
PERSONAL SPEECH: essentially 
covers any speech which is 
apparently an accompaniment to 
an activity and apparently addressed 
to the speaker (self) rather than others. 
UNINTERPRETABLES: any utterance 
judged to be uncodable by the 
observer and any utterance which 
was unintelligible at the stage of 
transcription to the observer. 
Percentage of agreement between the observers was checked by using 
five pages of transcription from each mother-child pair. A research 
student in psychology and cognitive studies at the University of 
California, Irvine acted as the co-observer. The co-observer had a copy 
of the classification system for a week. After a week he was asked to 
code children's speech acts in some old transcripts. The co-observer was 
thus trained for a day before he started coding the present study's data. 
There were no speech acts categories which were more prone to errors. 
The pages were drawn at random thus representing the beginning, middle or 
end of the game interaction. The reliability was assessed at 94% in the 
speech-acts analysis. (For a detailed description of the definitions 
used for the speech-act categories and their subcategories see Appendix 
2). 
(ii) Analysis of indirect and non-literal speech  
All the speech-acts produced by both the mother and the child were 
examined in relation to their degree of directness and non-literality. 
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All the different types of direct, indirect and non-literal speech were 
computed for each child across the different age groups. 
The coding system for understanding the presence of an indirect or 
non-literal expression was the following: 
INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS: 
Any speech act which was judged as having two illocutionary forces was 
coded as being an indirect speech-act. To judge the presence of an 
indirect speech-act, the coder had to rely on the relevant contextual 
information of the utterance in question. 
For example: Speaker (S) utters : " There is a tiger there" to the hearer 
(H). 
It is a mutual contextual belief that S and H are playing 
a game and the location of the tiger on the board is 
irrelevant to the discussion so far. 
Thus, H infers that S could not be merely stating that the 
tiger is over there. 
It is a mutual contextual belief that "tigers" are 
dangerous. Thus, H infers that S in stating that there 
is a tiger there, he is also requesting H not to go near 
the tiger. 
Therefore, the utterance " There is a tiger there" is an 
ASSERTION but under the specific circumstances it serves 
an additional illocutionary intent and it also becomes a 
REQUESTIVE. 
All the indirect utterances were isolated and they were re-coded 
according to several sub-categories. Following Bach and Harnish (1979) 
there are three main subcategories of indirectness: 
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(1) Standardized  form 
Some forms which appear to be indirect actually behave as if they were 
direct in that the usual inferential process illustrated above is 
apparently short-circuited. This process has been called 
"standardization" and some typical examples are : 
(a)Wh-Imperatives  
E.g. Could you pass the salt? 
Would you pass the salt? 
Indirect Force : (I request you) to pass the salt 
(b)Impositives  
E.g. Why don't you read? 
Shouldn't you read? 
How about reading? 
Indirect Force: (I request you) to read 
(c)9ueclaratives  
E.g. Does anyone read anymore? 
Indirect Force: Nobody reads anymore 
(2)Pragmatic Idioms(or situated conventional speech) 
Some forms do not receive their proper interpretation in any regular way; 
they are in effect idiomatic and must be learned case by case. Here are 
some typical examples: 
(Imperatives) 	 Take it easy (calm down) 
Never mind 	 (forget it) 
Buzz off 	 (leave) 
(Interrogatives) Isn't that nice? (that's nice) 
How do you do? 
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(3) Hints  (Logical inferences ) 
Hints require a logical inference on the part of the hearer for the 
realization of the speaker's intention. Typical examples are 	 The door 
is over there" - implying "Leave the room", or "The matches are all 
gone"- implying "Bring me some matches". Hints are employed when the 
speaker and hearer can rely on shared rules or on shared understandings 
of habits and motives in familiar set ups. 
NON-LITERAL SPEECH ACTS  
Where it was judged that the speaker does not intend the literal 
meaning of the expressed phrase, the speech-act was coded as being 
non-literal. There are three main subcategories of non-literality. 
These are: 
(1)Understatement or Overstatement  
E.g. Not bad! (Very good, Great!) 
I wasn't born yesterday ( I am not so naive) 
No one understands me (Not a lot of people understand me) 
In these cases, the hearer understands what is implied by recognizing the 
next evaluation towards the midpoint of the relevant scale. 
(2)Irony, Sarcasm 
To recognize sarcastic comments, the hearer must understand that under 
the particular circumstances the opposite of what is said is meant. 
E.g. Boy, this food is terrific! (the food is terrible) 
(3)Metaphor  
E.g. She is as tall as a tree 
For the last kind of non-literality some relation R between what is said 
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and what is meant is needed to help guide the hearer's search for what is 
meant. For metaphors, like "She is as tall as a tree", the R is a 
figurative or metaphorical connection. In most cases, such connection is 
learned case by case. Thus, there is cultural diversity for metaphors. 
Whereas in our society the "tree" is used to symbolize "tallness", in 
another society the "house" might be used for the same purpose. 
To check the reliability of the coding, agreement between observers' 
categorization of utterances as direct, indirect or non-literal was 
checked using approximately 10% of all data. Agreement was evidenced in 
85% of the cases. Because of the very small number of indirect or 
non-literal utterances, all cases of each were used in assessing the 
reliability of the coder's categorization of the type of indirectness or 
non-literality of utterances of this kind. Inter-coder's agreement was 
assessed at 100%. 
(iii)Analysis of cooperation vs uncooperation  
In this level of language analysis we are concerned with the extent 
to which children at different developmental periods are able to draw on 
the relevant contextual information and make the kind of inferences 
required to understand each type of speech-act. To narrow down the scope 
of enquiry, we concentrated on two speech-act categories - the categories 
of assertions and responses - and analyzed them in terms of their degree 
of cooperation and relevance. Thus, the children's assertions and 
responses were examined in relation to how they are performed and whether 
they are relevant to previous discourse. This analysis aims at 
understanding the child's competence in acting upon the world by 
maximizing communicative competence. The method used for classifying 
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cooperation and competence was influenced by suggestions in child 
language literature regarding the problems that young children have in 
communicating. As reviewed in chapter 3, the literature suggests that 
the main limitation young children have in using language is in 
sustaining everyday communication by producing relevant replies, in 
clarifying their intentions and in realizing that their perspective is 
not always clear to others. 
The following system was used to classify the child's assertions and 
responses: 
(i)Analysis of the child's assertions: 
All the assertions produced by the children were isolated and were 
numbered. These were then coded according to specific categories. There 
were two main categories under which the child's assertions could fall. 
The assertions could be cooperative assertions or uncooperative  
assertions (i.e. the child is talking to himself and thus uses private 
speech). 
Two subcategories existed for the cooperative assertions: successful  
and unsuccessful cooperative assertions. The former are assertions 
directed to the hearer and successful in terms of the hearer's ability to 
understand them. The latter are assertions which, although directed to 
the hearer, the hearer is not in a position to understand (i.e. the child 
utters "I want it" without specifying verbally or nonverbally what "it" 
refers to). 
The successful assertions were further analyzed according to the 
degree to which they are dependent on the verbal or the nonverbal general 
background for understanding them. Thus, some assertions were grouped as 
being made appropriate by the verbal discourse (e.g. " I like it" when 
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"it" refers to the "doll" used in the previous utterance) and others as 
being made appropriate by nonverbal signals (i.e. " I want this" 
accompanied by pointing). 
(ii)Analysis of children's  responses: 
Given that our aim is to understand the degree of successful 
communication among the four age groups, the child's responses were 
isolated and were grouped as either successful, unsuccessful or 
uncooperative responses. 
Successful responses consisted of 	 (i) directly relevant responses  
(E.g. S:What colour is that? 
H:Blue 
(ii)indirectly relevant responses  
(E.g. S:Where do you want to go? 
H:No play 
(iii)non-verbal responses  
(E.g. S: Where shall we start? 
H: (points at GO) 
Unsuccessful responses consisted of (i) irrelevant responses  
(E.g. S: When did we play such a 
game? 
H: Tomorrow grandma 
Uncooperative responses consisted of (i) No responses  
(E.g. S: What shall we do with 
this? (shows dice) 
H: (turns back, plays.) 
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Percentage of agreement between observers was checked on 10% of all 
assertions and response. The reliability was assessed at 98% in the 
assertions and responses analysis. 
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 
The child's behaviour during the game interaction was broken down 
into several units. Each behavioural unit represented either a verbal 
utterance accompanied by a non-verbal act or a relevant non-verbal act. 
Each unit was then coded along two dimensions of social interaction. -It 
was coded according to whether the unit represented an act which was a 
positive act facilitating further interaction, or a negative act 
inhibiting further social interaction. To be more specific about naming 
positive and negative acts, these two categories were broken down into 
several sub-categories: 




(ii)Responses: 	 (a)One-Word 
(b)Extended 
(c)Non-Verbal 
(iii)Shared 	 (a)Watches 
Activity: 	 (b)Gives 
(c)Takes 
(d)Smiles 
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(e) concentrates 
on same activity 
(f) Acts in agreed 
ways. e.g. throws 
dice. 
(i)Waiting for initiation 	 (a) Stares at board 
or mother. 
(b) Sits motionless 
(ii)Non-social behaviours 	 (a) Concentrates 
on irrelevant act 
(b) Acts against 
agreed rules 
(c) Talks to self 
(d) Cries-Leaves 
room 




(iii)Unresponsive 	 (a) Sits motionless 
behaviours 	 (b) Concentrates on 
different activity 
Negative social  
interactional acts  
Percentage of agreement between observers was checked on whether the 
act was a positive or a negative one and on whether it was a positive 
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initiation or a response or an act which indicated shared activity. The 
other subcategories were not checked for reliability in so far as no 
statistical analysis was done on them. The reliability was assessed at 
88% in the social interactional acts analysis. (For a detailed 
description of the social interactional act categories see Appendix 2.) 
ANALYSIS OF MOTHER'S CONVERSATIONAL STYLE 
In several studies it was found that mother's speech to children is 
distinctively different from their speech to other adults. At the same 
time, as Howe (1978), Nelson (197'), McDonald and Pien (1982) and others 
have pointed out, there are individual differences in mother's 
conversational style. It is believed that differences in the mother's 
conversational style may in fact create differences in the child's 
language use. The present analysis investigates the extent to which 
mother's language across and within each age group is variable. Two main 
questions are of interest in the present analysis. The first is 
concerned with finding out any individual differences in mother's 
conversational style across and within age groups. The second looks at 
whether the variation among mothers (if there is any) is merely a 
response to differential age or linguistic maturity in the child. 
All the utterances produced by the mother in the game situation had 
been previously coded according to their illocutionary force in the 
speech-acts analysis. Here a further classification of the mother's 
intended illocutionary force was obtained. The system adopted was 
McDonald and Pien's (1982) category system which differentiates the 
utterances intended to elicit or acknowledge physical actions from those 
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intended to elicit or acknowledge verbal behaviour. This differentiation 
appears necessary because, as McDonald and Pien pointed out, mother's 
conversational behaviour tends to fall into two main clusters: that 
which elicits conversational participation and that which attempts to 
control and direct the child's behaviour. The mother who wishes to 
elicit her child's conversational participation will do so through the 
use of frequent questions (especially low-constraint questions), 
infrequent negations of the child's actions, infrequent use of 
directives, and infrequent monologuing. On the other hand, the mother 
who wishes to control or direct her child's behaviour will do so through 
the use of frequent high-constraint questions, (i.e. test questions), 
frequent use of directives, frequent use of negations of the child's 
verbal or physical actions and frequent monologuing. 
To explore such kinds of functions, the speech-acts produced by the 
mothers were further classified. Requestives were broken down into 
five-sub-categories: 
(1) Real questions: information seeking questions for 
which the speaker does not have the answer. 
Those types of questions carry a low degree of 
constraint of the child's behaviour. 
(2) Test questions: information seeking questions for 
which the speaker already has an answer. They are 
thus used to direct the hearer's attention, to 
demonstrate his knowledge or to explore its 
extent. Such questions carry a high degree of 
constraint. 
(3) Verbal reflective questions: questions which 
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repeat, reduce or paraphrase the hearer's 
previous utterance, without adding new 
information. They often take the form of 
Yes-No questions with rising intonation 
(e.g. "He did?") or tag questions with 
falling or falling-rising intonation (e.g. 
"He did, didn't he?"). Verbal reflective 
questions act to acknowledge the previous 
utterance, while at the same time, they pass 
the speaking turn to the hearer. Their 
constraint upon the form or content of the 
hearer's response is minimal for what is 
required is only a response which maintains 
the conversational topic. 
(4) Clarifications: are devices for "repairing" 
conversation when a misunderstanding has arisen. 
Repairs elicit a whole or partial repetition of 
the hearer's previous utterance with no alternative 
and are thus considered high-constraint questions. 
(5) Permission: These questions seek permission or 
acceptance for an action of the speaker. These 
questions may be thought of as indirect commands. 
The category of acknowledgment was also broken down into two 
categories: (1) Positive acknowledgment (e.g. "Good, girl!"). 
(2) Negative acknowledgment (e.g. "No" in response to 
the child's action ). 
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Mother's Dominance or monologuing was also measured. The degree of 
mother's monologuing was measured by the mother utterance-turn ratio. 
That is by the average number of mother utterances in a speaking turn. 
Percentage agreement between observers was checked on 10% of all the 
mother's utterances. The reliability was assessed at 91%. 
METHOD AND ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIO-COGNITIVE TASKS 
It has already been pointed out that the observer was called into the 
room as soon as each mother-child pair had finished with the game. The 
observer then played with each child for approximately an hour and as 
soon as the child was familiar with the observer, she administered the 
three socio-cognitive tasks. The child's behaviour during those tasks 
was video-recorded. The transcription, however, was not as detailed as 
for the game situation. The observer transcribed the videotapes by 
following a running-record method. 
For example : Observer : What is happening to the little boy? 
Child 	 : It is his birthday (looks at 0. smiles) 
Observer : And is he giving a party? A birthday party. 
Child 
	 : ( looks at O. nods head) 
Observer : How do you think he feels? (pause) 
What's his face? (turns looks at child) 
Child 	 : (turns looks at faces) Ha;;ppy ! 
Observer : Happy. Good. Put the face on the boy. 
Child 	 : (Selects happy face, puts it on top of 
the boy's body). 
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A description of the three socio-cognitive tasks is presented below. 
(1)"The Guess my story" Task and the "Face Sensitivity" Task  
The first task given to the children is concerned with "face 
sensitivity" to other's emotions and with the set of inferences needed 
for the child to guess what another person is trying to say by inferring 
the causality of pictures. In designing the task, the observer was 
influenced by the work of Borke (1971, 1973) and Light (1979). Borke 
(1973), presented children between three and eight years of age with a 
series of short stories. The children were asked to indicate how the 
child in each story felt by selecting a "happy", "sad", "angry" or 
"afraid" face. Similarly, Light (1979) read aloud some short stories and 
the children were asked to select among several faces the one which they 
thought matched the appropriate emotion of the child in the story. 
In the present study, the child was asked to come up with a story 
which matched some pictures and then to select an appropriate face. The 
"guess my story" task was composed of seven pictures of several objects 
and of five blank faced cutout figures of a boy. The cards, were 
presented to the child in a predetermined sequence and each card 
represented an event. The seven pictures of objects were: a birthday 
cake, a present, a present box partially opened, a box with a snake 
coming out of it, a cat eating a piece of the birthday cake, and a sick 
boy in bed. The pictures were presented in the following sequence: A boy 
with his birthday cake and his present. A boy who sits down and opens 
the present. A boy who discovers a snake in the present box. A boy who 
sees a cat eating a piece of his birthday cake. And finally, a boy who 
is ill in bed. (Figure 3 represents the actual pictures given to the 
children). 
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FIGURE 3 Guess my  story task 
The experimenter presented the pictures to each child and asked them 
to guess the story. As soon as the child came up with an interpretation, 
the experimenter asked: "Which face do you think the boy has?" or "How do 
you think the boy feels?". For that purpose eight colored pictures of 
hoy 	 faces were drawn 	 two happy, two frightened, two sad, and two 
angly laces. The child was presented with two faces representing each 
emotion so that he could choose the same face for several sets of 
pictures If he thought that doing so is appropriate. Finally, the child 
THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO 
THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL 
ISSUES
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was asked to pick up the Eace he felt was the most appropriate one and to 
complete the boy's blank faced figure. (Figure 4 illustrates the faces 
used for this task). 
FIGURE 4 The 4 emotions used for the Face Sensitivity task 
(It) Wing Task: 
As goon As the children had completed the' "guess my story" task and 
the task of "face sensitivity", a "hiding task" was presented. This was 
A vAtIAtion of Light's (19/9) task, aiming to explore the child's ability 
THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO 
THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL 
ISSUES
- 114 - 
in role taking. It involved a three dimensionll figure of a cat and the 
picture of the birthday cake to be hidden from it amongst a group of 
obstacles arranged for that purpose. The obstacles were : a 
two dimensional wall, a three-dimensional armchair and a 
three- dimensional table. The child was asked to "hide the cake so that 
the cat cannot see it". When the child had done so, the experimenter 
gave the child the cat figure and asked : "Can the cat see the cake?" If 
the child answered "no" he was then asked to take the cat and to Eind the 
cake. The same procedure was carried out with a boy-figure, a girl 
figure and a dog figure. In each of the four trials, the position of the 
wall, armchair and table were changed. ( For a representation of the 
actual format of the task see Fig. 5). 
FIGURE 5 THE HIDING TASK 
THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO 
THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL 
ISSUES
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To score the socio-cognitive tasks, we initially adopted Light's 
(19 ) system. He developed a set of four or five point categorical 
scales. However, when applying these to the analysis of our children's 
performance, we found them inadequate. Most of the children's 
performance scores fell into the the middle two of Light's categories. 
To develop a more sensitive measure, we expanded Light's scoring 
categories by differentiating the middle categories. For example, in the 
hiding task, we observed that there were important differences in the 
quality of the majors errors committed as well as their number. The four 
and a half and five year-old children committed only one kind of major 
error in hiding the object from another person's view. They hid the 
object under the table. Although the object can be seen, there is a 
clear attempt to hide the object. Three and a half and four year-old 
children committed cruder errors. For example, they "hid" the doll in 
the middle of the room and merely turned the doll's head to the side. 
Using our eight category measure, we were able to code these differences. 
Applying our expanded measure, we were still dissatisfied. The 
categorical system was not doing justice to the richness of the data. 
Subtle, but important, distortions were produced. The key problem was 
that although the categories defined a series of steps in the ever more 
adequate solving of a task, there were clear differences in the amount 
accomplished in moving from one step to the next. To refine the measure 
further, the qualitative categories were translated into a percentage 
scale which more accurately reflected the relative distances between the 
developmental steps. 
The advantage of our scale may be illustrated with reference to the 
"guess my story" task. Using the categorical measure, we could simply 
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note that children progressed from (a) being unable to perform the task 
to (b) giving a label in response to the experimenter's question "What is 
that?" to (c) giving the label by himself to (d) giving a description of 
the objects to (d) describing the event to (e) giving a descriptive story 
and so on. The conceptual (and later statistical) problem is that each 
of these steps is regarded as an equivalent increment of achievement. 
Using the 0-100 scale, we could then attempt to represent our sense of 
the relative distance between the steps. In this vein, we assigned only 
five point differences between minor advances such as giving a label on 
one's own rather than just in response to the experimenter's inquiry.- We 
assigned a much larger increase (fifteen points) when the child takes the 
very significant step from describing the events in each picture to 
offering a descriptive story which integrates the Eour pictures. 
Another example of the advantage of our interval scale is provided by 
the hiding task. In scoring this task, we wished to differentiate among 
major errors. In particular, we felt that the error of "hiding under the 
table" reflected more adequate performance than the others. However, we 
did not wish to overestimate this difference. Other distinctions among 
categories reflected greater progress. By using the 0-100 scale, we were 
able to both differentiate the "hiding under the table" error from the 
others and indicate that it reflected a relatively minor advance. 
In sum, we decided to score the socio-cognitive tasks using a measure 
which transposed our expanded eight category system onto a 100 point 
scale. It is certainly the case that our assignment of relative 
distances between categories is somewhat arbitrary and vulnerable to 
criticism. However, we felt the advantages outweighed the 
disadvantages. Armed with an interval scale, we were able to measure the 
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performance of subjects in a way which was more sensitive to the 
differences among them. This in turn allowed for a more powerful 
statistical analysis of our results and ultimately a more accurate 
portrayal of the children's behavior. 
The "guess my story" task was scored as follows: 
Point 0 : The child is unwilling to participate. 
Points 25: The child is unable to perform. 
Points 30: The child seems unable to come up with a story-like 
elaboration of the seven pictures. However, the child answers 
experimenter's questions of the form " What is that?". 
Points 35: The child names particular objects in the pictures. 
(E.g. "A snake") 
Points 45: The child gives a description for each picture after 
the experimenter's questions.(E.g. "A cake and a boy") 
Points 55: The child labels the events that are represented in 
each picture. (E.g. "Birthday party"). However, there is no 
attempt to link the pictures or to use any connective or 
anaphoric articles. 
Points 70: The child gives a more or less straightforward 
presentation of the four picture story. The story includes some 
connective articles (e.g. "and", "then") but is very descriptive 
and lacks motivational statements of any kind. The child simply 
describes the objective details of the situation or action. 
Points 90: The child gives an elaborated story of the four 
pictures. However, the child comes up with the story with the 
experimenter's help. 
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Points 100: The child offers an elaborated story. The 
presentation of the correct four picture story makes it obvious 
that in the child's mind one picture represents an event which 
has a place in a sequence. The story includes motivational 
statements and connective and anaphoric articles. 
The Scoring Scale for the "face sensitivity" task was the following: 
Points 0 : The child is unwilling to participate in the task. 
Points 25: The child is unable to perform. 
Points 35: The child comes up with emotions which match the • 
story but he seems unable in more than half of the trials to 
find the appropriate face to match the emotion. 
Points 40 : The child uses the "Happy" face improperly. 
Points 50 : More than one "sad", "scared" and "cross" face is 
used inappropriately, with or without the right emotion. 
Points 65 : Only one "sad", "scared" and "cross" face is used 
inappropriately, with or without the right emotions. 
Points 75 : The appropriate emotion is chosen and the face to 
match the emotion is selected, but the child makes one careless 
identification of faces which is corrected. 
Points 90 : Fully correct choices in all six trials. The 
appropriate emotion is chosen and the face to match the emotion 
is selected. However, in at least two trials the child comes up 
with his choice only after the experimenter's query : "How does 
the child feel?". 
Points 100: Fully correct choices in all six trials. The 
appropriate emotion is chosen and the right face to match the 
emotion is selected without the experimenter's questioning. 
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The scoring categories for the "hiding task" were the following: 
Points 0 : The child is unwilling to participate. 
Points 25 : The child shows interest in the game and seems 
unable to perform. 
Points 30 : The child makes more than one major error or errors 
of some kind in all trials. Major errors were such that the 
object supposedly hidden was in fact openly and immediately 
visible to the seeker doll. 
Points 45 : The child makes one major error other than the 
hiding the object under the table. 
Points 50 : The child makes one major error. In this category 
however, the major error performed was only of one kind. The 
object was hidden under the table. 
Points 60 : The child makes two or three minor errors or at 
least one minor error which was left uncorrected or was 
corrected only after the experimenter's query : "Will that be a 
good hiding place?" or Are you sure that the cat cannot see the 
cake?" Minor errors included careless placements (e.g. leaving 
an arm or a foot protruding), or placements behind an armchair 
or the wall which did not use the limited cover effectively. 
Points 70 : One or two minor errors otherwise all correct. 
These errors were spontaneously corrected by the child. 
Points 80 : No errors in all four trials. The child in more 
than two of the trials placed the object in a position where 
both the seeker doll and the child could not see it. 
Points 100: No errors in all four trials. In more than two of 
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the trials the child placed the object in a position where the doll could 
not see it but the child himself could. 
,v- 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS  
The results of the study are presented in three sections. In the 
first, we present the results from the language analysis. In the second, 
we present children's scores on the social interactional analysis during 
the game. In the third section, we present children's scores on the • 
socio-cognitive tasks. 
(1) LANGUAGE ANALYSIS 
(a) Results from the speech-acts analysis  
The utterances addressed to the child or the mother during the game 
interaction were isolated and were categorized according to their 
conversational act or function. The conversational acts of all five 
children in each age group were added for each conversational class. 
Table 2 and 2a represents the mean scores and the standard deviations of 
the mother's and child's scores for each age group. 
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ASSERTIVES 	 X 21.8 37 37.4 45 
SD 12.4 20.2 21.2 8.7 
RESPONSIVES X 14.8 27.6 17.8 23.7 
SD 8.5 13.2 9.9 1.7 
REQUESTIVES X 4.4 10.2 13.2 23.5 
SD 4.1 4.6 4.3 10.3. 
EXPRESSIVES X 2.4 7 7.6 10 
SD 1.5 2.6 5.2 4.8 
ACKNOWL. 	 X 4 10.6 10.6 14 
SD 2.9 7 7.6 4.5 
COMMISSIVES X 0 1 1.4 2.5 
SD 0 1.7 2.4 3.1 
UNCODABLE 	 X 4.4 7.8 4.1 2.1 
SD 3.1 1.3 1.5 1.8 
PERSONAL 	 X 5 0.6 0 0 
SD 3.1 1.5 0 0 
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ASSERTIVES 	 X 31.4 26.8 40.4 40.2 
SD 7.6 5.8 15.2 10.1 
RESPONSIVES 	 X 1 2.8 3.4 9.5 
SD 0.8 2.2 1.6 3.4 
REQUESTIVES 	 X 39.2 48.6 31.8 32 
SD 6.4 4.1 19.8 9.5 
EXPRESSIVES 	 X 7.4 9.8 10 10 
SD 4.1 5.6 4 8.4 
ACKNOW. 	 X 13 27.4 13.4 17.5 
SD 5.4 13.6 2 8.3 
COMMISSIVES 	 X 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.75 
SD 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.1 
UNCODABLE 	 X 2.2 4 2.1 0.8 
SD 2.1 3.6 1.8 0.5 
PERSONAL 	 X 0 0 0 0 
SD 0 0 0 0 
As suggested in Tables 2 and 2a, despite some within group 
variability, the speech acts produced by mothers and their children of 
each age are importantly different. The nature and extent of these 
differences will be demonstrated throughout the analysis which follows. 
The relationship between the mothers' and the children's scores was 
also examined. A non-significant relati[►ship was found between the 
mother's and the child's acknowledgment (r=0.29), commissives 
(r=-0.152), expressives (r=-0.009), assertives (r=-0.008), requestives 
(r=0.010), and responsives (r=0.39). 
The distribution of functions within general conversational class are 
presented in Table 3. The table presents the overall number and 
percentages of each age group. For the individual results of the 
speech-acts see appendix 3. 
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TABLE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS  
WITHIN GENERAL CONVERSATIONAL CLASS  
1st Age Group 2nd Age Group 	 3rd Age Group 	 4th Age Group 
mean age:3.7 	 mean age:4.8 
	 mean age:5.7 	 mean age:6.9 



















































































































TOTAL 269 475 508 598 460 525 470 450 
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There is a considerable difference in the "uses" of language by an 
adult and a child within the above major conversational classes. 
Especially in the first two age groups, mothers typically direct actions 
and ask questions. Similarly, with so many requestives addressed to the 
child, it is not remarkable that the child's responsives are high. With 
an increase in the child's age, we see a decrease in the mother's 
requestives (from 40.3% to 28.4%) and a move towards other uses of 
language (mother's assertives increase from 33.5% to 38.5%). However, 
the main change in the mother's speech is in the responsives and 
requestives categories. As indicated in Table 3, the change of these two 
categories comes at different developmental ages. We have the biggest 
change in the mother's use of requestives between the second and third 
age group (from 40.6% to 30.3%) and for the mother's responsive category 
the change is between the third and fourth age group (from 3.2% to 
8.4%). In the child's language we also see a decrease of responsives 
(from 27.5% to 18.9%) accompanied by an increase in requestives and 
expressives (from 8.2% to 15.7% and from 4.5% to 8.5% respectively). 
To test statistically for any differences between the speech-acts 
produced by the mother and the child across the age-groups, several 
analyses of variance were carried out. Two measures were isolated for 
determining significant differences between the mother and child. The 
first was the amount of talkativeness for each mother-child pair across 
the age groups. For this measure we computed the actual number of 
utterances produced by mother and child during the game interaction 
across the four age groups. The second measure was the actual 
differences between mother and child among the different conversational 
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classes. 
(a) Measure of Talkativeness: 
A Two-Way analysis of variance was carried out to determine any 
significant differences in the actual number of speech-acts uttered by 
the mother and the child across the four age groups. The F-Table is 
presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 DIFFERENCES IN THE No OF SPEECH ACTS  
PRODUCED BY MOTHER AND CHILD 
ACROSS THE AGE GROUPS  
SOURCE SS DF MS 
Between A. 
mother/child 




9359.13 3 3119.71 
A X B 2556.42 3 852.14 3.02 
Error 30949.2 30 1031.64 0.83 
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A nonsignificant difference was found between treatment A (F=2.57, 
p>0.05). Thus, the amount of speech-acts produced by both the mother and 
the child across the age groups is not significantly different. However, 
a significant difference was found (F=3.02, p<0.05) between Treatment B. 
Thus, with an increase in age we have an increase in the actual number of 
speech-acts which shows that both participants become more talkative 
within this specific interactional context. A nonsignificant 
interaction (F=0.83, p>0.05) was found between age and the number of 
speech-acts produced. 
A multiple comparison of means test was carried out to compare any 
mean differences in terms of their reliability. Using the Neuman-Keuls 
test, it was found that there was a significant difference between the 
mothers' and children's talkativeness in the first age group. The 
children remain speechless most of the time, and the mother is 
responsible for conversing. A nonsignificant difference was found in the 
mothers' and children's talkativeness in the remaining three age groups. 
(b) Differences between conversational classes:  
Several analyses of variance were performed to determine any 
significant differences between the mothers' and children 's speech 
within each conversational class. The F-table for the assertive category 
is presented in Table 5. 
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TABLE 5 F-TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
IN ASSERTIVES BETWEEN MOTHER AND CHILD 
MEANS : 	 MOTHER 	 Al = 31.4 	 CHILD Al=21.8 
A2 = 26.8 	 A2=37 
A3 = 40.4 	 A3=37.4 
A4 = 40.2 	 A4=45 
SOURCE SS DF MS 
Between A. 
mother/child 





1989.15 3 663.05 
A X B 281.05 3 93.68 
0.42 
Error 6697.5 30 223.25 
A nonsignificant difference was Eound in the number of assertives 
produced by the mother and the child across the four age groups (F=0.32, 
p>0.05). However, there was a significant difference (F=2.97, p<0.05) 
between the number of assertions produced in each age group. Young 
children produced less assertions than did the older ones. There was a 
nonsignificant interaction (F=0.42, p>0.05). 
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Table 6 represents the F-table of the analysis performed to determine 
if any significant differences between the number of the child's and 
mother's responsives exist. 
TABLE 6 F-TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
IN RESPONSIVES BETWEEN MOTHER AND CHILD 




SOURCE SS DF MS 
Between A. 
mother/child 




644.11 3 214 
3.24 
A X B 335.74 3 111.91 
1.69 
Error 1988.6 30 66.29 
A highly significant difference was found between the number of 
responsives used by the child and the mother across the four age groups 
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(F=31.84, p<0.05). Looking at the means we can see that mothers used 
significantly less responsives in their speech than did their children. 
A significant result (F=3.24, p<0.05) was also obtained between the four 
age groups. In other words, as children grow older, their use of 
responses increases. The interaction effect was not significant (F=1.69, 
p>0.05). In Table 7, the F-Table of the analysis performed to determine 
any differences in directives between the mother and child across the age 
groups is presented. 
TABLE 7 F-TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
IN REQUESTIVES BETWEEN MOTHER AND CHILD  








SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Between A. 
mother/child 






308.82 3 102.94 
A X B 1354.87 3 451.62 
Error 4462.55 30 148.75 
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The two-way analysis of variance yields a significant interaction 
(F=3.04, p<0.05). In other words, there is an interaction between the 
age group the child belongs to and their production of requestives. 
Looking at the mean scores, we see that children's use of directives does 
appear to increase with time. 	 In applying the Neuman-Keuls test to 
compare the means, we found that children's production of requestives in 
the fourth age group is significantly different from children's 
production in the first age group. The Neuman-Keuls test yield5a 
nonsignificant difference for the intermediate age groups. Even though 
the intermediate groups are not significantly different they nonetheless 
show an increase in the correct direction. As the children grow older, 
their use of requestives in communicating with their mothers increases. 
The Neuman-Keuls test yields nonsignificant differences in the mother's 
production of requestives across the four age groups. Thus, the amount 
of requestives in the mother's speech remains more or less constant 
across the age groups. 
A nonsignificant result was obtained between and within conditions 
Eor the remaining conversational classes. (For the raw data, see 
appendix 3) 
Overall, there are differences between the child's speech across age 
groups. In particular, mothers of young children speak more and their 
speech is directed to control their children's behaviour. As the 
children grow older they become more competent in using language as a 
successful communicative device. Thus, the actual number of speech acts 
for older children increases. At the same time, older children are able 
to shape and control conversation by requesting and producing relevant 
information to the mother's requests. 
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(ii) Results from the analysis of direct, indirect and non-literal speech  
The observer counted all the cases of indirect or non-literal speech 
which were produced by both the mother and the child across the four age 
groups. The proportions of direct and indirect or non-literal speech are 
presented in Table 8. Given that the instances of complex speech acts 
were few among the first three age groups, table 8 shows the total number 
of utterances produced by the mothers and children (five pairs) in each 
age group. 
TABLE 8 NUMBERS AND PROPORTIONS 
OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT OR NON-LITERAL SPEECH ACTS 
DIRECT INDIRECT NON-LITERAL TOTAL 
AGE 1 
Mother 451 	 (94.9%) 21 	 (4.4%) 3 (0.6%) 475 
	 (100%) 
3.6-4.0 Child 264 	 (98.1%) 4 	 (1.5%) 1 (0.:4%) 269 	 (100%) 
AGE 2 
Mother 560 	 (94.5%) 28 	 (4.7%) 10 (1.6%) 598 	 (100%) 
4.6-5.0 Child 495 	 (97.4%) 8 	 (1.6%) 5 (1%) 508 	 (100%) 
AGE 3 
Mother 484 	 (92.4%) 31 	 (5.9%) 9 (1.7%) 524 	 (100%) 
5.6-6.0 Child 451 	 (97%) 10 	 (2.1%) 4 (0.9%) 465 	 (100%) 
AGE 4 
Mother 377 	 (83.9%) 46 	 (10%) 26 (5.7%) 449 
	 (100%) 
6.6-7.0 Child 425 	 (89.7%) 38 	 (8%) 11 (2.3%) 474 	 (100%) 
7' • 
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Table 8 shows that there is indeed a gradual increase of indirectness 
across the age groups. This increase is present in both the mother's and 
the child's speech. Table 8 also shows an increase in the amount of 
non-literal speech, but this increase is evident only in the last age 
group. (For the children's and the mothers' individual scores see 
Appendix 3). 
Table 9 below gives the detailed analysis of the child's and the 
mother's indirect speech across the four age groups. 
TABLE 9 FREQUENCIES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIRECTNESS 
IN MOTHER'S AND CHILD'S SPEECH 
INDIRECT SPEECH 




M 	 7 7 1 4 19 
Al C 4 4 
M 	 8 11 5 4 28 
A2 C 1 5 2 8 
M 	 3 9 9 10 31 
A3 C 1 3 6 10 
M 	 6 11 8 21 46 
A4 C 	 2 7 8 21 38 
(*) 	 Note: M= mother, C=child, A1=3.6-4.0, 	 A2=4.6-5.0, A3=5.6-6.0, 
A4=6.6-7.0. 
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Figures 6,7 and 8 show graphical representations of the above results 
for the mothers' and children's speech across the four age groups. 
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FIGURE 7 GRAPHIC PRESENTATION 
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FIGURE 8 GRAPHIC PRESENTATION 
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Looking at Table 8, we can see that the mother's indirect comments in 
the youngest group represent 4.4% of the total speech and over half of 
these are of a standardized form. In the second group, we see an 
increase of pragmatic indirectness with standardized indirectness being 
very high. This result is hardly surprising. Mothers use speech to 
which they think that their children are more likely to respond. At 
three and four years of age, children are competent in using language for 
communicating. However, they lack the social cognitive requirements to 
see conversational acts as steps in plans for social ends. Thus, they 
can not cope with complex forms of indirectness such as hints, which • 
require an active inferential capacity on the part of the hearer. The 
mothers are less likely to produce talk which will confuse the children 
who will consequently fail to participate in the conversation. By four 
and five, however, the children understand that there is a distinction 
between the "form" and the "function" of an utterance and that utterances 
may convey different attitudes and perform many functions with the same 
form. Therefore, indirect speech which is of a standardized form is 
easier to comprehend. 
In the last two age groups, we see an increase of hints. By six 
years of age, the child's ability to understand indirectness develops 
fully and he starts coping with hints without needing explicit 
characterizations of the desired goal. However, though the mother is 
using some hints, most children were hesitant in using them in their 
speech. By the sixth year, the child's indirect remarks represent only 
2.1% of his total speech. We have the most significant increase of 
indirectness in the last age group, where it represents 8% of the total 
speech. By age seven, children are fully aware of the active and 
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flexible use of language and its power in a social context. 
The children in the first two age groups produced very few instances 
of indirect speech. However, most of the child's indirect speech 
consisted of hints. Ervin-Tripp (1979) and Keenan (19/zi) have commented 
on the young child's nature of indirect speech when they talk to adults. 
As both argued, the child's utterances may "look" indirect without having 
a clear intention to be so. That is because three year olds often focus 
their attention on obstacles rather than on specifying their means, when 
they speak to adults. Thus, although they are simply elliptical, their 
utterances look indirect. In the present study, the elliptical nature of 
the young child's indirectness was evident. Most of the speech which 
could be coded as hints was of the following nature : "I am tired" which 
may imply " Let's finish the game" or simply state an internal event. 
We saw some clear instances of hinting after age four and a half. We 
observed two instances of hinting in the children's speech in the second 
age group. Both instances were more sophisticated than the ones produced 
by the children in the first age group. However, the ability to hint 
among children in the second age group was limited. Although we found a 
complete structural masking of the directive intent, in both cases the 
desired object was mentioned. The two hinting instances of the second 
age group were the following: 
(1) "Mom don't you have a blue?" (Implying "It's your turn and you 
move to blue"). 
(2) "I didn't have any candies" (Implying "Let me have some"). 
In the remaining two age groups, children's hinting was of an even 
more complex nature. All of their hints were subtle and the desired 
objects were not mentioned. 
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Table 10 presents the frequencies of the different kinds of 
non-literality on the mother's and child's speech. 
TABLE 10  FREQUENCIES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF NON-LITERALITY 
IN MOTHER'S AND CHILD'S SPEECH  
DIRECT NON-LITERAL 
	
INDIRECT NON-LITERAL 	 TOTAL 
Under/Over Extension Metaphor Sarcasm General 
M 2 1 3 
Al C 1 1 
M 2 6 2 10 
A2 C 5 5 
M 4 5 9 
A3 C 4 4 
M 11 8 6 1 26 
A4 C 1 8 2 11 
(*) Note: M=Mother 
C=Child 
A1=3.6-4.0, A2=4.6-5.0, A3=5.5-6.0, A4=6.6-7.0 
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The instances of non-literality in both the mother's and the child's 
speech are very few. That is true for all the age groups. We can 
clearly see an increase of non-literal utterances in the last age group. 
However, the actual numbers are so small that they do not allow for any 
conclusive remarks about the nature of non-literality in the mother-child 
conversations. 
One concern of the present study was whether the game situation 
inhibited the expression of indirect or non-literal speech. To test for 
this, we administered the task to one adult pair and videotaped theif 
interaction. The pair consisted of two adults who were very familiar 
with each other. The degree of familiarity between adult participants 
was judged to be of great importance because most of the complex forms of 
indirectness are employed when the speakers can rely on shared 
understandings of habits and motives. Table 11 represents the 
proportions of direct and indirect or non-literal speech acts found in 
adult conversations. 
TABLE 11 PROPORTIONS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT AND NON-LITERAL SPEECH 
IN ADULT CONVERSATIONS 
DIRECT SPEECH INDIRECT AND NON LITERAL SPEECH 
Subject 1 136 (65.5%) 47 (34.5%) 
Subject 2 131 (61.8%) 50 (38.2%) 
Total 267 (63.7%) 97 (36.3%) 
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Overall, 63.7% of the adult's speech was of a direct nature and 36.3% 
was of an indirect or non-literal nature. Thus, we can argue that the 
game situation does not in fact inhibit the production of complex 
speech. In negotiating the rules of the game, adults used speech which 
did not explicitly state the desired goal or speech which was of a 
metaphoric or sarcastic nature 36.3% of the time. 
Table 12 and 13 represent the proportions of the different kinds of 
indirectness or non-literality in the adult conversations. 
(See following page) 
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TABLE 12 PROPORTIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES 
OF INDIRECTNESS IN ADULT CONVERSATION 
INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS 
STANDARDIZED FORM 	 PRAGMATIC 	 HINTS 
Wh-Imperatives Impositives Queclaratives 
S1 4 (12.9%) 4 (12.9%) 1 (3.2%) 6 (19.3%) 16(51.6%) 
S2 6 (17.6%) 1 (2.9%) 9 (26.5%) 18(52.9%) 
TOTAL 10 (15.4%) 5 (7.7%) 1 (1.5%) 15 (23.1%) 34(52.3%) 
FIGURE 9 GRAPHIC PRESENTATION 
OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIRECTNESS IN ADULT CONVERSATIONS  
\:. 
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TABLE 13 PROPORTIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF NON-LITERALITY 
IN ADULT SPEECH  
NON-LITERALITY 
Under/Over Extension Irony/Sarcasm Metaphor 
Si 5 (35.7%) 6 (42.8%) 3 (21.4%) 
S2 4 (30.8%) 7 (53.8%) 2 (15.4%) 
TOTAL 9 (33.3%) 13 (48.1%) 5 (18.5%) 
FIGURE 10 GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES  
OF NON-LITERALITY IN ADULT CONVERSATIONS  
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Looking at Table 12 and 13, we can see that most complex speech was 
indirect literal speech. There were very few instances of non-literal 
speech. Moreover, 52.3% of all indirect speech were hints. 
The videotape analysis of both the adult and the mother-child 
interactions has shown that understanding starts from context. When a 
listener is attending to ongoing action and its trajectory, it is 
possible to understand a congruent utterance with minimal interpretative 
work. What is said is likely to be redundant from what is already 
known. Alternative interpretations are not likely to be considered, 
including "literal interpretations", unless the utterance is so 
unconventional as to require inference to reach a relevant 
interpretation. Thus, the present study is in agreement with 
Ervin-Tripp's proposal: "We propose that participants become aware of 
inferential processes when there is an incongruity or misunderstanding 
and that this awareness has been the model for standard interpretation. 
Most of the time, language is facilitative to ongoing event projection, 
and merely confirms or supplements what is already known." (Ervin-Tripp, 
19 , p. 207). 
(iii) Results from the analysis of cooperation in conversations between  
mothers and their children  
All the assertions produced by the children were isolated and 
numbered. The assertions were then categorized according to whether they 
were cooperative, uncooperative, successful or unsuccessful. Table 14 
presents the proportions and the raw data of the different kinds of 
assertions and responses performed by the children in the four age groups. 
Verbal and nonverbal assertive and responsive remarks are included. 
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TABLE 14 CHILD'S ASSERTIVE REMARKS  
COOPERATIVE 	 UNCOOPERATIVE 
Successful 	 Unsuccessful 
3.6- 	 Assertives 	 102 (73.4%) 
4.0 
Age 	 Responsives 	 80 (57.1%) 
Group 




3 (2.1%) 	 57 (40.2%) 





Assertives 	 149 (80.5%) 
Responsives 	 157 (76.6%) 
Total 	 306 (78.5%) 
30 (16.2%) 	 6 (3.2%) 
11 (5.4%) 	 37 (18.4%) 
41 (10.5%) 	 43 (19%) 
5.6- 	 Assertives 	 185 (97.4%) 	 5 (2.6%) 
6.0 
Age 	 Responsives 	 123 (90.4%) 	 1 (0.7%) 
	
12 (8.8%) 
Group 	 Total 	 308 (94.5%) 	 6 (1.8%) 	 12 (3.7%) 
6.6- 	 Assertives 	 180 (100%) 
7.0 
Age 	 Responsives 	 97 (98%) 	 2 (2%) 
Group 	 Total 	 277 (99.3%) 	 2 (0.7%) 
Table 14 indicates that as age increases, cooperative and successful 
assertions increase. In a complementary manner, uncooperative or 
unsuccessful assertions decrease. 
In Table 15 below, proportions and frequencies of the verbal or 
nonverbal means employed by the children for making their assertions 
successful are presented. Here again, we have a decrease in the 
dependence on nonverbal means of communication with an increase of age. 
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TABLE 15 PROPORTIONS AND FREQUENCIES OF VERBAL AND NONVERBAL 










109 	 (78.4%) 
	
74 	 (52.8%) 
	
183 	 (65.6%) 
30 	 (21.6%) 
66 	 (47.15%) 
96 	 (34.4%) 
4.6- ASSERTIVES 185 	 (97.9%) 4 	 ( 	 2.1%) 
5.0 
Age RESPONSIVES 138 	 (68.6%) 63 	 (31.4%) 
Group Total 323 	 (82.8%) 67 	 (17.2%) 
5.6- ASSERTIVES 187 	 (98.4%) 3 	 (1.6%) 
6.0 
Age RESPONSIVES 89 	 (65.4%) 47 	 (34.5%) 
Group Total 276 	 (84.7%) 50 	 (15.3%) 
6.6- ASSERTIVES 180 	 (100%) - 	 (0%) 
7.0 
Age RESPONSIVES 89 	 (89.9%) 10 	 (10.1) 
Group Total 269(96.4%) 10 	 (3.4%) 
(a) Further analysis of the child's assertions  
Several anovas were performed in order to further explore the 
children's use of assertions. Because the amount of successful and 
unsuccessful production of assertions could be confounded with the amount 
of talk, the one-way analysis is done using the percentages of the 
child's speech rather than the raw data. The angular transformations 
were used for transforming the percentages in to a form which could be 
used in a statistical analysis. The data used and the anova tables are 
presented in Tables 16, 17 and 18. 
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TABLE 16 THE CHILD'S SUCCESSFUL ASSERTIONS  
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS  
1ST AGE GROUP 2ND AGE GROUP 3RD AGE GROUP 4TH AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 4.6-5.0 5.6-6.0 6.6-7.0 
SUB. 1 66.74 66.97 81.09 88.19 
SUB.2 61.27 59.74 88.10 88.19 
SUB.3 55.18 67.78 76.06 88.19 
SUB.4 47.18 59.79 88.19 88.19 
SUB.5 57.67 71.85 82.73 88.19 
ANOVA 	 TABLE 
SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Between 3160.18 3 1053.4 
39.9 
Within 423.32 16 26.4 
Total 3583.5 19 
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TABLE 17 THE CHILD'S UNSUCCESSFUL ASSERTIONS 
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS  
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
SUB.1 20.70 18.63 8.91 0 
SUB.2 28.73 27.20 0 0 
SUB.3 21.13 22.22 13.94 0 
SUB.4 31.24 33.21 0 0 
SUB.5 32.33 18.15 5.74 0 
ANOVA TABLE 
SS DF MS SOURCE 
Between 2633.2 3 877.7 
4.4 Within 31877.1 16 199.2 
Total 5820.3 19 
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TABLE 18 THE CHILD'S UNCOOPERATIVE ASSERTIONS 
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUP  
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
SUB.1 10.14 13.05 0 0 
SUB.2 0 12.25 0 0 
SUB.3 26.28 0 0 0 
SUB.4 25.99 0 0 0 
SUB.5 0 0 0 0 
ANOVA TABLE 
SOURCE SS DF MS 
Between 384.65 3 128.2 
2.3 
Within 882.32 16 55.1 
Total 1404.67 19 
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A highly significant difference (F=18.9, P<0.05) in the production of 
successful assertions was found among the four age groups. As children 
get older, they become better in producing speech which fits the 
listener's perspective and the social context of discourse. 
A highly significant difference (F=16.21, P<0.05) in the production 
of unsuccessful assertions was also found. In other words, young 
children often produce assertions which are directed to the listener, but 
the listener is not in a position to comprehend them. 
A nonsignificant difference (F=2.88, p>0.05) in the production of 
uncooperative assertions was found between the age groups. This finding 
is hardly surprising. By the age of three and a half, children have a 
clear desire to engage in communication with an adult and they do so by 
attempting to cooperate with him. Thus, in a structured situation where 
there is a specific task to be performed, the children are less likely to 
use private speech. 
(b) Further analysis of the child's responses  
Several one-way analyses of variance were performed to analyze the 
degree of successful and unsuccessful assertive responses. The 
statistical analysis used percentages and the angular transformations 
were computed. 
Given that our aim is to investigate the degree of successful 
communication among the four age groups, responses were grouped as 
successful, unsuccessful or uncooperative. 
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The following system was used: 
Successful Responses consisted of = Directly Relevant Responses 
Indirectly Relevant Responses 
Non-Verbal Responses 
Unsuccessful Responses " 	 = Irrelevant Responses 
Uncooperative Responses " 	 11 = No Responses 
The data and the anova tables are shown in Tables 19,20 and 21. 
TABLE 19 THE CHILD'S SUCCESSFUL RESPONSES  
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS 
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 	 3RD AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 	 5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
SUB.1 49.78 66.11 88.19 88.19 
SUB.2 43.91 68.19 68.61 88.19 
SUB.3 48.22 62.65 72.44 78.91 
SUB.4 52.24 47.87 66.34 78.91 
SUB.5 45 55.18 88.19 81.87 
ANOVA TABLE 
SS DF MS 	 F SOURCE 
Between 3872.54 3 1290.8 
4.5 
Within 4596.79 16 287.3 
Total 8469.33 19 
- 152 - 
TABLE 20 THE CHILD'S UNSUCCESSFUL RESPONSES 
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS  
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
SUB.1 16.74 16.64 0 0 
SUB.2 11.09 10.63 0 0 
SUB.3 13.56 13.31 0 0 
SUB.4 0 12.92 7.71 0 
SUB.5 0 11.97 0 0 
ANOVA TABLE 
SOURCE S DF MS F 
Between 558.48 3 186.16 
9.6 
Within 308.97 16 19.3 
Total 867.45 19 
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TABLE 21 THE CHILD'S UNCOOPERATIVE RESPONSES 
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS  
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
SUB.1 35.24 16.64 0 0 
SUB.2 43.91 18.72 21.39 0 
SUB.3 38.59 23.42 17.56 11.09 
SUB.4 37.76 39.23 22.22 11.09 
SUB.5 45 32.14 0 8.13 
ANOVA TABLE 
SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Between 3450.2 3 1150.1 
17.2 
Within 1069.5 16 66.8 
Total 4519.7 19 
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There is a highly significant difference (F=29.15, p<0.05) in the 
children's production of successful responses. As children grow older, 
they become more sensitive to the social demands of a question. They 
also become able to locate their responses in the appropriate context. 
A highly significant difference (F=7.59, p<0.05) was also found in 
the children's production of unsuccessful responses. This suggests that 
the number of irrelevant responses for young children is significantly 
higher than it is for older children. This can be explained by the fact 
that children at three and four years of age have realized that the 
purpose of a question is partly to give the speaking turn to the hearer. 
However, they are often either unable to understand what the question 
requires or what is the appropriate context against which the question 
should be understood. They take their turn, but provide irrelevant 
responses which only serve the purpose of maintaining the flow of 
conversation. 
A highly significant difference was found (F=22.01, p<0.05) in the 
use of uncooperative responses among the four age groups. The amount of 
unanswered questions declines with an increase in the child's age. 
Overall, the present results support the original hypotheses. Young 
children have major problems when they communicate with their mothers. 
Up to the age of four and a half to five, children seem to have problems 
in clarifying their intentions, in taking the perspective of the listener 
and in producing talk which is relevant to the conversation at hand. By 
the age of seven, the above limitations have evaporated. By that age, 
children seem able to maximize communicative effectiveness by drawing on 
the relevant contextual information. They are also able to role-take and 
understand the perspective of the listener. 
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RESULTS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL INTERACTION IN THE GAME  
SITUATION 
The number of positive and negative social acts performed by the 
child were counted across the four age groups. The original intention 
was to perform the same analysis for the mother's speech. However, it 
became apparent from looking at the transcripts that mothers did not 
engage in negative social acts. In particular, none of the mothers 
engaged in non-social behaviour or acted against agreed rules. In most 
cases, they responded to their children's questions. This finding can be 
explained by emphasizing the semi-experimental nature of the present 
design. It seems that in such a situation, mothers are unlikely to 
produce non-social behaviour. Thus, the following analysis is directed 
towards examining the child's social interaction. Table 22 presents the 
total number of such acts and their percentages.(For the child's 
individual scores see appendix 4). 
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TABLE 22 PERCENTAGES OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SOCIAL ACTS  
DURING THE GAME INTERACTION  
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 





S1 121 (73%) 140 (81.4%) 228 (98.3%) 153 (99.3%) 
S2 113 (77.9%) 158 (80.6%) 151 (96.8%) 215 (99.1%) 
S3 131 (66.8%) 190 (87.5%) 192 (97%) 313 (99.3%) 
S4 123 (65.1%) 181 (85.8%) 143 (86.4%) 197 (100%) 
S5 106 (76.2%) 132 (76.7%) 240 (99.2%) - 





S1 48 (27%) 32 (18.6%) 4 (1.7%) 1 (0.;7%) 
S2 32 (22%) 38 (19.4%) 5 (3.2%) 2 (0.9%) 
S3 65 (33.5%) 27 (12.5%) 6 (3%) 2 (0.6%) 
S4 64 (34.9%) 30 (14.2%) 32 (18.3%) 0 (0%) 
S5 33 (23.7%) 40 (23.3%) 2 (0.8%) 
Total 242 (28.2%) 167 (17.6%) 49 (5.4%) 5 (0.5%) 
22 shows that there is a decrease of negative social acts with 
an increase in the child's age. As children grow older they become 
increasingly able to engage in a meaningful social interaction and do so 
for longer periods of time. In other words, with an increase in the 
child's age, we have a decrease in behaviours which are potentially 
harmful to social exchanges. As we can see in Table 22, there is little 
variation among children within first two age groups and the fourth age 
group. However, this is not true for the third group. Subject 4 in the 
third age group scored an unusually high number (32) for his negative 
social acts. This result increased the total number of negative social 
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acts for this particular age group. In examining subject 4's scores, we 
saw that he seemed to be unresponsive because he chose to concentrate on 
a different or an irrelevant activity from the one his mother addressed. 
His scores, however, on the other subcategories of negative acts were 
less. Also his scores on the language parameters and the socio-cognitive 
parameters were not substantially different from the scores of the other 
four children in his age group. 
Table 23 provides a more differentiated picture of the above social 
acts looking at sub-categories of each act for each of the four age 
groups. 
TABLE 23 FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTAGES OF POSITIVE 
AND NEGATIVE SOCIAL ACTS BY AGE GROUP 
POSITIVE SOCIAL ACTS 
	 NEGATIVE SOCIAL ACTS 
Initiations Responsive Shared 
Activity 
Waiting 





Al 148 (17.3%) 136 (15.9%) 328 (38.3%) 57 (6.6%) 101 (11.8%) 87 (10.1%) 
A2 284 (32.3%) 189 (21.5%) 239 (27.2%) 46 (5.2%) 36 (4.1%) 85 (9.7%) 
A3 272 (27.3%) 89 (8.9%) 576 (57.8%) 14 (1.4%) 20 (2%) 26 (2.6%) 
A4 284 (30.9%) 97 (10.5%) 533 (58%) 1 (0.1%) 1 (0.1%) 3 (0.3%) 
(*) Note : Al= 3.6-4.0, A2= 4.6-5.0, A3= 5.6-6.0, A4= 6.6-7.0 
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Table 23 presents some interesting results. First, within the 
positive acts category, we have an increase of acts illustrating shared 
activity (from 38.3% to 58%) and initiating interaction (from 17.3% to 
30.9%) with an increase of age. This result illustrates an interesting 
difference in the nature of interaction in which children at different 
ages can engage. Young children sustain social interaction by merely 
responding to the adult's comments or acts. Thus, the successful 
maintenance of interaction depends on how skillful the adult is in 
producing comments to which a young child can respond. Older children, 
however, are able not only to respond to the other's comments but also to • 
initiate and control the nature of the interaction. Thus, when 
interacting, children are active and equal participants with the adult. 
(3) RESULTS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE MOTHER'S CONVERSATIONAL STYLE 
All the utterances produced by the mothers in the game situation were 
isolated and coded according to their illocutionary force. The new 
coding system differentiated the utterances intended to elicit or 
acknowledge the child's physical actions from those intended to elicit or 
acknowledge the child's verbal behaviour. 
Table 24 presents the pattern of distribution among categories across 
the mothers. Variability across the patterns of distribution among the 
mothers is not pronounced. Most mothers across the age groups used a lot 
of questions and a lot of assertives in communicating with their 
children. The third most frequent category used by mothers is the 
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Although there is no variability in the pattern of speech 
distribution among mothers in the same age group, there is an 
interesting variation in the use of mother's questions and mother's 
dominance across age groups. Several analyses of variance were 
performed to test for any significant differences in the mother's type 
of questions across the four age groups. The statistical analyses used 
angular transformations to transform the percentages of mother's 
utterances. 
Table 25 presents the anova table for the mother's use of test 
questions across the four age groups. 
TABLE 25 	 F TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
IN THE MOTHER'S USE OF TEST QUESTIONS 
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS 
SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Between 337.68 3 112.56 
4.81 
Within 374.35 16 23.4 
Total 712.04 19 
There is a significant difference (F=4.81, p<0.05) in the use of 
test questions across the four age groups. Mothers tend to use 
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high-constraint questions with the younger two age groups more 
frequently than they do with the older children. 
Table 26, 27 and 28 present the F-Tables of the mother's use of 
verbal reflective questions, real questions and directives across the 
four age groups. 
TABLE 26 	 F-TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES  
IN THE MOTHER'S USE OF VERBAL REFLECTIVE QUESTIONS  
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS  
SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Between 140.09 3 46.7 
2.66 
Within 281.36 16 17.58 
Total 421.45 19 
A non-significant difference (F=2.66, p>0.05) was found in the 
mother's use of verbal reflective questions across the four age 
groups. Mother's speech to young children and to older ones contains 
equal instances of such questions which are simple and help the 
maintenance of the conversational flow. 
A non-significant difference (F=0.27, p>0.05) was also found for 
the mother's use of real questions across the four age groups. (See 
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Table 27). It seems, therefore, that mother's instances of real 
questioning do not increase with age. 
TABLE 27 	 F-TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
IN THE MOTHER'S USE OF REAL QUESTIONS  
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS.  
SOURCE 	 SS 
	
DF 	 ,S 
Between 	 35.75 	 3 	 11.92 
0.27 
Within 	 709.83 	 16 	 44.36 
Total 	 745.57 	 19 
Given that we have an increase of the mother's amount of 
questioning with a decrease in age, we can conclude that mother's 
questioning behaviour changes as a function of age only in terms of 
test questions. The mother's speech to young children contains many 
instances of this type of question which are simple and exercise a high 
constraint on the child's behaviour. However, this is not true for 
mothers in the two older groups. Although the mothers used many 
questions in their speech, these were genuine questions and the mothers 
showed no desire to control or direct their children's behaviour. 
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A non-significant difference (F=2.25, p>0.05) was found in the 
mother's use of directives across the four age groups (see Table 28). 
Thus, the mothers directive behaviour towards their children does not 
change as a function of age. 
TABLE 28 F TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
IN THE MOTHER'S USE OF DIRECTIVES 
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS 
SOURCE SS DF MS F 
Between 142.87 3 47.62 
2.25 
Within 338.07 16 21.13 
Total 480.93 19 
A significant difference (F=3.59, p<0.05) was found in the degree 
of the mother's monologuing across the four age groups (see Table 29). 
As the child gets older and a more equal partner in a conversation, the 
mother's speaking turns contain less utterances. 
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TABLE 29 F TABLE FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES 
IN MOTHER'S DOMINANCE 
ACROSS THE FOUR AGE GROUPS 
SOURCE SS DF MS 
Between 55.35 3 18.45 
3.59 
Within 82.27 16 5.14 
Total 137.62 19 
Overall, the results from the analysis of the mother's 
conversational style do not suggest any major individual differences in 
the mother's conversational style within age groups. There were, 
however, some differences of the mother's conversational style across 
age groups. Mother's speech to young children contains significantly 
more test questions than their speech to older children. At the same 
time, mothers tend to dominate the conversations with young children by 
producing significantly more utterances per speaking turn than they do 
when conversing with older children. Thus, we can conclude by saying 
that we found variations among mother's conversational styles but these 
variations were merely a response to differential age or linguistic 
maturity of the child rather than a response to individual differences 
of children or mothers styles. 
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RESULTS OF THE SOCIO-COGNITIVE TASKS 
The first socio-cognitive task - the Guess my story task - 
investigated the child's ability to come up with a story when faced 
with a set of pictures which represented connected events. The 
detailed system of the scoring is presented in the method section. For 







Child refuses to participate 
Childs attempts to perform but seems unable to do so 
Points 30 : Child labels objects after E's query of the form "What 
that?". 
is 
Points 35 : Child names objects in the pictures. 
Points 45 : Child gives a description of objects. 
Points 55 : Child labels events. 
Points 70 : Child gives a descriptive story. 
Points 90 : Child gives an elaborated story with Ex. help. 
Points 100 : Child gives an elaborated story , 	 full of motivational 
elements and connective devices. 
Table 31 presents the scores each subject received across the Eour 
age groups. 
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TABLE 30 	 CHILDREN'S SCORES ON "QUESS MY STORY" TASK 
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
SUB.1 25 45 55 70 
SUB.2 50 25 70 70 
SUB.3 30 55 70 70 
SUB.4 25 55 55 90 
SUB.5 35 45 50 100 
The results illustrate that the scores on the "Guess my story" task 
depend on age. Children as young as three and a half and four years of 
age fail to perform correctly in the above task, whereas children in 
the ages of six and a half and seven have no difficulty in linking the 
pictures together and coming up with an elaborated sequence of events. 
However, it is noteworthy that only one child performed in accordance 
with the last category. It seems that the task is complicated. Even 
children between the ages of six and a half and seven are not able to 
make an elaborated story when faced with a set of potentially connected 
pictures. 
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The second task investigated the child's ability to recognize 
different emotions and be sensitive to the other's emotions. 
The scoring system was: 
Points 0 : Child not willing to participate. 
Points 25: Child attempts to participate but 
he is unable to do so. 
Points 35: Child comes up with emotions which 
match story but selects wrong faces 
to match emotions. 
Points 40: The "Happy" face is used 
inappropriately. 
Points 50: More than one sad, scared or cross 
face is used inappropriately. 
Points 65: Not more than one of the above 
faces is used inappropriately. 
Points 80: The child gives one careless 
identification of faces . 
Points 90: The child gives correct choices 
but only after the E. questions 
about the emotions. 
Points 100:The child gives correct choices 
without E's intervention. 
Table 31 represents the results of children's performance on the 
"Face recognition" task. 
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TABLE 31 	 CHILDREN'S SCORES ON "FACE RECOGNITION" TASK  
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
SUB. 1 25 65 100 100 
SUB.2 50 65 70 100 
SUB.3 35 80 80 90 
SUB.4 50 50 90 90 
SUB.5 50 65 90 
Here again, performance increases with age. Children in the older 
age group had no difficulty with the task. However, children in the 
youngest age group were unable to perform adequately and one of them 
gave up. Table 31 indicates some interesting results. Despite their 
age, all children used the "happy" face appropriately throughout the 
task. The "happy" face thus was used most adeptly. This finding is in 
agreement with the findings of Borke (1971) and Light (19 ). On the 
remainder, the "sad" face was used more frequently than the "angry" and 
the "angry" face more frequently than the "scared". Children in both 
Group 1 and Group 2 did not use the "scared" or "angry" faces and did 
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not incorporate such emotions in their stories. 
The third task investigated the child's ability to take the 
perspective of another (i.e. to role-take) and his ability to make 
certain perceptual inferences. The scoring categories were the 
following: 
Points 0 : Child unwilling to participate 
Points 25: Child attempts to perform but seems unable 
Points 30: Child makes more than one major error 
Points 45: Child makes one major error 
Points 50: Child hides object "under" table 
Points 60: Child makes 2-3 minor errors 
Points 70: Child makes 1-2 minor errors 
Points 80: Child performs correctly. Both the seeker doll 
and the child cannot see the object 
Points 100: Child performs correctly. The seeker doll can 
not see the object but the child can 
Table 32 presents the children's scores on the Hiding task. 
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TABLE 32 CHILDREN'S SCORES ON THE "HIDING TASK"  
1ST AGE GROUP 	 2ND AGE GROUP 	 3RD AGE GROUP 	 4TH 	 AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 	 4.6-5.0 	 5.6-6.0 	 6.6-7.0 
SUB. 1 30 30 	 50 80 
SUB.2 30 45 	 50 80 
SUB.3 30 25 	 60 80 
SUB.4 40 50 	 60 100 
SUB.5 25 45 	 70 70 
Once again, the above results illustrate that the scores on the 
"hiding task" depend on age. Young children fail to perform correctly 
in the above task, whereas children in the last age group have no 
difficulty in hiding an object so that another person could not see 
it. Children in the first age group were either unable to understand 
the purpose of the game or were hiding the object right out in the 
open. By five years of age, we see some developments. All children in 
this age group except one, understood what was asked from them. 
However, they were still making major errors. The object to be hidden 
was either hidden "under" the table or they left the object in the open 
and simply turned the doll's head around so that it was facing the 
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other way. Two children from the third group hid the object under the 
table. Apart from the "under the table" error no other major errors 
were observed in the third age group. However, only the six and a half 
to seven year old children had no problems with the above task and 
responded in correct ways. 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF THE SOCIO-COGNITIVE TASKS  
The validity of role-taking ability as a construct was investigated 
by examining the inter-correlations of the three socio-cognitive tasks: 
Table 33 presents the correlation coefficients of the hiding task (HT), 
the guess my story task (GT) and the face recognition task (FT). 




GTASK FTASK AGE 
GTASK 0.764 1.000 
FTASK 0.752 0.698 1.000 
AGE 0.768 0.645 0.796 1.000 
All the above correlation coefficient are statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level. 
However, given that we know that performance on the socio-cognitive 
tasks is highly dependent on age, several regressions were carried out 
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in order to determine the level of significance when the age variable 
is controlled. 
Table 34, 35 and 36 present the regression tables for the three 
socio-cognitive tasks when the age variable is controlled. 
TABLE 34 REGRESSION TABLE OF HTASK CONTROLLING FOR FTASK AND AGE 
Dependent Variable : HTASK 
IV 	 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
	 STANDARD ERROR 	 t(1,16) 
GTASK 	 0.4594 	 0.1752 	 2.6 
AGE 	 0.5059 	 0.1878 	 2.7 
TABLE 35 REGRESSION TABLE OF HTASK CONTROLLING FOR FTASK AND AGE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE :HTASK 
IV 	 REGRESSION COEFFICIENT 
	 STD. ERROR 
	 t (1, 16) 
FTASK 	 0.4741 	 0.2728 	 1.7 
AGE 	 0.2610 	 0.3108 
	 0.8 
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TABLE 36 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF GTASK CONTROLLING FOR FTASK AND AGE  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:GTASK 
IV 	 REGRESSION COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 	 t (1, 16) 
FTASK 	 0.4741 	 0.2728 	 1.73 
AGE 	 0.2610 	 0.3108 	 0.8 
As Tables 34, 35 and 36 illustrate, there is a significant positive 
relation (t=2.62, p<0.05) between performance on the GTASK and the 
HTASK even when the effects of age are controlled. This finding is not 
surprising. Performance on the guess my story task depends partly on 
the ability to take the perspective of another person and to make 
accurate emotional inferences about the psychological states of other 
people. The hiding task, on the other hand, depends on the ability to 
take the visual perspective of other people. The other two regression 
coefficients are not significant at the 0.05 level. However, it is 
worth noting that we found a significant relation between the FTASK and 
the GTASK (t=1.7) at the 0.10 level. We can thus tentatively say that 
successful perspective taking of a set of events is related to 
successful perspective taking of another person's emotional states. 
Performance on the face recognition task, however, is not 
significantly related to performance on the hiding task (t=1.5, p>0.05) 
when the effect of age is removed. This finding is in agreement with 
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Flavell's argument. Following Flavell (1968), a distinction must be 
made between "perspective taking" tasks and tasks which depend on the 
"affective" side of role-taking. Flavell suggests that visual 
perspective taking is easier than role-taking when this involves the 
intentions or emotions of others. 
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CHAPTER 6  
DISCUSSION 
In the first section, the results of each type of analysis will be 
presented. In so doing, an attempt will be made to place the child's 
communicative functioning within the literature on children's language 
use. In the second section, the general issues raised by the study will 
be discussed. Here, we will discuss the relationship of conversational 
competence to social awareness and social sensitivity. In the end, we 
aim to contribute essential information towards a model of conversational 
development. 
(a)The present results  
Overall, the results of the present study confirm the original 
expectations. All participating children had a good grasp of the 
language and were able to use it as a powerful tool for communicating 
with their mothers. Even the children in the youngest age group were 
good communicators. They were able to understand most speech addressed 
to them, had clear intentions to communicate and, in most cases, were 
able to do so. The present study thus, is in agreement with so many 
others in the field (e.g. Ervin-Tripp, 1977, 1979; Keenan, 197 ; Dore, 
1979; Garvey, 1979; McShane, 1980; McTear, 1985), all of whom showed 
that, by the third year, children are conversationally quite competent. 
They initiate conversations, control the information received, and 
sustain a conversation for more than one turn by being able to identify, 
and in most cases respond appropriately to, the questions addressed to 
them. 
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Despite these accomplishments, three and a half and four year-old 
children have difficulties in using language. Their language only serves 
a limited number of functions and and their speech is not yet fully 
social. Moreover, their conversational exchanges are short. The 
interaction of the younger children contains significantly less 
utterances (per speaking turn) than does the interaction of older ones. 
However, it is important to keep in mind, that the learning of the 
social uses of language and the understanding of its social possibilities 
is a matter of degree. In the present study, we have witnessed a gradual 
improvement in the child's ability to use language. In the beginning; 
use of language is egocentric. The child often lacks the ability to take 
his listener's perspective and place language in the appropriate social 
context. By the age of five and six, the child becomes increasingly 
competent in producing relevant talk and in fitting his utterances to the 
listener's needs. But at this age, the child has problems in 
comprehending and producing subtle uses of language (e.g. hints) which do 
not explicitly state the desired goal of communication. By the age of 
seven, we see the beginning of language use which attempts to go beyond 
the here and now context of interaction, and attempts to accomplish a 
series of social ends by employing subtle means. 
(i) Functions that language performs at different developmental periods  
From the outset, one of the aims was to investigate the various 
functions that language serves for both participants across different 
developmental periods. We found interesting differences between the 
child's language across the four age groups and between the child's and 
mother's language use. 
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The functions that all children performed with language were 
numerous. All were able to use language to request, to make a statement, 
to respond, and to acknowledge prior utterances. Table 37 presents the 
pattern of the distribution of language use together of the child's and 
mother's speech across the age groups. 
TABLE 37  
PATTERN OF SPEECH ACTS DISTRIBUTION  
IN MOTHER'S AND CHILD'S SPEECH, RANKED IN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE 
1ST AGE GROUP 
3.6-4.0 
2ND AGE GROUP 
4.6-5.0 
3RD AGE GROUP 
5.6-6.0 
4TH AGE GROUP 
6.6-7.0 
child 	 Mother child 	 mother child 	 mother child mother 
Assertives 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 
Responsives 2 7 2 6 2 6 2 5 
Directives 3 1 4 1 3 2 3 2 
Commissives - 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Expressives 7 4 6 4 5 4 5 4 
Acknowledg. 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 3 
Uncodable 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 6 
Private 6 
The pattern of the child's language functions remains more or 
the same across the four age groups. 	 The category of assertives 
less 
is the 
most frequent one for all the children. The second most frequent is the 
category of responsives. There are two important points worth noting 
here. First, it is interesting that the category of commissives is never 
used by the children of the first age group. Commissives are utterances 
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that look forward and promise or offer a claim to the hearer, committing 
the speaker to some future course of action. Both Searle (196 ) and Bach 
(19 ) have commented on the fact that this kind of speech act is the 
hardest one to find in everyday conversations. However, the present 
context of interaction is ideal for the employment of such language uses 
because it encourages language which is directed to future actions. It 
seems, therefore, that the actual illocutionary force of such utterances 
is too complicated for the younger children. For all the other age 
groups the category of commissives is the least frequent one. Second, it 
is only in the first age group that we see some instances of private. 
speech. Children between the ages of three and a half and four are more 
likely to use speech to fulfill their personal needs than older 
children. In contrast, older children's utterances were used only as a 
social activity, where conversational participation becomes the main aim 
and purpose of language. 
There are important differences in the functions that language 
performs across the four age groups despite the fact that the pattern of 
the child's language functions remains the same. Significant differences 
were found among the general conversational classes and among the several 
sub-categories within each conversational class. Though the assertive 
category is the most frequently used by all children, there is a 
significant increase of assertions with age. This is accompanied by a 
significant increase of directives. More significant are the differences 
across the age groups in the functions of language for the subcategories 
of the major conversational classes. Table 38 below, represents the raw 
data together with the percentages of the different subcategories within 
the assertive category. 
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TABLE 38  
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHILD'S ASSERTIVE REMARKS  
INTO THREE SUBCATEGORIES  





Al 60 21 28 -109 
55% 19.3% 25.7% 100% 
A2 43 58 84 185 
23.2% 31.3% 45.4% 100% 
A3 41 110 36 187 
21.9% 58.9% 19.2% 100% 
A4 25 93 62 180 
13.9% 51.7% 34.4% 100% 
Assertion is the function in which language is used as a means of 
communicating information to someone who does not already possess that 
information. As we can see from Table 38, the first stage of the child's 
attempt to talk about the world comes by his adoption of conventional 
means of communicating. The first age group scored a high percentage for 
- 180 - 
the labelling category. Fifty-five percent of all assertions consisted 
of one word which was a label of an object (i.e. "Ball") or a label of an 
attribution of an object (i.e. "Blue"). However, this labelling 
decreases as age increases. By the age seven, only 13.9% of the child's 
assertive remarks were labels. Instead, assertive comments were usually 
to describe events. Ervin-Tripp and Kernan (1977) and McShane (1980) 
found that labelling is the first activity to be grasped. For two and 
two and a half year-olds, the majority of assertive utterances are 
commonly labelling. By their third year, children begin to produce 
assertions which do not only label objects but also attribute properties 
to objects or describe an action (e.g. "fall down"). Though our younger 
group produced many labels as compared to the older groups, they were 
still able to produce assertions which were describing events or 
properties of objects in 45% of the cases. Thus, their speech had 
improved beyond that of the two year-old's. 
With age, we have a gradual increase of vocabulary. Words that 
describe events and subjective feelings are acquired as is the gradual 
ability to produce structured utterances. We also see an increased 
ability to use sentences that go beyond the here and now. The use of 
language to refer to spatially and temporally remote phenomena is a 
complex cognitive and linguistic skill. As Ervin-Tripp (1979) points 
out, children begin to master it after their third year. However, in our 
study, three and a half year-old children did not use any instances of 
assertions which attempted to go beyond the present environment. We 
observed the beginning of this ability in our second age group. It was 
after the fourth year that we found children exploiting the semantic 
potentials of language to refer beyond the immediate context. We 
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observed frequent instances of recall of past events or internal 
feelings, sometimes prompted and sometimes not. Some of the instances 
made reference to potential events (see example 1) or past events (see 
example 2). 
Example 1 	 Child (4;9): Let's play it again. 
Mother 	 : You want to win? 
Child 	 : Yes. This time I'll win. 
Example 2 	 Child (6;6): It is like the game I play with Kim. 
Mother 	 : Yes, it's like Candyland 
We see similar developments when examining the subcategories of the 
child's responsives across the four age groups. Table 39 presents the 
raw data together with the percentages of the child's scores in the 
category of responsives. 
TABLE 39 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHILD'S RESPONSIVES INTO TWO SUBCATEGORIES  
RESPONSES 
One -Word Responses Extended Responses Total 
Al 7 (77%) 17 	 (23%) 74 (100%) 
A2 83 (61.5%) 52 	 (38.5%) 135 (100%) 
A3 58 (65.2%) 31 	 (34.8%) 89 (100%) 
A4 41 (46.1%) 48 	 (53.9%) 89 (100%) 
(*) Note : A2=4.6-5.0, A3=5.6-6.0,A4=6.6-7.0 
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As Table 39 illustrates, responses providing the required information 
decreased with age. This was accompanied with an increase of responses 
providing extended replies. Whereas both the above type of answers are 
appropriate for conversation, extended replies serve an additional role. 
Apart from providing an answer, they also help maintain conversation by 
initiating further remarks and by extending the topic. Most of the 
minimal replies consisted of yes-no answers or naming answers. The 
prevalence of minimal replies in the young child's language can be 
explained by taking into account many different factors. First, one can 
argue that the linguistic ability required for one word replies is 
substantially less than that required for an extended one. Whereas the 
former requires knowledge of the conventional aspects of language, the 
latter needs both sematic, linguistic and social ability. Second, the 
mother's speech towards the young children contains many instances of 
yes-no and naming questioning. This is not true of her speech towards 
older children. In our analysis of the mother's conversational style, we 
Found a high percentage of test and tag questions directed towards young 
children. It seems, therefore, that most mothers adapt their speech 
pattern according to their perception of what the young child can 
understand. Most mothers were aware that addressing complicated 
questions (e.g. requiring explanations, justifications, or extra 
information) will cause a breakdown of communication. Consequently, they 
rarely used them. Most questions, however, addressed to older children 
(especially towards six and seven year-old children ) were of a how, 
where and why nature. 
Some interesting differences among the age groups in the "yes-no" 
replies were found. In adult conversations, yes-no questions elicit a 
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range of alternative replies. These include yes-no replies, simplo 
synonyms of them, and replies containing various degrees of inferential 
distance between explicit answers and explanations depending on shared 
assumptions. For example, the question Can I go outside?" could be 
responded to with "It is cold". Such inferential gaps are in fact 
characteristic of communication where both sharing of assumptions and 
abbreviations are considered normal. 
For the first two age groups, all yes-no replies were very explicit. 
In addition, we had an increase of explicitness in the second age group. 
It seems that children in the age range of four and a half and five are 
far more preoccupied with the clarity of their responses than in saving 
time in replying. It was in the last two age groups that we observed a 
few instances of non-explicit replies to yes-no questions which depended 
on shared assumptions for inference (See example 3 and 4). 
Example 3 	 Mother 	 : Can I go there? 
Child (6:8) : You will be eaten 
Example 4 	 Mother 	 : Shall we have this rule? 
Child (6;0) : Ok, let's have it.. 
Table 40 represents the raw data and the percentages of the child's 
subcategories of the directive and requestive function. Young children 
rarely employed this function. Moreover, whenever they did, it was only 
for the purpose of soliciting an action. We have very few instances of 
real questioning in the youngest age group. With the second age group on 
the other hand, we observe the beginning of the child's ability to use 
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directives for a variety of purposes: to clarify the speaker's 
intention, to ask permission, to request further information and to 
control the information received. 
TABLE 40  
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHILD'S REQUESTIVES 
INTO SEVEN SUBCATEGORIES  
REQUESTIVES 
* DAR DAS QC QR QT QRF QP TOTAL 
Al 16 6 22 
72.7% 27.3% 100% 
A2 20 5 9 12 2 3 51 
39.2% 9.8% 17.6% 23.5% 3.9% 5.9% 100% 
A3 19 7 6 29 2 2 65 
29.2% 10.8% 9.2% 44.6% 3.2% 3.1% 100% 
A4 21 6 5 34 2 6 74 
28.4% 8.1% 6.7% 45.9% 2.7% 8.1% 100% 
(*) Note : DAR= Request for Action Al=3.6-4.0 
DAS= Suggestions A2=4.6-5.0 
QC = Request for Clarification A3-5.6-6.0 
QR = Real Questions A4=6.6-7.0 
QT = Test Questions 
QRF= Verbal Reflective Questions 
QP = Requests for Permission 
Most researchers have argued that the acquisition of requestives 
appears earlier than the acquisition of assertives. This is because the 
two speech acts are importantly different. Utterances which make a 
statement or an assertion are the linguistic expression of the child's 
cognition of the world of objects and of other people. To express 
successfully the speaker's intention, such utterances require 
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conventional lexical content, whereas appropriate intonation is often 
sufficient to indicate a request regardless of the phonological or 
lexical content of the utterance. The difference goes yet further. 
There are behavioural correlates of requesting and directing attention 
such as "reaching" and "pointing" which serve to further clarify 
communicative intentions. These, however, cannot be behaviourally 
disambiguated to the same extent with statements. An additional 
difference between the two types of speech acts is reflected in the fact 
that statements are subject to criteria of truth or falsity whereas 
utterances that request and call attention are more appropriately 
considered as felicitous or infelicitous. Thus, with statements the 
burden of intelligibility is carried by the semantic content of the 
utterance. Consequently our finding of a high percentage of assertives 
and a smaller percentage of directives, especially in the speech of the 
young children, requires an explanation which must come outside the field 
of the child's linguistic ability. 
We can explain the present results by examining the structure of the 
interaction that occurred between the mother and the child in the present 
social context (i.e. the establishment of specific rules for a game ). 
The interaction between the mothers and young children was unequal and 
pedagogical in nature. Mothers typically asked questions and directed 
behaviour, while the child labelled objects around him or responded to 
the questions addressed to him. It is only in the last age group that a 
more equal interaction emerges. Here we have an increase in assertions 
accompanied with a rise of directives. This changes the pattern of the 
distribution of language functions. The mother becomes a true 
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participant with equal rights rather than a controlling figure 
responsible for directing communication. 
The gradual development of an equal interaction can be seen when we 
consider several factors in the child's and mother's speech across the 
four age groups. First, we have an unequal distribution of the actual 
number of speech acts between mother and child for the first age group. 
Mothers talk far more than their children and they do so significantly 
more than in any of the other three age groups. By the fourth year, this 
inequality is not present. Second, with age, we have a significant 
increase in the child's directives. As children grow older, they become 
more competent in asking questions and in controlling and directing their 
mother's behaviour. Last, in examining the type of the mother's 
questioning, we see a significant difference in their use of test 
questions across the four age groups. When interacting with three and a 
half to five year-old children (i.e., with the first two age groups), 
mothers make use of a lot of high constraint questions. However, as we 
saw, this is not typical of their speech towards older children. High 
constraint questions serve two main purposes: they are simple and secure 
efficient communication, while serving as tools for directing and 
controlling the child's behaviour. 
The above points lead us to conclude that the present social context 
encourages a certain type of interaction between young children and 
mothers and a different type between older children and mothers. For the 
four year-old child, the interaction is asymmetrical - it is one of the 
relationship between an superordinate figure and a subordinate one. In 
contrast, the interaction that the seven year-olds are engaged in is 
symmetrical. 
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(ii) Coherence of Children's Discourse  
One of our aims was to examine how the child becomes a better 
conversationalist. We wished to examine how and when the child produces 
coherent discourse and learns to adapt his speech to the listener's 
needs. We isolated two important concepts which we felt are necessary 
for a successful conversation: the concept of "relevancy" and the concept 
of "speech adaptability". The first implies that the contributions a 
speaker makes should be relevant to the topic at hand. The second 
suggests that those contributions should be adapted to the listener's 
perspective and knowledge. 
Piaget (195's) suggested that even children as old as five and six 
years are reluctant to attend to one another's utterances. For the most 
part, children talk alongside one another but not with one another. The 
child's "egocentrism" both prevents him from adapting or addressing his 
speech to a listener and hinders him from adopting the perspective of his 
interactional partner. Insofar as his utterances are not contingent on 
the listener's showing signs of understanding, he does not expect the 
listener to respond appropriately. It seems, therefore, that the 
egocentric child is unable to consider seriously the conversational 
contributions of others. Thus, children in interacting with others 
produce collective monologues rather than dialogues. 
However, our analysis of the child's assertions and responses yield 
results which contradict the Piagetian paradigm. Our results agree with 
Keenan and Klein (1975), Dore (1979), Ervin-Tripp (1979) and McTear 
(1985) who show that children's pragmatic understanding of language is 
far better than the one which surfaces in their speech. We found that 
even four and a half year-old children frequently made the continuation 
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of their utterances contingent on the addressee's responding 
appropriately. It was also the case that as speakers, the children would 
often adapt their utterances to the form or content of the previous 
speaker's utterance. In this light, we feel that the capacity of young 
children to engage in dialogues had been underestimated and that the 
properties of these interactions deserve further elaboration. 
(a) Degree of Appropriateness and Relevance of the Children's Responses  
The results of our analysis of the children's responses yield an 
interesting picture. First, we found nonsignificant differences in the 
number of inappropriate responses across the four age groups. This 
finding suggests that even when young children choose to reply to the 
questions addressed to them, they are able to place their responses in 
the appropriate context and do so in a manner that ensures successful 
communication. 
Despite this ability, we found significant differences in the number 
of uncooperative and cooperative responses across the four age groups. 
In particular, we found that 40.7 per cent of the time, children in the 
age range of three and a half to four fail to respond to the questions 
addressed to them. This finding contradicts Stefferson's (1978). He 
found that two year old children generally responded to questions, but 
their responses were often inappropriate. We did not find evidence of 
the child operating with the rule if there is a question give an answer 
even if you don't understand it". It seems that children older than two 
years are in a position to understand rules of appropriateness and are 
thus less willing to violate them. However, the high percentage of the 
young child's unanswered questions leads us to agree with Dore's (1977) 
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claim that, for these children, failure to respond does not appear to 
violate a social obligation. Obviously, the ability to respond interacts 
with the development of the comprehension of the question. 
The ability to respond to Wh-questions develops between the ages of 
one and six years (Ervin-Tripp, 1970). Children first learn to respond 
to where and what questions and later to why, how and when questions. 
This can be explained partly by appealing to the notion of conceptual 
complexity (for example, location is acquired earlier than concepts such 
as causality), but also by the type of response which the question 
requires. For example, where questions can often be answered 
nonverbally, whereas when, how and why questions generally require a 
verbal response. There seems, however, to be good reason to distinguish 
between the child's responses which are the result of comprehension of 
the question and the responses which reflect a realization that questions 
impose a social obligation to respond. We have no way of being certain 
that children process unanswered questions, but we have at least some 
behavioural evidence that they attend to most of them. Looking at the 
videotapes, we found that more than 90 per cent of the questions seemed 
to be deliberately not answered by children in the first two age groups. 
If the first decision an addressee must make after grammatically 
processing a question is whether or not to answer, then no answer seems 
to be a viable alternative for young children, and one which does not 
appear to violate a social obligation. The second decision an addressee 
must make is exactly how to answer. With age, we have a gradual increase 
in the proportion of answered questions. With the second age group, we 
observe for the first time, the child's ability to go back to the 
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question and require additional help when he does not know exactly how to 
answer the question. (See example 5 ). 
Example 5 Mother 	 : How do you want to play it? 
Child (4;9): What? 
Mother 	 : Do you want to play this game? 
Child 	 : Yeaaaaah ! 
Mother 	 : Ok, we have to make up some rules. 
Child 	 : Me? 
Mother 	 : No, we'll make them together 
By the age of seven, the children responded to 98 per cent of the 
questions addressed to them and all of the answers were 100 per cent 
successful (i.e. appropriate and relevant). 
There are also other developments that take place in the child's 
responses between the ages of three and a half and seven. These have to 
do with the ways in which responses are used to construct coherent 
sequences of dialogue. The main development is in the child's ability to 
structure his conversation. In the earliest age group, we found that 
children could respond to simple topics (as we already have mentioned 
these responses were usually one-word responses ). Their exchanges were 
usually fairly closed and did not combine into larger topically and 
interactionally related sequences. As a result, their conversations 
often came to a dead end and there was a continual need for the mother to 
initiate new topics. Example 6 below, illustrates an interactional 
sequence of a three year, eight months old child with his mother. 
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Example 6  : 	 Mother 	 : What is that ? (shows object to child) 
Child (3;8) : Pig 
Mother 	 : What shall we do with that little pig? 
Child 	 : (raises shoulders). 
Mother 	 : Shall we use it in our game ? 
Child 	 : Yes 
Mother 	 : Ok, do you want to be the pig ? 
Child 	 : (Nods head) 
Mother 	 : Ok, and I'll be the cow. 
Child 	 : Alligator (points at alligator on board) 
Mother 	 : Yes, an alligator! Scary !! 
(pause ) 
Mother 	 : And what is that Justin? (points) 
Child 	 : Lion 
Mother 	 : Good boy, and this? (points) 
Child 	 : Snake 
In the above interactional sequence, we see little or no attempt to 
relate one sequence to another. For most of the conversations of this 
age group, each turn was independent of the preceding one. We observed 
very few instances of cohesive devices. One aspect of development 
consists of the ability to structure longer sequences of dialogue. The 
major development comes when children learn to set up expectations or 
provide for the possibility of a Further response. This can be combined 
with the acquisition of devices Eor fitting more than one utterance into 
a turn. Consequently, we have longer interactional sequences which 
contain many 
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instances of "anaphoric" reference, conjunctions (i.e. "and", "then", 
"well", etc. ) and tags. Example 7 below illustrates the interactive 
sequence between a child six years and eight months old and his mother. 
Example 7 Mother 	 : Ok, here, is this a pig? (looks at pig) 
Child (6;8) : Yes, you will be the pig and I'll be the 
cow 
Mother 	 : Ok, and then what? 
Child 	 : Well, then you take this (shows dice) 
and you throw it, ok? 
Mother 	 : Ok, and then I move to the right colour 
Child 	 : Right, if it's red you go to red (points 
at board) and if it's blue you go there, 
Ok? (turns looks at mother) 
Mother 	 : oh, ok! 
 
Note how the child's responses respond to the mother's questions. At 
the same time, they contribute extra comments which both secure thematic 
continuity and initiate further conversation. It seems that both 
participants are engaging in a cooperative activity in which they seek to 
increment the commonly accepted set of propositions by contributing 
further propositions which are relevant to it. One speaker puts up some 
propositional information (e.g., "Yes, you will be the pig and I'll be 
the cow") as a relevant contribution to the topic at hand. The listener 
then goes on to accept it (e.g., "Ok") and contributes additional remarks 
(e.g., "then what?"). The first speaker then adds a further contribution 
(e.g., "Well, then you take this and you throw it.") 
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subject to the same constraints of relevance. Given the nature of such 
exchanges, cohesive devices and anaphoric references are needed to 
connect utterances together. The use of "it" in the following exchange 
determines that the word "color" has been accepted by the interlocutors 
as part of the common pool of shared information. 
Mother : Ok, and I move to the right color? 
Child : Right, if it is red you go to red 
Thus, the latter proposition becomes relevant by virtue of its place 
relative to the set of propositions which form the common ground of the 
discourse. 
How about the child's responses in the middle two age groups? As we 
have seen, the child's uncooperativeness decreases with age. However, in 
the second age group, we see an increase of unsuccessful responses. 
Although this increase is not significant, we nevertheless examined the 
nature of the child's unsuccessful responses. Most of these were 
responses to why and how questions (See example 9). 
Example 9 Mother 	 : Why did you go there? 
Child (4;7) : An alligator (points at alligator on 
board) 
 
It seems that the style of the mother's questioning is different from 
the style she used with younger children. When interacting with the 
three and half and four year-old children, most of the mothers do not use 
Why and How questions. They are considered more complex than naming 
questions and yes-no questions. However, in interacting with four and a 
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half and five year-old children, mothers start employing complex 
questions. It might be the case that such questions are not easy for the 
children of this age group and they therefore fail to answer . 
The conversational sequences of the four and a half and five year-old 
child were long and coherent. However, we observed the presence of 
several strategies which are not present in the older children's 
conversations, all of which aim at achieving a coherent and sustained 
dialogue. One strategy children used to achieve this end, was to rely 
heavily on the form of the mother's utterance and repeat it. (See example 
10). 
Example 10 Mother 	 : Where does that go ? 
Child (4;7) : That go, that go, (looks around 
board) (turns looks at mother) 
Where? 
 
The second strategy children used was to rely on the mother's form of 
utterance and modify it slightly (See example 11,11a). 
Example 11 Mother 	 : Can you go there Angie ? 
 
Child (4;9): You can go there, ok! 
Mother 	 : Ok, but I thought you will be eaten 
there ! 
Child 	 : You will be eaten there ? 
Mother 	 : Yes, that's what we agreed 
Child 	 : Oh, Ok! 
Example lla 
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Mother 	 : Well, you see we have to decide 
that 
Child (5;4): You see, we have to go there 
(points at end-point on board) 
This strategy brings out the importance of separating the child's 
"willingness" to cooperate in talk from his "skill". It is clear from 
the above examples that despite the child's inability to maintain 
referential talk exchanges for longer conversational sequences, he is 
willing to interact verbally. At this level, the discourse coherence•is 
achieved to a large extent by tying one's utterances to the formal 
properties of an antecedent one. 
The above does not imply that children did not have some problems in 
conversing. In particular, children of the second age group had 
difficulty engaging in conversation. In some instances, it took the 
mother several turns to secure the attention of the child and establish a 
discourse topic. (See example 12 ). 
Example 12 	 Mother 	 : What do you think we do with this? (shows 
dice to child ) 
Child (4;6): Oh! (looks at board) 
Mother 	 : Jastin, what do you think this is? (shows 
dice) 
Child 	 : (looks around ) 
Mother 	 : JUSTIN! I am talking to you! 
Child 	 : (Raises head looks at mother) 
Mother 	 : What is that ? (shows dice) 
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Child 	 : (Looks at dice, then at mother) 
Box, BOX! 
Mother 	 : Yes, but what do you do with it ? 
Child 	 : (looks at dice) 
(PAUSE) 
Mother 	 : What is that Justin? 
Child 	 : (Raises shoulders, looks around) 
Mother 	 : Oh come one Justin. 
Child 	 : (turns looks at mother) Dice! 
Mother 	 : Well, at last! 
And what do you do with the dice? 
Child 	 : (takes dice) Throw it (throws dice) 
Mother 	 : and 	
 (looks at child) 
Child 	 : See, ... blue (points at dice's side) and 
here blue (points at board ) 
After the last turn, the above conversation continues with the child 
naming the different colours on the board. As we can see, the mother had 
to push the child to converse. But, after the first couple of turns, the 
child was able to respond and provide additional information concerning 
the use of the dice. 
In sum, we found that contrary to the Piagetian perspective, 
children's conversations with their mothers were dialogues. The children 
attended to the others' utterances and provided relevant responses. This 
is not to say that children experienced no difficulty in sustaining 
cooperative discourse. In the beginning, their conversations are short 
and the topic is exhausted in two turns. However, when the interlocutor 
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is focusing on the very concrete and immediate context, the child 
succeeds in producing relevant and coherent contributions. After the 
fifth year of life, we observe the beginning of extended themes where 
topic continuity takes several turns. This new accomplishment becomes 
possible because of the mother's willingness to use several turns to 
secure the child's attention and the strategy of repetition (phonological 
or semantic). Repetition is used as a successful cohesive device and it 
is a means of responding. This finding agrees with Keenan's (1974:1975) 
and McTear's (1978) findings on the children's strategy of repetition. 
By the age of seven, the child becomes an equal conversational partner 
and coherence is achieved by the employment of several cohesive devices 
and anaphoric references. 
(b) Degree of adaptability in children's assertions  
The results of the analysis of the children's assertions showed that 
even the youngest children were not bad conversationalists. About 
seventy-three percent of the time, children of three and a half and four 
years of age produced successful assertions, that is assertions which the 
listener was in a position to understand. All our children were engaged 
in conversations rather than in monologues and all tried to fit their 
utterances to the social context of discourse. 
In this context, it must be noted that young children had some 
difficulties. Three points illustrate the child's initial difficulties 
and subsequent development in appreciating the hearer's needs. First, we 
have a gradual improvement of successful speech with age. We found a 
highly significant difference between the age groups in the children's 
production of successful assertions. As children get older, they become 
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increasingly better in producing speech which is in accordance with the 
listener's perspective and the social context of discourse. By the 
seventh year, all assertions produced by the children were cooperative 
and successful. In contrast, young children produced some assertions 
which were either uncooperative (i.e. personal) or seemed to be directed 
to the listener, but the listener was not in a position to understand 
them. Although the number of uncooperative assertions is substantially 
reduced in the second age group, we still have an equal amount of 
unsuccessful speech (it represents 15.5 per cent of all the assertions 
produced ). It is only in the third age group that we see a significant 
decrease of instances of unsuccessful speech. 
Most cases of unsuccessful speech were not ambiguous. The child was 
clearly directing a comment to the mother, but the mother was not in a 
position to understand it. This was judged to be the case by both the 
mother herself and the experimenter. Examples 13 and 14 illustrate some 
cases of unsuccessful speech. 
Example 13 	 Child (4;6) : Mommy I go there 
Mother 	 : Where? 
Child 	 : Here, you see? (places cow on board) 
Example 14 	 (1) Mother 	 : Oh look this one! (points at 
alligator) 




: What honey ? 
: There (looks at board) 
: Ok, look what I've got 
here! (takes toy pig shows 
it to child) 
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Second, we found that as children get older, mothers have a greater 
tendency to disambiguate ambiguous speech. As example 14 above shows, 
the mother made one attempt to clarify the young child's intention 
(utterance 3). But when the child failed to pick up the clarification 
request, the mother did not insist on it. Instead, she changed the topic 
by initiating a new one (utterance 5). This behaviour was typical of all 
the mothers of the first age group. They either ignored their children's 
unsuccessful assertions (as if they were not potential conversational 
threats) or tried only once to disambiguate the child's messages. When 
they weren't successful, they continued their conversations as if the-
child had added nothing. In contrast, mothers conversing with four and a 
half and five year-old children were more concerned with understanding 
their child's intentions than with continuing the conversational flow. 
In example 13 above, the child is able to understand the mother's 
clarification request and to respond appropriately to it. We found, 
however, that children at this age had difficulty responding 
appropriately to an implicit verbal request for additional help. This 
finding is in agreement with Peterson, et al (1972). They claimed that 
Eour to seven year-old children reformulate their messages when they were 
explicitly asked to do so. It was only the seven year-olds, however, 
that responded appropriately to an implicit request Eor help. Example 15 
illustrates this point: 
Example 15  Child (4;9) 	 : (shows dice to mother) 
You go there (points at dice) 
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: (Looks at board, then at child) 
I don't understand 
(PAUSE) 
: (Looks at board) 
: You mean you throw this ? (shows dice 
to child ) 
: YES! And if you have RED you go he::re 
(points at square on board) 
: (turns looks at child) OK! 
It seems that the child was willing to explain his first assertive 
remark, but the utterance "I don't understand" did not make the problem 
clear. When the mother attempted to clarify her general statement, the 
child was able to provide additional remarks. 
Third, we found interesting differences in the nature of the actual 
conversational context in which children at different ages can engage. 
Although our youngest children produced assertions which were successful 
78 per cent of the time, we must note that the context of their 
interaction was very concrete and immediate. Most of the assertions 
produced by these children were statements about either observable 
objects (example 16) or statements about simple wants (example 17). Most 
children used a lot of nonverbal signs (e.g., "reaching" and "pointing") 
to illustrate nonverbally what they couldn't illustrate verbally. 
Example 16 	 Child (3;9) : I want this (reaches takes cow) 
Mother 	 : Ok, you will be the cow 
Example 17 
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Child (3;8) : Oh, candies! (points at candies on 
board) 
 
It seems that it is in fact quite difficult to produce unsuccessful 
speech when the actual context of interaction is so immediate and 
concrete. The high frequency of adult's concrete questioning and the 
prevalence of immediacy suggest that four year olds are not very 
competent as conversationalists and therefore they (and their adult 
partners) adopt a strategy which minimizes the chances of unsuccessful 
communication. It is not that young children often talk in a way whith 
takes the perspective of the listener into consideration, but rather that 
the complicated talk which requires such a consideration is rarely used. 
This, however, is not true of the child's conversations at five and a 
half and seven years. Their conversations are abstract, involve 
reference to future and past events and communicate subtle subjective 
feelings. 
(c) Degree of Indirectness and Non-Literality in Children's Speech 
In general, our analysis suggests that indirectness and 
non-literality gradually increase with age. We therefore agree with 
Ervin-Tripp's (1977) claim that children's language use progresses from 
the ability to produce and comprehend direct comments to the ability to 
produce and comprehend indirect or non-literal comments. 
(1) Analysis of Indirect Remarks  
Our results indicate that indirect speech is infrequent for all age 
groups. Given the low incidence of this kind of speech, our conclusions 
are necessarily tentative and should be regarded with great caution. 
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Indirectness increases with age. Two points are of interest here. 
First, the three first age groups evidenced similar levels of 
indirectness. A noticeable increase was only evidenced by the oldest 
group. The percentage of indirect speech for the first three age groups 
was 1.5, 1.6, and 2.1 respectively. For the oldest group, it was 8. It 
seems, therefore, that only six and a half and seven year-old children 
that use complicated language in their everyday conversation. Second, 
the mother's speech follows the pattern of the child's speech. Mother's 
indirectness increases in proportion to the child's. This is hardly 
surprising; it fits into the general picture. Mothers are likely to' 
produce only that kind of speech which accords with their children's 
understanding and abilities. 
When examining the frequencies of the different kinds of indirectness 
in the child's speech, we looked first at standardized speech; that is 
speech which contains wh-imperatives, impositives, and queclaratives, 
which is very simple. Though it appears indirect, it actually behaves as 
direct speech. This is because the usual inferential process is 
short-circuited. It should be expected, therefore, that indirectness of 
a standardized form would be the most frequent of the indirect remarks. 
Innvestigating standardized indirectness, we found that the first 
three age groups produced no or only one instance of standardized 
speech. This finding needs explanation. Two points can be made to 
explain this finding. First, we have to remember that most standardized 
indirectness consists of a request of the would, should or why form. But 
as already mentioned, when interacting with their mother under the 
present social context, young children are less likely to produce many 
remarks of an interrogative nature. The ability to perform a request for 
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information implies that the speaker can exercise power and can initiate 
further conversation. Given the fact that the young child is an unequal 
participant in the social interaction, very few questions will be found 
in his speech. when this is borne in mind, our failure to find indirect 
standardized remarks is not surprising. Secondly, most of the 
standardized indirect questions can also be seen as a polite way to form 
a question. The utterance "Could you pass the salt please" is, Eor 
example, best conceived as a polite way to request the salt from 
someone. Ervin-Tripp (1979) has argued that the beginning of polite 
forms of requests appears around the fourth year. Children start 
realizing that they have to use politeness markings as a way of showing 
their cooperation with their hearer. However, as Ervin-Tripp has found, 
mothers are less likely to be addressed with polite markers. Fathers and 
strangers are given different treatment. As Ervin-Tripp has noted, they 
receive fewer imperatives than mothers. This may be because the fathers 
and the strangers serve the children less often. Thus, our failure to 
find such speech may well be a result of the specific pattern of 
interaction between young children and their mothers rather than the 
result of the child's cognitive and linguistic limitations. 
In terms of standardized indirectness, the mother's speech is more or 
less constant across the four age groups. 
	 Although we do have some 
impositives and wh-imperatives, we found no queclaratives. However, when 
we consider the number of questions that mothers address to their 
children, we see that the percentage of the wh-imperatives and 
impositives is a small percentage. Indirect and more polite forms of 
requesting are thus not characteristic of interlocutors who are familiar 
with each other. Imperatives and other direct forms occur whenever 
cooperation can be assumed. Conversely, the special markings we call 
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polite, are called into play whenever cooperation can not be assumed 
either because the other is considered an outsider or because he is less 
familiar with an already established pattern of communication. 
In terms of pragmatic indirectness, we found a slight increase with 
the child's age. However, the actual instances of such indirectness are 
so small that they allow for no further comments. 
The results on indirect hinting are worth considering. First, 
hinting gradually increases with age. In the first age group, there are 
four instances of such indirectness. In the last age group, there are 
nineteen instances. Secondly, it is very interesting that although young 
children score very low on the other categories of indirectness, they do 
produce hinting, the Eorm of indirect speech which is considered the most 
complicated. In order to realize their intention, hints typically 
require a logical inference on the part of the hearer. We have claimed 
that the most important limit that the young child has in producing or 
comprehending hints is cognitive or inferential; he can not do the work 
on drawing the inference about the desired object or act. 
How can we explain, then, the presence of hinting in our young 
children's speech? We can attempt to answer this question by examining 
the instances of hinting that the first two age groups produced. Most 
hints were of the nature "I am tired", rather than "Let's stop playing", 
or "this alligator", rather than "You can not go there". For example, 
the child's utterance, "This alligator", received the following response 
from the mother: "Oh no, I will be eaten." Thus, the mother perceived 
her child's naming behaviour as an indirect remark directed to restrain 
her from making any particular kind of move. But can we be sure that the 
child hints deliberately? Does he consciously restrain himself from 
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doing otherwise? Restraint in mentioning what is wanted is used by 
adults both to leave the choice to the hearer (as a form of deference) 
and to allude to shared knowledge under conditions of solidarity and 
humour. Yet, it is easy to see that young children are likely to refer 
to the beginning stages or preconditions of need simply out of failure to 
specify what is wanted - as when they say " I am tired " rather than 
"Let's stop playing". Being nurturant, adults then complete the work Eor 
them. Similarly, given that the young child spends most of his time in 
labelling objects around him, we can not be sure that his choice to utter 
"this alligator" is an active choice resulting from the proper 
identification of what he wanted to imply. It seems, therefore, equally 
appropriate to argue that the three and a half and four year-olds' speech 
to adults often focuses on obstacles rather than on specifying their 
means. Consequently, although their utterances may look indirect, they 
fail to be direct and therefore are merely elliptical. A similar point 
has been raised by Ervin-Tripp (1980). 
It is only in the third and fourth age groups that such worries 
disappear. When the child hints, both the mother and the observer are 
sure that he does so consciously and his choice of concealing his needs 
is deliberate. For example, a six year and eight month-old child 
produced the utterance, "This is a blue square mommy!", when his mother 
moved there after rolling a red. There was no doubt in the mother's and 
the observer's mind that the child chose an indirect act to correct the 
mother's behaviour. This was judged to be milder than simply complaining 
about the mother's error. 
When we examine both the mothers' and the older children's 
indirectness, we find certain characteristics which raise doubts 
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regarding our preliminary definition of indirectness. The Indirect 
Speech Act Thesis views such acts as performing two functions, direct and 
indirect. One feature which distinguishes indirect acts from direct ones 
is that they can be contextualized to yield two interpretations - the 
literal and the non-literal interpretation. There are, however, problems 
involved. First, many of our indirect acts were conventional and 
standardized. Embedded in a particular context, the indirect reading of 
such acts, even when it has an indirect function, can be contextualized 
to yield no more than a literal interpretation. If, then, some formula, 
like "please" in (1) and (2) below, no longer admits two readings, there 
is no longer any point in calling the speech act "Indirect". 
(1) Can you keep playing, please? (child 6;9) 
(2) Can you please give me the dice (mother to her 7;0 year 
old child) 
One can argue that conventional indirect acts are a special case of 
indirectness and that the concept is still a useful one, especially in 
understanding the role of "hints" in social interactions. "Hinting" can 
never be so strong as to force the indirect speech act reading. However, 
looking closely at our hinting instances, we found that in some cases 
when these were embedded in a particular context, the indirect reading 
was the only one possible. For example, consider the utterance (1) "No, 
not the BLUE!" (child 6;6) made when the mother is just about to move 
into a blue square and the utterance (2) "You have a red" (child 6;7) 
made when, after rolling the dice, the mother looks around trying to 
decide where to go. Because they can be interpreted as statements and as 
directives, both seem indirect. However, there is an important 
difference between them. When the social context is taken into account, 
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the first is unambiguously a directive. The child utters it by suddenly 
leaning forward, turning to the mother and waving his hand. The sudden 
shift in body attitude and the loud excited voice signal an urgent 
warning, and the intonation that accompanies the act leaves the mother no 
room other than to interpret it as a clear directive. This is not the 
case with utterance (2). Here, the mother has options. She may wish to 
interpret it as a directive and respond appropriately. Alternatively, 
she might decide that the utterance is a statement and proceed in this 
vein. 
We think that the above distinctions are very important for 
clarifying the Speech-Acts Thesis. The videotape analysis demonstrated 
that understanding starts Erom context. Thus, in many situations, the 
calculation of the speaker's intent (as this has been conceived by 
linguistic philosophers) is unnecessary. When a listener is attending to 
ongoing action and its trajectory, it is possible to understand a 
congruent utterance with minimal interpretative work. What is said is 
often redundant or adds only certain specifications (e.g., as in 
"please"). In such cases, alternative interpretations, including literal 
ones, are unlikely to be considered at all unless the utterance is so 
unconventional as to require an inference to reach a relevant 
interpretation. Here, therefore, we find ourselves in close agreement 
with Ervin-Tripp (1979) who writes: "We can say that interpretation is 
retrospective to context 
	
 We propose that participants become aware 
of inferential processes when there is incongruity or misunderstandings 
and that this awareness has been the model for standard interpretation." 
(p. 207). 
- 208 - 
This discussion raises serious doubts about the usefulness of the 
concept of indirect speech acts in developmental research. If this term 
is unclear and does not seem to have a unique point of reference, what 
does it contribute? We believe that the concept does have a distinct 
point of reference, but this needs clarification. In our analysis of 
conversations, we found many instances of speech which were ambiguous and 
required certain inferences to be disambiguated. Intended meanings were 
often calculated from context and connected with certain general 
conversational principles, such as the cooperative principle. However, 
the term "indirect" is too broad. We need to make several distinctions 
among the different types of indirectness that it embodies. Some of the 
most important distinctions we found in our transcripts are: 
(1) When the intonation (or nonverbal behaviour) of some 
conventional phrases forces a reading which is indirect with 
respect to the speech act. Without the special intonation 
and the conventional phrase, the whole speech act is no 
longer indirect. 
(2) Indirect meanings may be understood immediately (short-
circuited implicatures). The interpretative process that 
occurs here relies heavily on context and appears to depend 
on expectations based on repetitions, knowledge of usual 
sequences, and roles. The process of comprehension that 
exists here is automatic. The speaker does not have to 
go through the same inferential process as that associated with 
complicated indirectness. 
In developmental terms, such indirect speech acts might be easier 
for children to comprehend since they depend on knowledge about 
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routines and social events. From a very early age, children 
have a rich system of alternations in a form that is systematically 
related to social features. They sensitively identify social 
contrasts signalled by tag modal, polite forms, address terms. They 
also have learned to respond to standardized indirectness (e.g., could 
you give me the book?). 
(3) Indirect meanings may also be computed. Here, the meanings 
are elliptical and the hearer is responsible for drawing the 
inference about the desired act or object. Children by 
the age of six or seven are able to cope with this kind of 
inference and they incorporate it in their everyday 
exchanges for ellipsis, for joking, or for the redundancy 
that instructs participants about conventions. 
(4) For the purposes of observational or experimental work 
with children, we need to make a distinction between 
deliberate indirectness and indirectness due to the child's 
inability to specify his wants. To test the likelihood that 
young children actively hint when they could do otherwise, 
we need to look solely at situations where we are sure they 
know how to identify what they want. 
(ii) Analysis of Non-Literal Remarks  
Instances of non-literality in both the mothers' and the children's 
speech are very few. This is true for all the age groups. The most 
frequent subcategory of non-literality is that of metaphoric language. 
This finding can be explained by addressing the characteristics of 
language which accompanies a game interaction. All the instances of 
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metaphor use were of only one kind: allocating roles in the game. For 
example, "I am the pig", "you are the cow", etc. In the last age group, 
we have an increase of non-literal expressions in the mother's speech. 
However, when we examined this increase in detail, we found that it was 
mainly due to one mother. She used a lot of under/over extensions and 
was responsible for most of the sarcasm. We therefore feel that the 
increase is due more to the characteristics of a specific person than to 
the group. 
Given that the numbers are so small, we feel that we are not in a 
position to arrive at any conclusive remarks about the nature of 
non-literality in the mother-child conversations. 
A  Task Designed to Investigate Children's Comprehension of Indirectness  
and Non-literality 
Since our observations revealed such a small number of indirect and 
non-literal speech, a special task was designed to test the child's 
direct comprehension of such speech. A "Puppet-Show" was performed by 
the experimenter. Together with her, the child was asked to hear the 
story and act it out by using the puppets. Three puppets were involved: 
a dog, a child, and a mother. The experimenter acted out the roles of 
the dog and the mother, and the child acted as the puppet-child. To 
create a concrete environment for the show, a three dimensional house 
and a garden which included all the objects mentioned in the story (i.e. 
flowers, watering jug, etc.) were designed. 
The Puppet-Show story was as follows: 
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One sunny day, Mary and her mother were out in the garden watering 
the flowers. The mother said to the child: (1) "Mary could you bring me  
the watering lug please?" As they were watering the flowers, the little 
dog came out and started immediately to play with the flowers. The 
mother saw the dog and said: "Oh Mary, the dog will destroy the  
flowers!" As soon as Mary had taken the dog away, the mother said : (3) 
"Dogs will always be dogs". Mary and her mother then continued with 
their watering. Suddenly, the mother saw the cactus that was in the Ear 
end of the garden. She said to Mary: (4) "Oh Mary look! The cactus has  
grown as tall as a tree!" One of the flowers was drying up and turning 
brown. Mother looked at the flower and said: (5) "Oh my goodness, and  
this flower is doing very well! We have to do something for that poor 
flower." She turned to Mary and said (6) "Mary where is the food for the 
flowers?" 
Soon Mary became bored with watering the flowers and started playing 
with the dog. She was pulling the dog's ear and making it cry out. 
Mother saw Mary and said : (7) " I am sure Mary the dog loves having his  
ear pulled". As soon as mother finished watering the flowers, she said 
to Mary: (8) "Mary it's getting dark". 
The story contains many instances of indirect or non-literal speech. 
After producing each, the experimenter stopped to ask: "What do you 
think Mary did?" or "What do you think mother meant by this?" 
Several problems must be considered: First, the task is subject to 
all the criticisms which may be raised about any comprehension test 
directed to young children. In particular, we have to be aware of the 
classical issue of performance versus competence. Does the failure to 
show elements of understanding derive Erom lack of understanding of what 
was asked, lack of specific knowledge asked of the child, or disinterest 
in the task? We have no way of distinguishing between these three 
alternatives. They are thus necessarily lumped together under the broad 
category of "no response". Second, even worse problems plague the 
attempt to evaluate the child's comprehension of certain instances of 
non-literal speech. When the child understood instances of indirect 
speech, he was usually able to indicate this by using behavioural means. 
For example, when the mother uttered: "Could you bring me the watering 
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jug, please?", the child (Mary) could pick up the jug and hand it to the 
mother. But, there was nothing that the child could do to show his 
understanding of the utterance: "Dogs will always be dogs". 
Consequently, the experimenter had to ask explicitly for a justification 
of the mother's remark. Here again, one finds difficulties in 
attributing a failure to any specific cause. Was it that he failed to 
give an explanation, because he did not understand non-literal 
expressions? Or was it because he could not find an adequate explanation? 
Moreover, the experimenter's form of questioning might have been 
problematic for young children. The literature suggests that why and 
what does he mean type of questions are in fact very difficult for young 
children. 
We found that these problems are serious enough to make the inclusion 
of the "Puppet-Show" task in the main body of the thesis, unwarranted. 
However, we do feel that some of our results are worth a brief mention. 
We found that the youngest children were mostly unable to perform the 
task. Three out of five sat motionless and refused to take part. 
Although two of the children were excited by the show, they did not stick 
to the experimenter's story. They acted as if they had forgotten the 
fact that the experimenter had a story to tell and were more interested 
in creating their own. It was in the second age group that we observed 
the child's willingness to hear the story and carry out the 
instructions. All the children in this group understood the standardized 
indirect comment (comment 1) and performed appropriately, (in other 
words, they picked up the watering jug and gave it to the mother). Two 
children understood the second indirect comment (comment 2) as being a 
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direct request. See example a. 
Example a Experimenter : (turns looks at child) 
Oh, Mary, the dog will destroy 
the flower 
Child 
	 : Ok, here! (takes dog away) 
 
The remaining three children did not, however, respond. One of them was 
clearly inattentive to the mother's comment. The other two gave the 
impression of listening, but did not respond. 
All the children in the last two age groups behaved in an appropriate 
way to the above two instances of indirect speech. We have similar 
results for the next indirect utterance (Comment 6: "Mary where is the 
food for the flower?"). Children in the second age group were hesitant. 
Two out of five responded by giving the food to the mother. However, 
three showed no signs of understanding. In the third and fourth group, 
all children searched for the food and gave it to the mother. See 
example b. 
Example b 	 Experimenter : Mary, (turns looks at child) 
Where is the food for the flowers? 
Child (6;8) : Is that the food? (picks up a box, 
shows it to mother) 
We found that the last indirect request (comment 8: "It is getting 
dark") was less difficult. In the second age group, all the children 
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except one interpreted the utterance as a request to terminate the 
activity and enter the house. Likewise, the children in the third and 
fourth age group had no difficulty in understanding the mother's 
intention. Two children in the third group who did not wish to end the 
game and go home, protested as if the mother's comment was in fact a 
direct request. See example c. 
Example c 	 Experimenter : It's getting dark! 
Child (6;7) : Oh,no! Let's play some more! 
Overall, we found that four and a half and five year-olds were able 
to cope with half of the indirect comments addressed to them. 
Standardized indirectness posed no problems for all the children over 
four and a half years. That was also true for the last indirect comment, 
"It is getting late". Although it is a hint, it has probably become 
conventionalized in the mother-child everyday conversations. However, 
some of the children in the second age group had problems in 
comprehending the other instances of hints which did not contain the 
desired act. Hints like "Oh, Mary, the dog will destroy the flower" were 
not picked up by half the children in this age group. Unfortunately, we 
do not know whether the children did not pick up that remark because they 
didn't understand it or because they chose to not pick it up. It was 
only after the fifth year, that the children responded promptly to such a 
remark. 
Our results concerning the comprehension of the non-literal 
expressions were less clear. In the second age group, we had only one 
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child who responded appropriately to the expression: "Dogs will always 
be dogs". See example d. 
Example d Experimenter 	 : "Dogs will always be dogs" 
Child (4;7) 
	
: (looks at dog, pats dog) 
Experimenter 	 : What does mother mean by that? 
(pause) 
Experimenter 	 : Why did mother say that? 
Child 	 : (looks at experimenter) 
Because dogs eat flowers 
 
It is worth mentioning that this was the only child in this age group 
that owned a dog. We don't know whether the child picked up the 
non-literality or whether he was just able to rely on past experience 
when he produced his response. The responses of the children in the 
third age group were equally problematic. Three children seemed puzzled 
by the above remark. When they were asked why the mother said that, they 
responded by saying that they did not know. 
The metaphor (comment 4: "The cactus has grown as tall as a tree") 
and the sarcastic comment (comment 5: "Oh my goodness, and this flower is 
doing very well") were also received with confusion. However, the second 
sarcastic comment (comment 7: "I am sure Mary, the dog likes having his 
ear pulled") had a laughing response by two of the children in this 
group. When they were asked why did the mother say this, both responded 
appropriately. See example e. 
Example e 
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Experimenter : I am sure Mary, the dog likes 
having his ear pulled! (looks at child) 
Child 
	
: (Child leaves dog's ear, turns looks at 
mother and laughs). 
Experimenter : Why did mother say that? 
Child 
	
: She is joking 
It seems that the second sarcastic comment is in fact more concrete 
than the first one. It contradicts an everyday fact that young children 
know. They were puzzled, however, by the previous sarcastic comment 
(comment 5: "Oh, my goodness, and this flower is doing very well"). The 
understanding of the sarcasm here necessitates a specific knowledge of 
the intonation accompanying sarcastic comments and an ability to operate 
within the framework of the story as presented by the experimenter. 
The performance of the children in the fourth age group was more 
advanced. They all understood the tautological expression - "Dogs will 
always be dogs". Their responses were: "Dogs are naughty", or "Dogs are 
bad", or " All dogs eat the flowers in the garden". Three out of four 
children understood the metaphorical expression. For example, a six year 
and eight month-old child responded to the experimenter's questioning of 
the mother's expression "Is the cactus as tall as a tree?", by explaining 
"No, it just grows fast". Only one child could not respond. When asked 
whether he believed that the cactus was in fact as tall as a tree, he 
said that he did not believe that, but he could not articulate why he 
thought the mother said so. We encountered the same problem of 
articulation with our sarcastic expression "Oh, my goodness, and this 
flower is doing very well". One child laughed, but the other three did 
- 217 - 
not. One of them was clearly confused by the remark. See example f. 
Example f Experimenter : Oh, my goodness, and this flower 




	 : (Leans forward looks closely at flower. 
Turns looks at mother) 
Is it? 
 
It seems that what was required of the children was the almost 
impossible task of realizing the exact meaning of the term sarcasm. 
Consider, for example, an adult response. He would not have stated that 
the mother was joking, for her remark is certainly not solely a joke. In 
all probability, his only course would have been to utilize the actual 
term sarcasm in his explanation. 
In sum, we found that tautological expressions are easier than all 
the other non-literal ones. Similarly, non-literal expressions that need 
conventional everyday knowledge are more readily understood than 
expressions which contradict the speaker's intentions. To comprehend the 
latter, one requires knowledge of the power of language and a sharing of 
the speaker's form of utilization. 
(iv) The performance on the socio-coqnitive tasks  
We have argued that successful communication presupposes certain 
socio-cognitive abilities. Two are of particular importance. The first 
is the ability to make inferences about other people. Included here are 
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inferences regarding the internal states and the perspectives of others. 
The second is the ability to understand a social context and its 
imperatives for social behavior. To test directly the children's 
abilities in these areas, we selected three tasks. The first, "the face 
sensitivity task," explores the child's knowledge of others' emotional 
states. The second, "the guess my story task," investigates the child's 
social understanding and awareness, in particular, his ability to 
attribute causality and his degree of social knowledge. In the latter 
regard, the focus is on the child's familiarity with what is relevant, 
what is irrelevant and what is the sequence of the events which take • 
place during a familiar social occasion. The third, "the hiding task," 
investigates one aspect of successful role taking, namely successful 
visual perspective taking. 
Overall, our results suggest that the development of social awareness 
and knowledge is not an all or nothing affair. Rather, it is a very 
gradual process which starts at around the fourth year of life. Despite 
making important mistakes, all our children at that age showed some 
elements of understanding. The process appears to be completed only by 
the seventh year. The oldest children performed without making any 
errors. Although they were the only ones to do so, we feel that to 
conclude the younger children are completely "egocentric" is incorrect 
and fruitless. Our results suggest that we ought to look closely at our 
transcripts and analyse both the achievements and limitations of the 
younger children. In so doing, we may determine which social cognitive 
parameters are problematic and which are not for children of each age 
group. We may thus arrive at a developmental picture of the children's 
understanding of their social world. At the same time, we can better 
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understand the performances of children belonging to the intermediate age 
groups. 
Face sensitivity task  
The aim of this task was not only to investigate only non-verbal 
responses to emotional representation (like for example, Shields' 1985 
study), but also verbal expressions of what the face is and what emotion 
goes with what kind of face. Virtually all the subjects found the task 
easy to comprehend and had no difficulty responding. Only one child, a 
member of the youngest age group, seemed unable to perform the task. 
Here, we summarize the results for each age group. The children's 
performances in the first age group were inadequate in several respects. 
A lot of the faces selected were incorrect and one child selected the 
wrong faces which did not match the emotions of the boy in the picture. 
In the second age group, levels of performance improved. All the 
children were able to identify four out of five faces and were able to 
come up with the right emotions to match the pictures. Most, however, 
made one mistake in identifying one of the sad, scared or cross faces (in 
two of the cases, this was a careless mistake corrected by the child 
himself ). The performance of the chldren in the third age group 
improved even further. Without any experimenter intervention, one child 
gave correct faces and correct emotions throughout the task. Two made 
careless Eace identifications which were immediately corrected by the 
child. 	 The remaining two children made no errors in identifying the 
faces. However, the experimenter had to intervene and direct the child's 
attention to the emotional aspect of the pciture. In the fourth age 
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group, all children performed without error and selected a face and 
matched it to a relevant emotion without help. 
Reviewing these results, several points are worth mentioning. First, 
children as young as four and a half make few errors regarding the 
representation of emotions. Secondly, all the children had no problems 
with identifying and finding the right emotion for the pictures which 
portrayed a "happy" face. Of the remainder, the "sad" face was 
identified most frequently, then the "cross" and the "surprised" face. 
The most difficult face proved to be the "scared" face. How ever, all 
these were identified with roughly equivalent accuracy. 	 In sum, 
pre-school children appear to be operating with a two-phase scheme of 
emotional representation where happiness is readily distinguished, but 
all the other states are not clearly differentiated. This finding is in 
close agreement with Shatz's review (1975) which concludes that by the 
age of four, children are proficient at identifying situations with happy 
outcomes and between four and seven, they become increasingly accurate at 
identifying situations leading to sad, fearful or angry outcomes. 
Looking at the results of the other age groups, we can say that the 
ability to identify "sad" faces develops from the ability to identify 
"cross", "scared" or "surprised" faces. By the age of five and a half, 
children are quite good at distinguishing happy Erom sad and cross 
faces. Scared and surprised faces, however, are still problematic. It 
is only after the sixth year that children start making finer 
differentiations (e.g., identifying "scared" faces which originally 
would have been categorized as "bad" or "sad.") 
To conclude, it appears that there is a developmental order to the 
sequence in which children become capable of differentiating between 
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emotions. Eappiness is the first emotion to be reliably distinguished 
and this is followed by the emotion of sadness. Then we see the 
development of the ability to make finer differentiation along the 
happy-sad continuum. 
The "Guess my story" task  
once again, the results illustrate that performance depends on age. 
However, unlike the previous task, the "guess my story" task was 
difficult for all the children, particularly the youngest children. One 
three and a half year old child was unable to perform the task at all. 
Three others were able to name the objects in the pictures only after the 
experimenter's prodding. Only one was able to identify the objects on 
his own. None of the children in this age group was able either to 
identify a single event in individual pictures or attempt to link the 
pictures together. We see some development in the children's 
performances in the second and third age groups. All the children in 
these groups understood that each picture represented a social event and 
that these events could be linked together to represent an integrated 
sequence. However, the children in the second age group were unable to 
come up with a whole story concerning the four pictures. Instead, they 
focussed on description and were particularly interested in labelling the 
event depicted in each individual picture. They also provided the first 
example of an attempt to link the pictures. Two children attempted this 
by using connective words. Both used only one such word, the word and 
to link one picture description with another. (See example 1). 
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Example 1 
Experimenter: (shows the picture with the birthday cake and the boy) 
(pause) 
Experimenter: What is that? 
Child (4;7) : A birthday cake. The boy has his birthday. 
Experimenter: (points at the second picture which shows presents) 
Child 	 : And birthday presents. And a boy opens them. 
(pause) 
Experimenter: Yes, and then what happens? 
Child 
	
	 : Oh a snake! (points at the snake which comes out of the 
present box). 
Two of the children in the third group and three children in the 
fourth age group, gave descriptive presentations of the four pictures. 
Their descriptions were accurate and contained many instances of 
connective articles and anaphoric references. (See example 2). 
Example 2  
Child 	 (5;3) : This boy (points at boy figure) has his birthday and 
	
 (looks around) uh... he has a birthday cake 
some presents. Well, he sits down and opens one.... 
then here a snake comes out and the boy is 
scared. Uh 	
 then.... a cat eats something, what? 
(turns looks at experimenter). 
Experimenter : I think the cat is eating the birthday cake. 
Child 	 : OK, and the cat is eating the cake and breaks the 
plate, and then its night and the boy sleeps 
	  
(pause) 	
 and the teddy bear sleeps. 
That's the end of the story (turns looks at 
experimenter) 
In the above example we see some of the child's attempts to generate 
a story for the four pictures and give a causal interpretation of the 
events. The linking of the pictures is done by the employment of such 
language as "then","and", "well". There was only one child who gave an 
elaborated and imaginative story to describe the four pictures (See 
example 3). 
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Example 3 
Child (6;9) : (Looks at the pictures) Ok, I'll start from here (points 
at the boy in bed) What's his name? (turns looks 
at experimenter). 
Experimenter: I don't know. 
Child 	 : Ok, he is David. So, one day David was very ill 
He was at his bed, and he was very miserable. He falls 
asleep and he dreams. He dreams that he has his 
birthday and his mother has a party for him. Here is 
the birthday cake (shows picture with cake) and here 
are the presents. One of the presents was a bad joke 
In the box there is a snake. David did not know that 
and he opened the box and the snake came out. He was 
very cross, because the snake was running after the 
cat that David loved. Well, (looks around at pictures) 
well.... the cat was running away from the snake and 
he threw the cake down. Oh no! it was a very nice cake. 
Well, "Mommy will take care of that" David said. He 
then put the snake into the box again. And...(looks 
around ) and... eh... well, that's the end of the 
story. 
(pause) 
Child 	 : I can make up another story, Ok? (looks at 
experimenter). 
Experimenter: No, let's play something else. 
Overall, the children found the task difficult. Although most 
children in the last two age groups showed some ability to make causal 
inferences in order-to describe social events, they had difficulty 
elaborating stories which contain motivational and imaginary statements. 
The task is more difficult because it not only requires an understanding 
of social events and their sequence, but also the ability to talk about 
them in a sophisticated and imaginative way. We can thus say that most 
of our five and seven year-old children were able to understand what a 
description of a social event should be and what the relevant sequence of 
the several steps of a birthday is. However, they generally were not 
able to produce an elaborated verbal presentation of the four pictures 
and arrive at a unique story. 
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The Hiding task 
Here again the results indicate that the children's performances 
improve with age. Two children in the first age group were unable to 
respond at all. Three others hid the doll, but did so right out in the 
open. By four and a half or five years, we see some developments. All 
children in this age group understood the purpose of the task and what 
was expected of them. However, they all made errors in hiding the doll. 
Two children hid the doll out in the open and turned the doll's head 
round so that it was looking away from the "seeker" doll and three 
children hid it under the table. Turning the doll around so that it 
looks away is an interesting response. As Light (1980) points out, the 
child in this case confuses the "not being able to see" with the "not 
being seen". Several mothers mentioned similar instances when playing 
hide and seek with their children. For example, one mother said that her 
child often goes away and hides his face into the sofa pillows. "He 
thinks, that when he himself cannot see, he cannot be seen by other as 
well." The "under the table" response was equally interesting. It is 
worth noting that two children in the third age group hid the doll under 
the table. Although incorrect, this response is more advanced than the 
others. It seems that the meaning of the word "under" itself is very 
powerful and makes children believe that something "under" an object is 
well hidden. This of course is partly true. Hiding something under a 
table is better than hiding it right in the middle of the room. For the 
seeker to find the object under a table he must carry out certain actions 
(like bending ) which might be seen as being equivalent to lifting a 
pillow and searching for a hidden object. Apart from the "under the 
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table" error, no other major errors were performed by the children in the 
third age group. Two children made minor errors. In both cases, the 
error was corrected by the child himself. All the children in the oldest 
age group had no problems with the task and all performed in correct ways. 
To conclude, three and a half to four year old children have real 
difficulties in taking the visual perspective of another person and 
responding appropriately. By four and five years of age, children still 
have major difficulties in such a task. However, we see the first 
attempts to understand what it is to hide something so that another 
person cannot find it. The children start by understanding that hiding 
something "under" an object makes it more difficult to find. They also 
start understanding that "not being seen" must have something to do with 
"not being able to see". So, in an immature way, they either attempt to 
close the doll's eyes or turn the doll around so that she can not see the 
object. It is in the fifth year that we see real progress. Here, three 
children performed with minor errors. At seven years, however, we see 
the development of a further ability. Four children not only performed 
correctly, but they also were able to hid'the object in a place where the 
seeker doll could not see it, but they could. That behaviour is very 
advanced. The child not only understands how to successfully hide, but 
does so without reference to his own visual perspective. 
In discussing our socio-cognitive task results, there are three 
general issues which we feel need mentioning. First of all, there is the 
issue of "egocentricity" in the child's thinking. We will be brief 
here. As we have already pointed out, our children did not seem totally 
egocentric . At four and a half, they had some ability to understand 
"happy" faces and to appreciate the situations which generate such 
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feelings. They were also able to understand that a particular picture 
represents a happening and that these individual happenings might be 
linked together to describe a social event. As far as their visual 
perspective taking abilities are concerned, they are still rather 
egocentric. Although their performances were better than the three and a 
half year olds' (who hide things right in the open), they were not 
successful. But by the fifth year, the children are far more competent 
at role-taking and making inferences about the other's internal states. 
These children were able to produce good descriptions of social events, 
to distinguish between "happy" and "sad", "cross" and "scared" faces,• 
and, in most cases, to hide an object in places where a seeker doll could 
not find it. Despite these achievements, their performances did suffer 
some limitations. Finer distinctions between similar emotional states 
were not made (i.e. between the"cross" and "scared"faces), elaborated 
descriptions of events were not given and their visual perspective taking 
was flawed in minor ways. Only among children of the last age group did 
we observe error free role-taking and visual perspective taking. 
In this light, we believe that the dichotomy of "egocentricity vs 
sociality" fails to see the real complexities of children's responses in 
the intermediate groups. The responses of our two intermediate age 
groups need further explication. We refer to Flavell's (1978) 
developmental analysis of role-taking. He argues that there are five 
important things that a child must know in order to achieve a role-taking 
mediated end: existence, need, prediction, maintenance and application. 
"Existence" refers to a simple awareness that others and oneself 
apprehend the same object or the same event differently. "Need" consists 
of a "growing 
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awareness that certain situations which do not explicitly call for 
role-taking activity do so implicitly; that certain situations constitute 
a signal to engage and utilize one's role-taking capabilities." A 
further knowledge is achieved when the child, assuming he knows all the 
foregoing, succeeds in actually carrying out the intended analysis of the 
other person's role attributes,(prediction), and yet a further knowledge 
is achieved when the child reaches an equilibrium between his own point 
of view and the others (maintenance). The last concern, application, 
refers to the remaining task to "behave appropriately" in light of one's 
understanding of another's perspective and to translate this into an • 
effective verbal message. 
It is because of children's inability to "apply" that our 
understanding of children's limitations are often incorrect. As Flavell 
argues, "if a child produces a poor solution to some problem which 
entails role-taking activity, it may not be and often will not be obvious 
where the trouble lies." He may have been unaware of perspective 
differences, unaware that the present task has an implicit role-taking 
requirement, unable to achieve or maintain an adequate representation of 
the other's perspective, unable to use the information contained in his 
representation, or some combination of these. Unfortunately, this is the 
major limitation of any psychological research on children. Because 
there are so many alternatives which can be marshalled to account for the 
child's failure to produce an appropriate response, we have chosen not to 
concentrate on the child's failures but rather on the child's success. 
Looking at our results, we can see that children at different 
developmental ages demonstrate different role-taking abilities. As we 
have seen, our three and a half to four year-old children failed to 
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perform adequately in most of our tasks. Our four and a half to five 
year olds showed the first signs of role-taking abilities. They seemed 
to have grasped both the "existence" and the "need" parameters of 
role-taking. They understood that "what is known to me might not be 
known to you", that "people have internal feelings and emotions which are 
different from mine", and that when you hide an object from somebody 
else, you have to hide it so that the other does not see it whereas you 
can see it". Their problem seemed to lie with the "prediction" element 
of role-taking ability. It is because of that that we see errors, like 
"hiding the cake under the table", or giving descriptions of events which 
were very concrete and did not include any complicated processing of the 
other person's motives and emotions. By five and a half to six years of 
age, most of the role taking problems have been solved. What most 
children seemed to lack was an ability to apply their inferences and 
their social cognitions and translate them into an effective verbal 
message. 
The second general issue is that of individual differences in 
performance on the socio-cognitive tasks. In Flavell's (1968) studies of 
role-taking, he repeatedly observed a very wide range of individual 
differences between children of the same age. Others (e.g. Hughes, 1975) 
have made the same observations. We did not find a great deal of 
individual variation in the performance of children in the same age 
group. Two points must be taken into account here. First, it is 
important to remember that the size of each of our age groups is very 
small. Second, Flavell has attributed some of the individual differences 
to environmental variation. For example, different maternal styles, 
different school environments, and different socialization practices may 
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lead to individual differences in the rate of relevant skill 
acquisition. Our group was very homogeneous. All the children attended 
the same school, came from middle class families and were members of a 
small community in California. In our analysis of individual differences 
in the mother's conversational style, we did not discover a great degree 
of maternal variation and we speculate that the socialization practices 
might be equally invariant. This suggests that although there is little 
individual difference in our present sample, this result has to be 
interpreted with caution. Our small group size together with our 
unusually homogeneous population can give us only one picture - the 
picture of homogeneity in performance. 
The third issue is that of the comparability of a child's 
performances across the socio-cognitive tasks. Can you speak of 
role-taking and social awareness of contexts as a general skill or 
disposition? When reviewing studies of social cognition, Shatz (1980) 
concludes: "while some studies have shown unexpectedly high levels of 
correlation, the overall picture is of only moderate relationships among 
the various role-taking skills." In contrast, Light (19 :) found 
important correlations among his various role-taking and 
visual-perspective-taking tasks. When we correlated performances among 
our tasks, we found that a significant correlation exists between the 
"Guess my story" task and the "Face recognition" task and between the 
"Guess my story" task and the "Hiding" task. The first correlation is 
hardly surprising. Performance on the "Guess my story" task depends 
partly on the ability to make accurate emotional inferences about the 
psychological states of other people. Face recognition, on the other 
hand, depends on the ability to know the existence of certain emotions 
- 230 - 
and to recognize a representation of them. At the same time, performance 
on the "Guess my story" task depends on the ability to conceive of a set 
of events and create a story which accounts for them. We found a 
significant correlation between this and taking the visual perspective of 
another person. However, performance on the "Face recognition " task is 
not significantly correlated with perfomance on the "hiding" task. This 
finding leads us to agree with Flavell's rather than with Light's 
argument. As Flavell (1968) has pointed out, a distinction must be made 
between "visual perspective " taking and "perspective taking which is 
concerned with the affective side of role-taking." Young children 
develop first the ability to role-take the emotions of ;he another person 
and then the ability to role-take the other person's visual perspective. 
Although, the present study provides evidence in support of Flavell's 
argument, the evidence should be interpreted with caution. The present 
study cannot yield firm conclusions because, when controlling for age, 
the cell sizes become so small that they do not allow for meaningful 
statistical analysis. 
INTERCORRELATIONS OF THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE TASKS 
WITH THE SOCIAL AND CONVERSATIONAL PARAMETERS 
Here, we examine the relationship between speech and other aspects of 
social functioning. In particular, we are interested in the 
interrelations among the child's language use, person perception, event 
knowledge, perspective taking and social interactional abilities. To 
statistically test for such relationships, the intercorrelations of the 
above mentioned variables were computed. The results are presented in 
Table 41. 





TABLE 41 CORRELATION MATRIX 
SS USS 	 UCP FTASK AGE PAS NAS 
GTASK 0.764 1.000 
FTASK 0.752 0.698 1.000 
AGE 0.768 0.645 0.796 1.000 
PAS 0.815 0.848 0.813 0.796 1.000 
NAS -0.817 -0.838 -0.781 -0.776 -0.992 1.000 
SS 0.869 0.804 0.901 0.839 0.905 -0.992 1.000 
USS -0.708 -0.755 -0.751 -0.761 -0.776 0.755 -0.835 1.000 
UCP -0.730 -0.539 -0.793 -0.640 -0.745 0.763 -0.813 0.421 1.000 
(*) NOTE:PAS=Positive Social Acts, NAS=Negative Social Acts, 
SS =Successful Speech, USS=Unsuccessful Speech, 
UCP=Uncooperative Speech. 
All the above correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.05 
level. However, because all the above variables are also significantly 
related to age, we carried out several regression analyses to control for 
age. One of the main beliefs of the present study is that the production 
of successful speech is related to performance on the three 
socio-cognitive tasks. Table 42 presents the regresion coefficients and 
the t value for successful speech when scores on HTASK and age are 
controlled. 
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TABLE 42 	 REGRESSION TABLE OF SUCCESSFUL SPEECH 
WHEN HTASK AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE :SS 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT 	 STD.ERROR 	 t (1, 16) 
HTASK 	 0.3591 	 0.1063 	 3.37 
AGE 	 0.2942 	 0.1140 	 2.6 
As Table 42 shows there is a significant relation between successful 
speech and scores on HTASK (t=3.37, p<0.05) even when the effect of age 
is controlled. 
Table 43 presents the regresion coefficients and the t value for 
successful speech when scores on the GTASK and age are controlled. 
TABLE 43 REGRESSION TABLE FOR SUCCESSFUL SPEECH 
WHEN GTASK AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : SS 
VAR REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS STD.ERROR t 	 (1,16) 
GTASK 0.2950 0.0903 3.3 
AGE 0.3860 0.0968 4.0 
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Table 43 demonstrates that there is a positive and significant 
relation between successful speech and GTASK (t=3.3, p<0.05) when the 
effect of age is controlled. 
Table 44 presents the regression coefficients and the t values for 
successful speech when FTASK and age are controlled. 
TABLE 44 REGRESSION TABLE FOR SUCCESSFUL SPEECH 
WHEN FTASK AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : SS 
VAR REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS STD. ERROR t 	 (1,16) 
FTASK 0.3928 0.0979 4.01 
AGE 0.2336 0.1116 2.1 
Here again, we have a positive and significant relationship (t=4.02, 
p<0.05) between successful speech and FTASK when age is controlled. 
We also found a positive and significant relationship (t=4.1, p<0.05) 
between successful speech and positive social acts, and a negative and 
significant relationship (t=4.42, p<0.05) between successful speech and 
negative social acts. Tables 45 and 46 present the regression 
coefficients and t values for these two analyses. 
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TABLE 45 	 REGRESSION TABLE FOR SUCCESSFUL SPEECH 
WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL ACTS AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SS 
VAR 	 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 	 STD. ERROR 	 t (1, 16) 
PAS 	 0.7010 	 0.1682 
	
4.2 
AGE 	 0.2273 	 0.1093 	 2.1 
TABLE 46 REGRESSION TABLE FOR SUCCESSFUL SPEECH 
WHEN NEGATIVE SOCIAL ACTS AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SS 
VAR 
	
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 	 STD. ERROR 	 t (1, 16) 
NAS 	 -0.7220 	 0.1632 	 4.42 
AGE 	 0.2408 	 0.1016 	 2.4 
Positive social acts were also positively and significantly related 
to scores on HTASK (t=2.5, p<0.05), to scores on FTASK (t=2.2, p<0.05) 
and to scores on GTASK (t=4.8, p<0.05) when the effects of age are 
controlled. Tables 47, 48 and 49 present the regression coefficients and 
the t values of positive social acts for the three socio-cognitive tasks 
when age is controlled. 
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TABLE 47 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF POSITIVE SOCIAL ACTS  
WHEN HTASK AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:PAS 
VAR REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS STD. ERROR t 	 (1,16) 
HTASK 0.3013 0.1218 2.5 
AGE 0.2691 0.1306 2.1 
TABLE 48 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF POSITIVE SOCIAL ACTS 
WHEN FTASK AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : PAS 
VAR REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS STD. ERROR t 	 (1.16) 
FTASK 0.2788 0.1246 2.2 
AGE 0.2644 0.1419 1.9 
TABLE 49 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF POSITIVE SOCIAL ACTS 
WHEN GTASK AND AGE ARE CONTROLLED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:PAS 
VAR REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS STD. ERROR t 	 (1,16) 
GTASK 0.3476 0.0827 4.2 
AGE 0.2770 0.0887 3.1 
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To conclude, the present results support the study's original 
expectations. The children's ability to produce successful speech (i.e. 
speech which is placed in the appropriate discourse context and is 
relevant to the hearer's perspective) is closely related to their ability 
to take the visual perspective of another person, to recognize the causal 
links in social events and to understand other people's inner feelings. 
At the same time, their ability to engage in a cooperative way in social 
interactions is related to their ability to perform the above social 
tasks and to use language successfully. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present thesis focused on how children learn to use language in 
interaction with their mother. For the most part, the results confirmed 
the original expectations. All participating children had a good grasp 
of the language and were able to use it as a powerful tool for 
communicating with their mother. Even the children in the youngest age 
group were adequate communicators. They were able to understand most 
speech addressed to them, had clear intentions to communicate and, in 
most cases, were able to do so. Despite these accomplishments, we found 
that the language use of three and a half and four and a half year old 
children was limited. Their language served only a limited number of 
functions and their speech was not yet fully social. Moreover, their 
conversational exchanges were short and the interactions of the younger 
children contained significantly less utterances (per speaking turn) than 
did the interactions of older ones. The mother-child interactions of the 
youngest group was dominated by the mother. She controlled, directed and 
maintained the conversational flow. For the children, the interaction 
was therefore pedagogical in nature and unequal. 
In the present study, we witnessed a gradual improvement in the 
child's ability to use language and to engage in purposive social acts. 
In the beginning, the child's use of language is tied up to the immediate 
environment and the child often lacks the ability to take his listener's 
perspective. However, contrary to the Piagetian perspective, we Eound 
that the child's conversations with his mother were dialogues. But, 
these conversations revolved around only the immediate context, were 
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short and the topic was exhausted in two turns. By the age of four and a 
half we observe the beginning of extended themes where a topic may be 
maintained for 4 or 5 turns. By the age of five and six, the child 
becomes increasingly competent. He is able to produce relevant talk and 
to shape his utterances according to his listener's needs. He also 
becomes more of an equal participant in the conversation. Despite these 
accomplishments, the child at this stage still has difficulty 
comprehending and producing complicated speech (e.g. hints) in which the 
desired goal of communication is not stated explicitly. By age seven, 
several new developments occur. The child becomes an equal partner in 
communicating with his mother. Cooperative discourse is sustained for 
longer periods of time and coherence is achieved by the employment of 
several cohesive devices and anaphoric references. We also see the 
beginning of language use which is non-literal or indirect and includes 
attempts to go beyond the immediate present of the conversational context. 
A central hypothesis of the present study was that conversational 
competence is only one aspect of successful social functioning and 
therefore achievements in one area are necessarily linked with 
achievements in the other. To explore this hypothesis, we isolated 
certain parameters of social functioning that we felt were relevant to 
successful conversational participation. We then designed certain 
socio-cognitive tasks to test these parameters. We found that there is a 
close relationship between performance on the socio-cognitive tasks and 
successful speech and a significant negative relationship between them 
and unsuccessful or uncooperative speech. In addition, we found that 
positive social acts during the language interaction are positively 
related to the production of successful speech and negatively related to 
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unsuccessful or uncooperative speech. On this basis, we conclude that 
person perception, event knowledge and knowledge of the social context 
are all closely associated with the child's acquisition of communicative 
and conversational competence. The conceptual underpinnings of language 
are broader than much of the existing literature would suggest. In order 
to manipulate socially influenced alternatives, engage in discourse, and 
interpret speech acts, young children draw on their knowledge of people, 
sequences of events and different types of perspectives. 
Before concluding the present thesis there is an important issue 
which needs to be raised and clarified. One can easily misunderstand the 
present purpose and conclude that the intention was to explain language 
development in terms of social cognitive development and thereby to 
reduce language explanation to social explanation. As Atkinson (1982) 
has argued: 
"It is immediately apparent that, if we view this task as that of 
relating theories of language development to theories of general 
cognitive development, it bears some resembalance to the problem of 
reductionism... Summarizing there are three necessary conditions 
that we must impose on reductive explanations: 
1) Theoretical terms in the reduced theory must be 
systematically related to theoretical terms in the reducing 
theory. 
(2) Formal operations in the reduced theory must be identifiable 
in the reducing theory. 
(3) The relevant terms and operations must appear in the 
sequence of theories of general cognitive development before 
they appear in the sequence of theories in D." (pp.22-23) 
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Here, however, we make no reductionist claims regarding language 
development. First, we do not do so in the sense that Atkinson proposes. 
We have concentrated on only one aspect of language development - 
conversational competence. Our aim was to argue that because it was more 
social than linguistic, conversational competence can only be understood 
when it is placed within the framework of the child's general social 
functioning. This is not to suggest a solely social explanation of 
conversational competence, but rather to broaden the analysis so as to 
include the consideration of social functioning. Second, we do not wish 
to make any claims concerning the order of development. We have no basis 
for claiming that social functioning precedes language ability or vice 
versa. To speculate, it is probable that development in one area 
coincides with development in the other. 
In this context, one can wonder about the value of a study of 
language functioning which does not seek to explain it with reference to 
another variable. It is valuable in following three respects: 
(1) It broadens the scope of theorizing about language. To do so, an 
attempt was made to apply a philosophical model of conversational 
participation to the study of child language and to isolate those 
aspects of that participation which would be particularly problematic 
for young children. The result provides strong support for the 
belief concerning the importance of studying language as face-to-face 
interaction which involves a social setting and requires social 
skills. 
(2) It provides a detailed description of the development of 
children's language use between the ages of three and a half to 
seven. The emphasis was not only on what children cannot do, but also 
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on what they can. In this vein, the focus was on discovering the 
various strategies they adopt to cope with their inadequacies. 
(3) It provides a new framework within which to analyze speech 
problems. For example, it may be that autistic children's language 
problems are related to communicative problems rather than syntactic 
or semantic problems. If this is the case, any successful education 
designed for autistic children's language should be directed towards 
their social inadequacies rather than to language per se. As 
suggested by this example, a conceptual framework that elucidates the 
social side of language is potentially of great value. 
Directions for Future Research  
The thesis demonstrates that a close analysis of children's 
conversations can be made so as to reveal both the social functions 
children perform with language and the devices they use to initiate and 
sustain coherent and appropriate discourse. However, the results 
presented do not provide a detailed picture of the development of the 
children's overall conversational abilities. Future research is needed 
to address other important aspects of conversational participation. In 
particular, there is a need to address the development of certain 
conversational processes (e.g. turn-taking and repairs) and to link this 
development to other parameters of social functioning. As suggested 
before, the present results account only for one kind of social 
interaction, namely mother-child interaction. Future research is needed 
to determine the relationship of the picture we have depicted here to 
child-child conversations and stranger-child conversations. 
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There are several other limitations of the present study which 
suggest additional directions for future research. The main limitation 
is the size of the subject population. Ninteen cases limit both the 
sophistication of the statistical analyses which can be employed and the 
extent of the generalizations which can be made. In the present thesis, 
numbers were sacrificed to allow for the development of more detailed and 
careful content analysis of conversations. In future research, larger 
numbers of children must be studied. Similarly, the present study 
investigated one situation %Jere language is used, namely the 
mother-child situation. Literature on mothers' conversational behaviour 
(Howe, 1978; Nelson, 1978) has consistently reported that there are 
individual differences in the mother's conversational style. Although in 
the present thesis, we did not witness a great variability in the 
mother's conversational style it might be the case that we did not 
because our sample was a vdy homogeneous one (i.e. middle class mothers, 
resident in one particular community, where their children attend the 
same school). Future research is needed to clarify if that is the case 
when a heterogeneous sample is included. A second limitation is the 
crudeness of the scoring method for the child's performance on the 
socio-cognitive tasks. The present work chose to concentrate on arriving 
at a detailed and coherent picture of the child's language functioning. 
Future research, however, should combine this with an attempt to develop 
a more elaborated basis for examining social functioning. In place of 
quantitative measures of performance, more detailed and qualitative 
constructs for understanding social functioning are needed. Finally, 
future research should seek to elaborate our sketchy picture of the 
child's abilities concerning non-literal and indirect speech-acts. These 
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speech-acts cannot be naturally investigated since they do not occur as 
frequently as anticipated. Thus, any transcript of naturally occurring 
conversations will contain so few instances that any kind of analysis 
will be impossible. However, indirect and non-literal speech-acts can be 
tested by controlling the speech situation and manipulating it in such a 
way which ensures their production. In this vein, it would be 
interesting to discover what children at different developmental periods 
do when they are placed in a position where they have to ask something 
from a stranger (and thus investigating politeness phenomena) or where 




1. Transcription Conventions and Transcription Symbols for Utterances 
2. Extracts from the Video-tape transcripts 
- 245 - 
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS  
(i) Units 
A Unit is an utterance and/or an act performed by one participant at 
a given time. It is bounded by a significant pause or by an utterance or 
an act of the other participant. Each unit is numbered separately in the 
sequence in which it occurred. Pauses are not precisely timed. However, 
significant pauses between utterances of the same participant are taken 
to represent a "floor change" and are recorded as a different unit with.a 
different number. Behaviours that occurred at the same time by two 
different participants are marked with the same number. 
(ii) Transcription Symbols for Utterances  
Loudness 	 : Was marked by using capital letters. 
E.g. " Come HERE " 
Emphasis 	 : Was marked by underlying parts of the 
specific word within a given utterance. 
E.g. " You mean you want this?" 
Lengthened : Was marked by colons ":". 
Syllable E.g. 	 " 	 This 	 is gre::en" 
Intonation : "," marks low rise 
: "?" marks high rise. Reference to the general 
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"." marks low fall 
"!" marks exclamatory utterances 
: Used whenever an utterance was unclear to the 
observer but tentative interpretation was 
possible of words or phases. 
: Used whenever an utterance was uninterpretable 
by the observer 
The transcriptions of Non-Verbal Acts were adapted from the Behaviour 
Catalogue, compiled by JIM CHISHOLM, FAE HALL. NICK BLURTON-JONES, and. 
ROB WOODSON, April, (1974). 
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Child : 6;9 
CHILD 
	
MOTHER 	 CONTEXT 
Non-Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Non-Verbal 
1. Sits down 	 1. Ok! Let's 	 1.Sits,looks 
play it 	 at child 
2. looks where 	 2.What is 	 2. points at 
M. points 	 3.this? 	 board 
3.looks at 	 3.Go (-),4.this 	 3.looks at board 
board 
	 is the starting 	 4. " 
point 	 4.Right! 
5.points at 	 5.And you can 	 5. looks at board 
pathways 	 move into here 	 6. 	 IS 
6. Raises 	 6.into two turns 
head looks M. 
7. And how 	 7. Looks at child 
7.Looks at board 
	 do you get 
turns? 
8. Looks around 	 8. Eh, we..., 	 8. Looks at child 
9.point at dice 	 9. we, eh, pick 




MOTHER 	 CONTEXT 
Non-Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Non-Verbal 
l.turns dice 	 1.//you turn// //you// 
	
l.extends hand 
2.that's a dice 	 takes dice 
2.glances at c. 
2.Sits,3.watches 	 3.A number? 	 3.Looks at dice 
4. plays with 	 4. Ye::ah! 	 4.looks at c. 
feet,5,6.looks 	 5.like you 	 5. " 	 " " 
M. 	 pick a six 	 6. nods head 
and 6.1'11 be 
two and that's 
7.turns looks 	 7.a number(!) 	 7.looks at c. 
8.sits back, 	 8.ok, you roll 
9.looks at M. 	 it,9.like that? 9.rolls dice 
10.Looks atM. 	 10. Yeah(!) 	 10. Looks at child 
11.Looks at 	 11.But, I don't 11. Looks closely 
dice 	 see any NUMBERS! 	 at dice 
12. looks at 	 12.You can 	 12. Raises head 
M. then 13. 	 13.make them 	 13. looks at child 
at dice 	 UP. 
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CHILD 
	
MOTHER 	 CONTEXT 
Non-Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Non-Verbal 
1. Looks at M. 	 (pause) 	 1. Looks at board 
2. Looks where 	 2. You know 	 2. looks at dice 
M. looks 	 what we could 	 3. raises head 
3. looks at M. 	 3. do? 
	
looks at child 
4. shakes head 
looks at M. 
5.looks atM. 
6.watches M. 
7.watches M.  
5.We could roll 
the dice,and 6. 
whatever colour 
comes on top we 




7. turns looks 
4. What? 	 4. shows dice 
to child 
at child 
8.Nods head 	 8. Ok! 	 8. Smiles 
9.Takes dice 	 9.And where are 
	 9.Looks at board 
we going to? 
l0.Leans 	 10. The 	 10. Watches child 
forward 
	 finishing line 
points 
	 is here 
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CHILD 
	
MOTHER 	 CONTEXT 
Non-Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Verbal 	 Non-Verbal 
1.Looks at 
board 
1. Ok, that's 
what we get, 
because what is 
in there? 
1. Looks at board 
2.turns looks 
at candies 
2. 	 I don't 
know, 3.what 
2. leans forward, 
looks closely at 
3.turns looks that? board? 
M. 
4.looks at M. 4. I think these 
are candies! 
4. Looks at baord 
5.Nods head 5.Who do you want 
to be? 
5. makes pig stand 
6.Takes pig 	 6.1'11 be 	 6.looks down 
the pig 
7.Raises 	 7. And you'll 	 7.Takes cow 
head looks 	 be the cow, 
at M. 	 8. ok? 
	
8.looks at child 
9.Looks 	 9.0k! 
	
9.Puts cow to 
at M. 	 starting point 
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APPENDIX 2 
1. The Relationship of Utterances and Speech-Acts 
2. Definitions of Speech-Acts and their Sub-Categories 
3. Definitions of the Social Interactional Acts 
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1.The Relatioship of Utterances and Speech-Acts  
In the present analysis two different measures have been taken for 
analysing each verbal unit. 
(i)Utterances = Any uttered sound which occupied a speaking turn. 
No attention was paid to full stops. Each utterance 
had finished when there was either a pause or when the 
speaking turn was taken by the other person. 
(ii)Speech-Act = A particular utterance could be coded as representing • 
several speech-acts. For example, the utterance "Look, 
the boy doesn't have a head" was coded as being an 
assertion about an event and an attention seeking act. 
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2. DEFINITION OF SPEECH-ACTS 
ASSERTIVES 	 (a) Assertions about Objects  
(Labelling) = Any one-word 
Any utterance which 	 assertion which merely labels a 
reports facts, states 	 perceivable object. 
rules, conveys attitudes 	 E.g. "Yellow", "Cow". 
(b) Assertions about Events= 
Any statement which predicates 
events, properties, locations, 
and describes objects, events, 
people or states definitions of 
social rules. 
E.g. "It fell on the floor", "That 
happens later" 
(c) Assertions about Internal  
Phenomena = Any assertions about 
emotions, sensations, intentions, 
and any other internal events. 
E.g. "I like it, "I don't know". 
RESPONSIVES 
	 (a)Supply Solicited One-Word  
Information = A one word response 
to a prior requestive. 
E.g. "Yes", "Green" 
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RESPONSIVES 	 (b) Supply Extended Response = 
Any utterance which 
	
An elaborated response to a prior 
supplies solicited 	 requestive act. 
information to a prior 	 E.g. " Because it must go in here". 
requestive act. 
(a) Questions  = 
Any utterance which requests information. 
E.g. "What is that?" 
(b) Requests for Action = 
Any utterance which seeks the performance 
of an action by the hearer. 
E.g. "Go over there" 
(c) Suggestions =  
Any utterance which recommends the 
performance of an action by hearer or 
speaker. 
E.g. "Shall we do that?" 
REQUESTIVES  
Any utterance which 
solicits information 
or action . 
COMMISSIVES  
Any utterance which looks 
forward and promises an 	 E.g. "I promise I'll do that" 
offer or a claim to the 	 "When we reach this point we'll have 
hearer. 	 to go back three spaces". 
EXPRESSIVES 	 (a) Exclamations= 
Convey attitude. E.g. "Oh", "Ah" 
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EXPRESSIVES 	 (b) Accompaniments = 
Any non-propositional 	 Maintain contact by supplying 
utterance which conveys 	 information which is redundant in 
attitudes or repeats or 	 respect to some contextual feature. 
acknowledges others. 	 E.g. "Here you are","There you go". 
(c) Repetitions = 
Repeat own or the speaker's prior 
utterance. 
(d) Attention-Getting Devices = 
E.g. "Hey John", "Look!". 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 	 (a) Utterances that agree or reject . 
Any non-propositional 	 prior utterances. E.g. "Yeah", "Ok". 
utterance which 	 (b) Utterances that praise or thank. 
recognizes prior non- 	 E.g. " Good Boy", "Thanks". 
requestive utterance, 	 (c) Utterances that apologize. 
and helps the maintenance 
	 E.g. "Oh sorry". 
of the conversational flow. (d) Utterances that greet  
E.g. "Hello". 
PERSONAL  
Any utterance which is 	 E.g. "I'll put that here, and that there" 
directed 	 the child utters this sentence without 
to self rather than others. 
	 looking at the adult and while she is 
playing by herself. 
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UNCODABLE 
Any utterance which is 
either uninterpretable or 
uncodable (i.e. does not fall 
in any of the above categories) 
to the observer at the stage of 
transcription. 
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DEFINITIONS OF THE CATEGORIES FOR SCORING SOCIAL INTERACTIONAL ACTS 
POSITIVE BEHAVIOURS 
INITIATIONS 	 (a) Labelling : The child initiates 
Any verbal or 	 conversation by labelling objects in 
non-verbal act 	 the immediate enviroment. 
which looks 	 E.g. "Cow" 
forward and 	 (b) Stating 	 : The child initiates 
requires another 	 conversation by stating extra 
person to speak. 	 information. 
E.g. This goes here". 
(c) Requesting : The child initiates 
conversation by requesting information 
or action from his partner. 
E.g. "What do we do now?" 
(d) Non-Verbal : The child initiates 
conversation by non-verbal means. 
E.g. (takes, shows pig to mother). 
RESPONSIVES 
	 (a) One Word Responses : The child 
An act which 	 responds with a one-word utterance. 
supplies information 
	 E.g. " Yes". 
to a prior requestive 	 (b) Extended : The child responds with 
act. 	 a more than one-word utterance. 
E.g. " You'll be the pig". 
(c) Non-Verbal: The child responds by 
non-verbal signs. 
SHARED ACTIVITY 
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(a) Watches : The child watches what 
his partner does. 
(E.g. Mother: Oh, I'll go here" (moves 
on right colour on board). Child : Watches 
closely mother's actions. 
(b) Gives/Takes : E.g. When the child 
has finished with his turn, he gives the 
dice to the mother for her turn. 
(c) Laughs/Smiles:The child laughs or 
smiles during a shared joke. 
(d) Concentrates on Relevant Activity : 
The child's attention is directed to an 
activity or an object which is directly 
relevant to the immediate context of the 
interaction. 
E.g. Mother throws dice, and child 
attempts to make cow stand on the 
right place on board. 
(e) Acts following Agreed Rules: 
The child acts in a way which takes into 
account the rules that have been decided. 
E.g. The child at his turn, takes and 
throws the dice. 
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NEGATIVE BEHAVIOURS 
WAITING FOR INITIATION : (a) Staring : The child sits and 
stares at game board or mother. 
(b) Motionless:The child sits 
motionless , looks around him 
or straight ahead of him, showing 
complete disinterest. 
NON-SOCIAL BEHAVIOURS  : (a) Child cries. 
(b) Child attempts to leave the  
room or to terminate the game  
interaction. 
(c) Child acts against agreed rules. 
(d) Child concentrates on different  
activity  from his partner without 
attempting to share it with her. 
(e)Child talks to self.  
UNRESPONSIVENESS : (a) Child fails to respond to 
prior request because he concentrates 
on a different activity. 
(b) Child fails to respond to prior 
request and sits motionless looking 
at mother. 
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APPENDIX 3  
1.Individual Results of the Speech-Acts Analysis. 
2.Individual Results of Mothers' and Child's Indirect Speech. 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF SPEECH ACTS ANALYSIS  
FIRST AGE GROUP 
RESPONSIVES :24 
DIRECTIVES 	 :12 
Labelling 	 7 
Assertions of Events 	 15 
Assertions Internal 	 15 
One-Word Response 	 13 
Extended Response 
	 11 
Real Questions 	 2 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective Quest.: 
Requests for Clarificat.: 
CHILD1 : 3;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 :37 
Requests for Action 	 : 10 
Suggestions 	 : 
Requests for Permission : 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT:8 
Exclamations 	 2 
Accompaniments 	 : - 
Repetitions 	 : 	 1 
Agrees/Rejects 	 8 
Thanks/Greets etc. 	 - 
TOTAL 	 : 94 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 
EXPRESSIVES :3 
UNCODABLE 	 :1 
PRIVATE 	 :9 
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CHILD2 	 : 	 3;9 
FIRST GROUP 
ASSERTIVES : 21 Labelling : 10 
Assertions of Events : 5 
Assertions Internal : 6 
RESPONSIVES : 23 One-Word Responses :18 
Extended Responses : 5 
DIRECTIVES : 6 Real Questions : 2 
Test Questions : 
Verbal Reflective : 
Clarification Request.: - 
Requests for Action 	 : 4 
Suggestions 	 : 
Permission Requests 	 : 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 4 Exclamations 	 : 4 
Repetitions 	 : 
Accompaniments 	 : 
Attention Getters 	 : 
Agree/Rejects 	 :3 
Thanks/Greets etc. 	 : 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT: 3 
UNCODABLE 	 : 7 
PRIVATE 	 : 5 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS FROM THE SPEECH-ACT ANALYSIS 
CHILD3 	 : 	 3;5 
FIRST AGE GROUP 
ASSERTIVES : 	 7 Labelling : 	 5 
Assertions of Events : 	 1 
Assertions Internal : 	 1 
RESPONSIVES : 	 4 One-Word Responses : 	 4 
Extended Responses 
DIRECTIVES : 	 1 Real Questions 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective 
Clarification Request.: - 
Requests for Action 











CHILD4 : 	 4;0 
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS FROM THE SPEECH-ACTS 
FIRST AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
ASSERTIVES : 13 Labelling : 7 
Assertions of Events : 2 
Assertions Internal : 4 
RESPONSIVES : 11 One-Word Responses :10 
Extended Responses : 1 
DIRECTIVES : 2 Real Questions : 1 
Test Questions : 
Verbal Reflective : 
Clarification Requests : - 
Requests for Action : 1 
Suggestions : 
Permission Requests : 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 3 	 Exclamations 	 : 
Accompaniments 	 : 
Repetitions 	 : 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : 5 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 : 5 
Thanks/Greets, etc. 	 : 
UNCODABLE 	 : 7 
PRIVATE 
	 : 
TOTAL 	 : 41 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS FROM THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
CHILD 5 	 : 3;8 
FIRST AGE GROUP 
ASSERTIVES : 31 Labelling : 	 21 
Assertions of Events : 8 
Assertions Internal 	 : 2 
RESPONSIVES : 12 One-Word Responses :12 
Extended 
DIRECTIVES : 1 Real Questions : 	 1 
All other questions 	 : 
COMMISSIVES / - 
EXPRESSIVES : 2 Exclamations : 	 1 
Attention-Getters 	 : 1 
Repetitions 
Accompaniments 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 4 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 : 4 
Thanks, Greets, etc. : 
UNCODABLE 	 : 1 
PRIVATE 	 : 1 
TOTAL 	 : 52 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
SECOND AGE GROUP  
CHILD 1 : 4;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 28 	 Labelling 	 : 2 
Assertions of Events : 9 
Assertions Internal :17 
RESPONSIVES 	 : 38 	 One-Word Responses 	 :27 
Extended Responses 	 :11 
DIRECTIVES 	 9 	 Real Questions 	 : 3 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective 
Clarification Request: 3 
Requests for Action : 1 
Suggestions 
Permission Requests : 
COMMISSIVES  
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 8 	 Exclamations 	 : 3 
Repetitions 	 : 1 
Accompaniments 	 : 4 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT : 10 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 : 10 
Thanks, Greets, etc. : 
UNCODABLE 	 : 7 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL 
	 : 100 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS FROM THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
CHILD 2 	 : 	 4;5 
SECOND AGE GROUP 
ASSERTIVES : 	 9 Labelling : 	 2 
Assertions of Events : 	 5 
Assertions Internal : 	 2 
RESPONSIVES :13 One-Word Responses : 	 10 
Extended Responses : 	 3 
DIRECTIVES : 	 1 Real Questions : 	 1 
All other questions : 
COMMISSIVES : 	 0 
EXPRESSIVES : 	 4 Exclamations : 	 3 
Accompaniments : 	 1 
Repetitions 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT : 	 3 Agree/Rejects : 	 3 
Thanks, Greets, 	 etc. : 
UNCODABLE : 	 10 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL 	 : 39 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS 
CHILD 3 	 : 	 4;8 
FROM THE SPEECH-ACTS 
SECOND AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
ASSERTIVES : 	 57 Labelling : 	 10 
Assertion of Events : 	 19 
Assertions Internal : 	 28 
RESPONSIVES : 	 21 One-Word Responses : 	 9 
Extended Responses : 	 12 
DIRECTIVES : 	 20 Real Questions : 	 4 
Test Questions : 	 - 
Verbal Reflective 
Clarification Request.: 	 4 




EXPRESSIVES : 	 6 Exclamations : 	 2 
Accompaniments : 	 3 
Repetitions : 	 1 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT : 	 20 Agrees/Rejects :19 
Thanks : 	 1 
UNCODABLE 7 
PRIVATE 1 
TOTAL : 	 132 
- 269 - 
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
SECOND AGE GROUP  
CHILD 4 : 4;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 35 	 Labelling 	 :18 
Assertions of Events :15 
Assertions Internal :2 
RESPONSIVES 	 :21 	 One-Word Responses 	 :15 
Extended Responses 	 : 6 





Requests for Action 
Suggestions  
- 
Permission Requests : 2 
COMMISSIVES : 1 
EXPRESSIVES : 6 Exclamations : 1 
Accompaniments : 3 
Repetitions : 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 5 Agrees/Rejects : 5 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE : 2 
PRIVATE  
TOTAL 	 :73 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
SECOND AGE GROUP  
CHILD 5 : 4;6 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 56 	 Labelling 	 :11 
Assertions of Events :16 
Assertions Internal :29 
RESPONSIVES 	 :45 	 One-Word Responses 	 :24 
Extended Responses 	 :21 
DIRECTIVES 	 : 17 	 Real Questions 	 : 1 
Test Questions  
Verbal Reflective 	 : 2 
Clarification Request: 1 
Requests for Action : 6 
Suggestions 	 : 3 
Permission Requests : 1 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 4 
EXPRESSIVES 	 :11 	 Exclamations 	 : 4 
Accompaniments 	 : 3 
Repetitions 	 : 4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:15 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 :15 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE 	 :12 
PRIVATE 	 : 2 
TOTAL 	 :162 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
THIRD AGE GROUP 
CHILD 1 : 5;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 23 	 Labelling 	 : 7 
Assertions of Events :13 
Assertions Internal : 3 
RESPONSIVES 	 :26 	 One-Word Responses 	 :18 
Extended Responses 	 : 8 













EXPRESSIVES : 5 Exclamations : 4 
Accompaniments : 1 
Repetitions 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 3 Agrees/Rejects : 3 
Thanks, Greets 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
THIRD AGE GROUP  
CHILD 2 : 5;8 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 52 	 Labelling 	 : 7 
Assertions of Events :43 
Assertions Internal :2 
RESPONSIVES 	 :18 	 One-Word Responses 	 :14 
Extended Responses 	 : 4 





Clarification Request: - 
Requests for Action : 2 
Suggestions 
Permission Requests : 2 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 6 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 2 
	 Exclamations 
Accompaniments 	 : 2 
Repetitions 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 7 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 : 7 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE 	 : 4 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL 	 :107 
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CHILD 3 	 : 	 5;8 
ASSERTIVES 
INDIVIDUAL 
: 	 42 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 
THIRD AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
: 	 7 Labelling 
Assertions of Events :18 
Assertions Internal :17 
RESPONSIVES :29 One-Word Responses :18 
Extended Responses :11 
DIRECTIVES :20 Real Questions : 	 5 
Test Questions 
 
Verbal Reflective : 	 1 
Clarification Request: - 
Requests for Action : 	 8 
Suggestions : 	 4 
Permission Requests : 	 2 
COMMISSIVES 
EXPRESSIVES : 15 Exclamations : 	 5 
Accompaniments : 	 7 
Repetitions : 	 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 12 Agrees/Rejects :10 
Thanks, Greets : 	 2 
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CHILD 4 : 5;9 
ASSERTIVES 
INDIVIDUAL 
: 	 61 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 






Assertions of Events 
Assertions Internal 
RESPONSIVES :10 One-Word Responses : 4 
Extended Responses : 6 
DIRECTIVES : 	 17 Real Questions : 3 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective 
Clarification Request: 6 
Requests for Action : 5 
Suggestions : 3 
Permission Requests : 2 
COMMISSIVES : 1 
EXPRESSIVES : 11 Exclamations 
Accompaniments : 7 
Repetitions : 4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 23 Agrees/Rejects :23 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE : 3 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL :126 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
CHILD 5 : 5;6 
THIRD AGE GROUP 
ASSERTIVES : 9 Labelling : 6 
Assertions of Events : 3 
Assertions Internal : 
RESPONSIVES : 6 One-Word Responses : 4 
Extended Responses : 2 









EXPRESSIVES : 5 Exclamations : 1 
Accompaniments : 2 
Repetitions : 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 8 Agrees/Rejects : 8 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE : 14 




INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP  
CHILD 1 : 6;9 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 43 	 Labelling 	 : 7 
Assertions of Events :29 
Assertions Internal :7 
RESPONSIVES 
	
:23 	 One-Word Responses 	 :12 
Extended Responses 
	 :11 
DIRECTIVES 	 :18 	 Real Questions 	 :11 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective 	 : 2 
Clarification Request: 2 
Requests for Action : 1 
Suggestions 
Permission Requests : 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 7 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 6 	 Exclamations 	 : 1 
Accompaniments 	 : 3 
Repetitions 	 : 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 15 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 :11 
Thanks, Greets 	 : 4 
UNCODABLE 
	 : 8 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL 	 :120 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP  
CHILD 2 : 6;6 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 41 	 Labelling 	 :17 
Assertions of Events :16 
Assertions Internal :8 
RESPONSIVES 	 :20 	 One-Word Responses 	 :13 
Extended Responses 	 : 7 






Clarification Request: 2 





EXPRESSIVES 	 : 12 	 Exclamations 	 : 7 
Accompaniments 	 : 4 
Repetitions 	 : 1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 10 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 :10 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE 	 : 7 
PRIVATE  
TOTAL 	 :108 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP 
CHILD 3 : 6;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 58 	 Labelling 	 :20 
Assertions of Events :14 
Assertions Internal :24 
RESPONSIVES 	 :28 	 One-Word Responses 	 :18 
Extended Responses 	 :10 




	 : 1 
Clarification Request: 2 
Requests for Action :11 
Suggestions 	 : 3 
Permission Requests : 2 
COMMISSIVES  
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 16 	 Exclamations 	 : 11 
Accompaniments 	 : 5 
Repetitions 	 : - 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP 
CHILD 4 : 6;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 38 	 Labelling 	 :16 
Assertions of Events :12 
Assertions Internal :10 
RESPONSIVES 	 :24 	 One-Word Responses 	 :19 
Extended Responses 
	 : 5 
DIRECTIVES 	 :19 	 Real Questions 




	 : 1 
Clarification Request: 4 
Requests for Action : 3 
Suggestions 	 : 2 
Permission Requests : 2 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 3 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 6 
	 Exclamations 	 : 2 
Accompaniments 	 : 4 
Repetitions 	 : - 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 20 
UNCODABLE 
Agrees/Rejects 	 : 8 




    
TOTAL 	 :106 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FIRST AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 1: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 3;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 24 	 Labelling  
Assertions of Events :23 
Assertions Internal : 1 
RESPONSIVES 	 : 1 	 One-Word Responses 	 : 1 
Extended Responses 
DIRECTIVES 	 :44 	 Real Questions 	 :24 
Test Questions 	 : 3 
Verbal Reflective 	 : 7 
Clarification Request: 4 




EXPRESSIVES 	 : 2 	 Exclamations 
Accompaniments 	 : 2 
Repetitions 	 : - 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 11 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 : 8 
Thanks, Greets 	 : 3 
UNCODABLE 	 : 2 
PRIVATE  
TOTAL 	 : 84 
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INDIVIDUAL 
MOTHER 2: INTERACTING 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 
FIRST AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
WITH CHILD AGE : 3;9 
ASSERTIVE'S : 	 28 Labelling : 	 2 
Assertions of Events :20 
Assertions Internal : 	 6 
RESPONSIVES : 	 2 One-Word Responses : 	 1 
Extended Responses : 	 1 
DIRECTIVES :42 Real Questions :17 
Test Questions : 	 3 
Verbal Reflective : 	 9 
Clarification Request: 	 3 




EXPRESSIVES 	 : 8 	 Exclamations 
Accompaniments 	 7 
Repetitions 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 19 Agrees/Rejects 	 :11 
UNCODABLE 	 : 1 




     
TOTAL 	 :100 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FIRST AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 3: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 3;5 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 32 	 Labelling 	 : 3 
Assertions of Events :19 
Assertions Internal :10 
RESPONSIVES 	 : - 	 One-Word Responses 	 : - 
Extended Responses 
DIRECTIVES 	 :28 	 Real Questions 	 :14 
Test Questions 
	 : 3 
Verbal Reflective 	 : 3 
Clarification Request: - 




COMMISSIVES 	 : 1 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 5 	 Exclamations 	 : 1 
Accompaniments 	 5 
Repetitions 	 : - 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 13 	 Agrees/Rejects 	 :13 
Thanks, Greets 	 : - 
UNCODABLE 	 : 6 
PRIVATE  
TOTAL 	 : 85 
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MOTHER 4: INTERACTING 
ASSERTIVES 
INDIVIDUAL 
: 	 44 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 
FIRST AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
: 	 2 
:22 
WITH CHILD AGE : 4;0 
Labelling 
Assertions of Events 
Assertions Internal :20 
RESPONSIVES : 2 One-Word Responses : 	 1 
Extended Responses : 	 1 
DIRECTIVES :42 Real Questions : 	 6 
Test Questions : 	 5 
Verbal Reflective : 	 7 
Clarification Request: 	 1 
Requests for Action : 	 9 
Suggestions : 	 6 
Permission Requests : 	 8 
COMMISSIVES : 4 
EXPRESSIVES : 9 Exclamations 3 
Accompaniments 6 
Repetitions 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 17 Agrees/Rejects :11 
Thanks, Greets : 	 6 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FIRST AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 5: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 3;8 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 29 	 Labelling 	 : 8 
Assertions of Events :18 
Assertions Internal : 3 
RESPONSIVES 	 : - 	 One-Word Responses 	 : 
Extended Responses 	 : 




Verbal Reflective 	 : 3 
Clarification Request: 5 
Requests for Action :11 
Suggestions 
	 : 1 
Permission Requests : 4 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 3 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 13 	 Exclamations 	 : 1 
Accompaniments 	 : 8 
Repetitions 	 : 4 






TOTAL 	 : 91 
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INDIVIDUAL 
MOTHER 1: INTERACTING 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 
SECOND AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
WITH CHILD AGE : 4;7 
ASSERTIVES : 	 29 Labelling : 	 1 
Assertions of Events :11 
Assertions Internal :17 
RESPONSIVES : 	 4 One-Word Responses : 	 1 
Extended Responses : 	 3 
DIRECTIVES :69 Real Questions :28 
Test Questions : 	 6 
Verbal Reflective :11 
Clarification Request: 4 
Requests for Action : 8 
Suggestions 	 :10 
Permission Requests : 2 
COMMISSIVES  
EXPRESSIVES 	 4 	 Exclamations 	 : 1 
Accompaniments 	 : 2 
Repetitions 	 : 1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 22 
	
Agrees/Rejects 	 :20 






TOTAL 	 :130 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
MOTHER 2: INTERACTING 
SECOND AGE GROUP 
WITH CHILD AGE : 4;5 
ASSERTIVES : 	 18 Labelling 	 : 3 
Assertions of Events : 8 
Assertions Internal 
	 : 7 
RESPONSIVES : 	 - One-Word Responses 	 : 
Extended Responses 
	 : 
DIRECTIVES :31 Real Questions 
	
: 4 
Test Questions 	 : 9 
Verbal Reflective 	 : 6 
Clarification Request: 2 
Requests for Action 	 : 2 
Suggestions 	 : 6 
Permission Requests 
	 : 2 
COMMISSIVES 
EXPRESSIVES 5 Exclamations 	 : 2 
Accompaniments 	 : 2 
Repetitions 	 : 1 




UNCODABLE 	 : 5 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL 
	 : 70 
- "L 
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INDIVIDUAL 
MOTHER 3: INTERACTING 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 
SECOND AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
WITH CHILD AGE : 4;8 
ASSERTIVES : 	 64 Labelling :10 
Assertions of Events :20 
Assertions Internal :34 
RESPONSIVES : 	 21 One-Word Responses : 	 9 
Extended Responses :12 
DIRECTIVES :21 Real Questions : 	 4 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective 
Clarification Request: 4 
Requests for Action 
Suggestions 
:12 
Permission Requests : 1 
COMMISSIVES 
EXPRESSIVES : 6 Exclamations 5 
Accompaniments 1 
Repetitions 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 20 Agrees/Rejects : 20 
Thanks, Greets : - 
UNCODABLE : 8 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL 	 : 140 
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INDIVIDUAL 
MOTHER 4: INTERACTING 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 
SECOND AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
WITH CHILD AGE : 4;7 
ASSERTIVES : 	 31 Labelling : 	 4 
Assertions of Events :20 
Assertions Internal : 	 7 
RESPONSIVES 1 One-Word Responses : 	 1 
Extended Responses 
DIRECTIVES :57 Real Questions :20 
Test Questions : 	 9 
Verbal Reflective :10 
Clarification Request: 6 
Requests for Action : 8 
Suggestions 	 : 3 
Permission Requests : 1 
COMMISSIVES  
EXPRESSIVES 	 9 	 Exclamations 	 : 3 
Accompaniments 	 : 5 
Repetitions 	 : 1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 31 
UNCODABLE 	 : 1 
Agrees/Rejects 	 : 27 
Thanks, Greets 	 : 4 
PRIVATE 
   
    
TOTAL 	 : 130 
- 289 -  
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
SECOND AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 5: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 4;6 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 32 	 Labelling 	 : 6 
Assertions of Events :13 
Assertions Internal :16 
RESPONSIVES 	 : 6 	 One-Word Responses 	 : 2 
Extended Responses 	 : 4 
DIRECTIVES 	 : 54 	 Real Questions 	 :20 
Test Questions 	 : 2 
Verbal Reflective 	 :21 
Clarification Request: 4 
Requests for Action : 5 
Suggestions : 1 
Permission Requests : 1 
COMMISSIVES : 1 
EXPRESSIVES : 14 Exclamations : 3 
Accompaniments : 8 
Repetitions : 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 48 Agrees/Rejects : 37 
Thanks, Greets : 11 
UNCODABLE : 10 
PRIVATE : - 
TOTAL : 165 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
THIRD AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 1: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 5:7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 32 	 Labelling 	 : 5 
Assertions of Events :21 
Assertions Internal : 6 




DIRECTIVES 	 : 63 	 Real Questions 	 :35 
Test Questions 	 :11 
Verbal Reflective 	 : 5 
Clarification Request: 5 
Requests for Action : 5 
Suggestions 	 : 2 
Permission Requests 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 1 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 12 	 Exclamations 	 : 10 
Accompaniments 
Repetitions 	 : 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 14 Agrees/Rejects 
Thanks, Greets 
: 14 
   
UNCODABLE 	 : 3 
PRIVATE 	 : - 
TOTAL 
	 : 127 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
THIRD AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 2: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 5;8 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 25 	 Labelling 	 : 8 
Assertions of Events :12 
Assertions Internal : 5 
RESPONSIVES 	 : 6 	 One-Word Responses 	 : 5 
Extended Responses 	 : 1 
DIRECTIVES 	 : 27 	 Real Questions 	 :16 
Test Questions 	 : 1 
Verbal Reflective 
	 : 3 
Clarification Request: 2 
Requests for Action : 3 
Suggestions 	 : 2 
Permission Requests : 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 1 
EXPRESSIVES 	 9 	 Exclamations 	 : 1 
Accompaniments 	 8 
Repetitions 	 - 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 15 
	
Agrees/Rejects 	 : 15 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE 	 : 6 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL 	 : 65 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
THIRD AGE GROUP 
MOTHER 3: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 5;8 
ASSERTIVES : 38 Labelling : 	 4 
Assertions of Events :25 
Assertions Internal : 	 9 
RESPONSIVES 5 One-Word Responses : 	 4 
Extended Responses : 	 1 
DIRECTIVES : 38 Real Questions :20 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective : 
Clarification Request: 5 
Requests for Action : 2 
Suggestions 
	 : 4 
Permission Requests : 
COMMISSIVES  
EXPRESSIVES : 6 	 Exclamations 	 : - 
Accompaniments 	 : 5 
Repetitions 	 1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 10 Agrees/Rejects 	 9 
Thanks, Greets 	 1 
UNCODABLE 	 : 3 
PRIVATE 
    
     
TOTAL 	 : 100 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
THIRD AGE GROUP 
MOTHER 4: INTERACTING 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 65 
WITH CHILD AGE : 5;9 
Labelling 	 : 	 8 
Assertions of Events :45 
Assertions Internal 	 :12 
RESPONSIVES 	 : 4 One-Word Responses 	 : 2 
Extended Responses 	 : 2 
DIRECTIVES 	 : 15 Real Questions 	 : 9 
Test Questions  
Verbal Reflective 
Clarification Request: 3 
Requests for Action 
	 : 2 
Suggestions 	 : 1 
Permission Requests 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 2 
EXPRESSIVES 	 : 7 Exclamations 	 : 2 
Accompaniments 	 : 11 
Repetitions 	 : 4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 15 Agrees/Rejects 	 : 12 






TOTAL 	 : 112 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
THIRD AGE GROUP 
MOTHER 5: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 5;6 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 42 	 Labelling 	 : 6 
Assertions of Events :28 
Assertions Internal : 8 
RESPONSIVES 	 - 	 One-Word Responses 
Extended Responses 
DIRECTIVES 	 : 16 	 Real Questions 	 : 7 
Test Questions  
Verbal Reflective 	 : 3 
Clarification Request: 4 
Requests for Action : 1 
Suggestions 
 
Permission Requests : 1 
COMMISSIVES  
EXPRESSIVES : 16 	 Exclamations 	 : 5 
Accompaniments 	 : 8 
Repetitions 	 : 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 13 
	
Agrees/Rejects 	 : 13 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE 	 : 12 
PRIVATE 	 : - 
TOTAL 	 : 99 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 1: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 6:9 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 38 	 Labelling 	 : 2 
Assertions of Events :32 
Assertions Internal : 4 




DIRECTIVES 	 : 30 	 Real Questions 	 :22 
Test Questions 
 
Verbal Reflective 	 : 3 
Clarification Request: 2 
Requests for Action : 1 
Suggestions 
	 : 2 
Permission Requests 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 1 
EXPRESSIVES 	 7 	 Exclamations 




Agrees/Rejects 	 : 20 
Thanks, Greets 
UNCODABLE 	 : 6 
PRIVATE  
TOTAL 	 : 110 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP  
MOTHER 2: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 6;6 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 36 	 Labelling 	 : 9 
Assertions of Events :23 
Assertions Internal : 4 




DIRECTIVES 	 : 22 	 Real Questions 	 :16 
Test Questions 
Verbal Reflective 	 : 2 
Clarification Request: - 
Requests for Action : 4 
Suggestions 
Permission Requests : 
COMMISSIVES  
EXPRESSIVES 	 21 	 Exclamations 	 : 9 
Accompaniments 	 : 11 
Repetitions 	 : 1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 21 Agrees/Rejects 	 : 20 
Thanks, Greets 	 : 1 
UNCODABLE 	 : 4 
PRIVATE 
     
    
TOTAL 	 : 110 
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INDIVIDUAL 
MOTHER 3: INTERACTING 
RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP 
ANALYSIS 
WITH CHILD AGE : 6;7 
ASSERTIVES : 	 57 Labelling : 	 3 
Assertions of Events :22 
Assertions Internal :32 
RESPONSIVES : 	 14 One-Word Responses :6 
Extended Responses : 	 8 
DIRECTIVES : 	 45 Real Questions :13 
Test Questions : 	 2 
Verbal Reflective : 	 3 
Clarification Request: 5 
Requests for Action 
Suggestions 
:13 
: 	 8 
Permission Requests : 
COMMISSIVES 
EXPRESSIVES 1 Exclamations 1 
Accompaniments 
Repetitions 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 10 Agrees/Rejects : 8 
Thanks, Greets : 2 
UNCODABLE 
PRIVATE 
TOTAL : 137 
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS OF THE SPEECH-ACTS ANALYSIS 
FOURTH AGE GROUP 
MOTHER 4: INTERACTING WITH CHILD AGE : 6;7 
ASSERTIVES 	 : 30 	 Labelling  
Assertions of Events :13 
Assertions Internal :17 
RESPONSIVES 
	 : 10 	 One-Word Responses 	 : 4 
Extended Responses 	 : 6 
DIRECTIVES 	 : 31 	 Real Questions 





Clarification Request: 7 
Requests for Action : 2 
Suggestions 	 : 2 
Permission Requests : 1 
COMMISSIVES 	 : 2 
EXPRESSIVES : 11 	 Exclamations 	 : 1 
Accompaniments 	 : 10 
Repetitions 	 : - 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 19 	 Agrees/Rejects 
	 : 19 




	 : 103 
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CHILDREN'S INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS 
STANDARDIZED 	 PRAGMATIC HINTS TOTAL 






- 	 - 	 - 	 - 
- 	 - 	 - 	 - 
- 	 - 	 - 	 - 
- 	 - 	 - 	 - 










S1 1 	 1 1 2 
A2 S2 2 2 
S3 1 1 2 
S4 
S5 
S1 - 2 2 
A3 S2 - 1 1 
S3 1 	 1 1 3 
S4 1 2 3 
S5 1 - 1 
S1 1 	 2 	 - 	 2 6 11 
A4 S2 3 	 - 	 3 6 12 
S3 1 	 - 	 2 5 8 
S4 1 	 1 	 - 	 1 4 7 
(*) Note: Al, A2, A3, A4 = The four age groups. 
Si, S2, S3, S4, S5 = The five subjects in each age group. 
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MOTHER'S INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS  
STANDARDIZED PRAGMATIC HINTS TOTAL 
Wh-Imperat. Imposit. Qeclarat. 
S1 2 3 2 7 
Al S2 2 1 1 4 
S3 1 1 2 
S4 2 2 4 
S5 - 2 2 
S1 2 4 2 1 9 
A2 S2 3 3 1 7 
S3 1 2 3 2 8 
S4 - 1 - 1 
S5 2 1 - 3 
S1 1 3 	 - 1 2 7 
A3 S2 - 2 	 - 3 3 8 
S3 2 1 	 - 4 2 9 
S4 - 1 	 - 1 3 5 
S5 - 2 	 - - - 2 
S1 2 6 	 - 2 5 15 
A4 S2 1 3 	 - 3 7 14 
S3 1 1 	 - 2 4 8 
S4 2 1 	 - 2 5 10 
(*) A1.A2.A3,A4 = The four Age Groups. 
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Appendix 4 
1. Children's Positive Social Acts. 
2. Children's Negative Social ACts. 
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CHILDREN'S POSITIVE SOCIAL ACTS 
INITIATIONS RESPONSIVENESS SHARED ACTIVITY TOTAL 
S1 
Al 
31 25 70 126 
S2 25 32 45 102 
S3 23 15 62 100 
S4 25 18 66 109 
S5 44 46 85 175 
S1 
A2 
57 39 49 145 
S2 58 38 52 148 
S3 43 40 47 130 
S4 49 25 51 125 
S5 77 47 40 164 
S1 
A3 
56 14 120 190 
S2 52 13 110 175 
S3 48 18 132 198 
S4 58 19 111 188 
S5 58 25 103 186 
S1 
A4 
81 25 140 246 
S2 70 31 128 229 
S3 83 18 116 217 
S4 50 23 149 222 
(*) NOTE : A1=3.6-4.0, A2=4.6-5.0, A3=5.6-6.0, A4=6.6-7.0 
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CHILDREN'S NEGATIVE SOCIAL ACTS  







12 21 18 51 
S2 13 22 15 50 
S3 9 18 19 46 
S4 10 15 12 37 
S5 13 25 23 61 
S1 
A2 
6 8 16 30 
S2 5 5 21 31 
S3 10 3 13 26 
S4 11 9 24 44 
S5 14 11 11 36 
S1 
A3 
3 5 4 12 
S2 1 2 6 9 
S3 4 7 11 
S4 4 3 2 9 
S5 6 6 9 21 
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